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ABSTRACT
The problem of understanding how terrorists are psychologically enabled to undertake 
violence against other human beings is one that has not been adequately examined in past 
research on terrorism. Indeed, while much has been researched on discovering 
motivations for such acts, an examination and analysis of the loss of inhibitions as a 
significant factor in the overall process of becoming a terrorist has been somewhat 
overlooked. This thesis is an attempt to remedy this shortcoming in the literature, and 
therefore represents an inquiry into how the process of disinhibition relates to the overall 
process of terrorism. By examining a number of different factors theoretically and 
applying them to two contemporary cases of terrorism, this thesis aims to show that there 
are numerous disinhibitors in relation to acts of terrorism, and that, in some situations, 
these disinhibitors can relatively easily come into play.
1CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
Introduction:
In early May of 2004, an Israeli woman and her four young daughters were suddenly 
attacked, shot and killed by two Palestinian militants while travelling in their car near 
the Gaza Strip (www.haaretz.com, May 2, 2004). The woman was eight months 
pregnant at the time and her daughters were aged eleven, nine, seven and two 
(Reuters UK, May 2, 2004). After reading or hearing about such a tragic, terrifying 
and seemingly incomprehensible act as this one, one immediate question comes to 
mind – how, psychologically, is a person able to attack and kill other human beings, 
be they men, women, old or young? This question needs to be seriously examined if 
the phenomenon of terrorism is to be sufficiently explained, understood, and 
appropriately countered. 
This thesis aims to explain what psychological mechanisms allow a person to feel 
justified in undertaking violent acts against other people. In other words, it looks at
what mechanisms enable people to remove or lower their inhibitions in order to act 
violently; and as such, a political psychology approach to analyse this problem will 
be the most appropriate and helpful. The structure of this thesis will take the form of 
2theory-based chapters, where included in each is an application of the particular 
theories to two illustrative cases of terrorism. An in-depth thesis outline explaining 
this further is articulated in the last section of this chapter. The findings of the thesis 
will be able to add a significant amount to the existing knowledge in the field of the 
psychology of terrorism because of the different perspective that a comprehensive 
understanding of disinhibition can offer. This is in turn due to the fact that the thesis 
focuses on investigating the role that inhibitions against violence play rather than 
analysing motivations for terrorism, which much of the literature tends to do 
currently.
The terrorism case mentioned at the beginning of this chapter points to two of the 
most frightening and confusing aspects of terrorism which are of relevance to this 
thesis: its indiscriminate as well as unpredictable nature. Seemingly, anyone can be 
targeted, and at any time. In reference to one of the two cases that are to be used as 
illustrations in this thesis, the IRA exemplify this in their infamous bombing 
campaign against Britain in 1939, when they were able to detonate a bomb in the 
middle of a busy street in Coventry that killed five people and injured approximately 
fifty others (Coogan, 1995, p.127). These factors, amongst others, raise many 
psychological questions about the terrorists themselves and terrorism as a 
phenomenon; for example, how do terrorists justify their violent actions? Are people 
who undertake these acts really ‘deranged’, mentally ill, or simply ‘evil’? This 
question has often been asked of suicide bombers; however, studies have shown that 
these kind of bombers as well as terrorists in general, despite being understood by 
some as “crazed cowards” (Atran, 2003a), display no abnormal psychology, and are 
not “crazed, cowardly, apathetic or asocial” (Atran, 2003b). In light of such evidence, 
this thesis considers its arguments largely from a situational standpoint on terrorism 
rather than from a purely personality-oriented approach.
Conceptual Clarifications: Defining Terrorism and Disinhibition
What an act of terrorism is and therefore how it is to be defined is a central issue that 
has created much debate over at least the past two decades (Laqueur, 1987); indeed, 
the cliché “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” has been one of the 
most hotly contested phrases in the study of terrorism (Laqueur, 1987, p.7; Ganor, 
31998, Marsella, 2004). Due to the concept of terrorism having become so subjective, 
a definition of it is extremely difficult to create and defend. Because of this, many 
definitions are either too vague, or far too subjective, to mean anything. An example 
of this definitional problem can be seen in the United States Department of State’s 
characterization of terrorism, which defines the phenomenon as “politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents” (www.fpc.state.gov/, 2001). Although admitted as too broad by 
the State Department itself, this definition runs into many other problems; for 
instance, the use of the word “non-combatant”. Through the use of this term, attacks 
upon such targets as military personnel, and the USS Cole bombing in 2000, may not 
be strictly defined as terrorism due to the fact that these targets are essentially classed 
as combatant (Ganor, 1998; www.fpc.state.gov/, 2001).
One other reason that terrorism is so hard to define is because it gives rise to so many 
questions; for example, can terrorism ever be a legitimate method of achieving an 
end? Linked to this, what differentiates terrorism from ‘revolutionary violence’ or a 
‘struggle for national liberation’, or even guerrilla warfare? Terrorism needs to be 
defined because of such questions, as well as many others. Indeed, as Ganor (1998) 
points out, “without a definition of terrorism, it is impossible to formulate or enforce 
international agreements against terrorism”. Furthermore, if there is no agreement on 
what terrorism is, “no responsibility can be imposed” on countries that support 
terrorist groups, “nor can steps be taken to combat terrorist organizations” (Ganor, 
1998). 
Adding to the difficulties of defining terrorism is recent research that has focussed on 
defining different types of terrorism as opposed to looking at terrorism in general. For 
example, Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin (2000) argue that during the mid to late 
1990s a “new terrorism” surfaced. This new terrorism is principally religious in 
nature, has an “increasing lethality” in attacks, and is characterized by the “increasing 
technological and operational competence of terrorists” (Simon and Benjamin, 2000, 
p.66). The authors argue that this new terrorism can be distinguished from terrorism 
of previous years due to these factors, and that it requires a different response in order 
to counter it. Matthew Morgan (2004), too, analyses terrorism in this way, arguing 
that terrorism is now characterized by religious motivations, with less of a 
4concentration on political aims, and with more of a focus on “millennial visions of 
apocalypse and mass casualties” (p.29). The new kind of terrorism these scholars 
examine makes it difficult to define terrorism because of its resulting emphasis on 
examining terrorism in different stages or eras than as one phenomenon.
Despite research that argues for classifications and a variety of definitions for 
different types of terrorism, this thesis will nonetheless provide a general definition 
for terrorism that can be applied to both of the illustrative cases to be used. The 
definition that is to be used for the purposes of this thesis has been informed by the 
ideas and arguments of Paul Wilkinson (1974) and Boaz Ganor (1998).
 Wilkinson emphasizes that terrorism is different from simple political violence due 
to such characteristics as the indiscriminate nature of the attack, the methods 
employed, and its apparent indifference to morality (1974, p.16). For example, he
argues that, although terrorists “generally have a specific human ‘target’, whether 
individual or collective”, the attack by nature is indiscriminate because it does not 
distinguish between people of different gender, age, or status in society (p.13-14). 
This is apparently because no person has “inviolable rights” in the perpetrator’s 
rationale because terrorism “necessarily involves disregarding the rules and 
conventions of war” (ibid, p.14). Wilkinson also argues that terrorism is clearly 
distinct from other forms of political violence because of its “extreme and ruthlessly 
destructive methods” (p.15). These methods can and often do include genocide, 
physical beating, massacre, torture or harassment. Aside from its methods and 
indiscriminate nature, Wilkinson claims that what fundamentally distinguishes 
terrorism from other violent acts is its “features of amorality and antinomianism” 
(p.16). By this, Wilkinson asserts that terrorists either “profess indifference to 
existing moral codes or else claim exemption from all such obligations” (p.16-17). 
While in many cases those belonging to terrorist groups may not “claim exemption” 
from moral codes, much of the time they do “profess indifference” to them in favour 
of their own version of morality, as shown in later parts of this thesis.
Ganor (1998) focuses his definition of terrorism on three key aspects: the objective of 
the act, the nature of the targets, and the “essence” of the act. Terrorism, for Ganor, is 
thus about political aspirations, which are achieved through the targeting of civilians, 
5and are acts that are always undertaken by violent means. His definition, therefore, 
encompasses these three aspects - “terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use, 
violence against civilians or civilian targets, in order to attain political aims” (Ganor, 
1998).
This thesis is concerned with terrorism specifically of a non-state nature, and as such 
its definition of terrorism is as follows: terrorism is the premeditated and deliberate 
use of violence against a civilian or a civilian population, with the intent of either 
killing or inflicting severe physical and psychological harm. An act of terrorism can 
be perpetrated by a person acting independently or on behalf of a group, and is 
undertaken in order to achieve some political goal or aspiration. 
While somewhat broad, this definition is significant in that it reflects the nature of the 
current understanding of the phenomenon by the international community, as stated 
by a United Nations 2004 report on terrorism. This report stressed that any workable 
definition of what terrorism is needs to incorporate the fact that an act of terror is one 
that is undertaken to deliberately harm civilians and is political in its aims and 
objectives (www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf, 2004).
Terrorism will be characterized in the above way because the definition encompasses 
the intentional aspect of terrorism, that is, the deliberate aim to harm, as well as the 
political nature of its goals and objectives, and the nature of the intended targets; 
these being civilian rather than military. Terrorism thus defined can be differentiated 
from guerrilla warfare, the other form of political violence with which it is most often 
confused. Guerrilla fighters “may have the exact same aims [as terrorists], but they 
choose different means to accomplish them” (Ganor, 1998). Simply put, guerrilla 
warfare is perpetrated against military targets and not civilian, as opposed to 
terrorism. The definition articulated therefore gives a clear and solid way to examine 
the two illustrative cases that are to be used in this thesis, the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) and Palestinian suicide bombers. 
Disinhibition is a psychological concept used to explain the process whereby a 
person’s inhibitions against acting or behaving in a certain way can become 
6significantly lowered. As such, it can be defined generally as a process that weakens 
and releases inhibitions so that a person acts in a way that they normally would not 
(Boakes and Halliday, 1972). 
While a fine line exists between what constitutes a motivation and what constitutes a 
disinhibitor, the two concepts are able to be clearly differentiated in most cases. 
Essentially, a motivation provides the push to act, whereas a disinhibitor instead 
enables or frees the person, psychologically, to see out their motivation. For example, 
a person may be motivated to physically harm another person; however he or she
does not actually harm them because they are constrained by, for instance, a sense of 
empathy for their victims or a fear of the consequences for their potential actions. In a 
differing situation, where the same person does not harbour any fears about the 
consequences of harming his or her victim or have any empathy for them, this may 
allow them to actually inflict harm upon their victim(s), as their inner constraints have 
been weakened or released. In such a situation, the person may or may not be aware 
of these inner constraints, yet they nonetheless have just as important an effect 
psychologically as a motivation to act.
Methodology: 
As this work deals with a large number of theoretical concepts and ideas with the aim 
of working toward a thorough understanding of the problem of terrorism, using a 
qualitative methodology seems the most appropriate way to approach this, especially 
given the time and resource constraints that are certain to affect the research. With 
this is mind, the historical/comparative analysis method has been chosen as the 
primary means of data collection and analysis. This is mainly because the thesis 
centres on sourcing and applying relevant social psychological theories of 
disinhibition to both the theory and practice of terrorism, and such a methodology is a 
more practical way to help add to the already existing knowledge within this 
particular field of research, as it focuses on analysing historical patterns and processes 
over a period of time using theory and records of history. 
7While a combination of several qualitative methods, including interviews and 
surveys, would perhaps be more ideal in researching the topic, a 
historical/comparative analytical method is better suited to this thesis given the 
difficulty in being able to undertake interviewing and surveys on this research topic 
as well as the time limitations attached to undertaking a Master’s thesis.
The two illustrative cases of terrorism that are used in this thesis to demonstrate 
theoretical concepts were chosen out of a range of others for various reasons. Though 
similar in the way that both of these cases originated from nationalist aspirations, they 
will be useful to this thesis because of their differences, as they are very far apart 
geographically and in their methods and activities. The IRA, for example, have tried 
to achieve their goals through such tactics as targeted assassinations and bombings of 
civilian areas in Ireland and Britain (Coogan, 1995; O’Doherty, 1998), whereas 
Palestinian suicide bombers, while using similar tactics, have willingly killed 
themselves in their attempts to kill others, an aspect that sets them well apart from the 
IRA and many other terrorist organizations. Indeed, between 1993 and April 2003, 
approximately 250 Palestinians have either attempted or perpetrated suicide attacks 
against Israelis (Kimhi and Even, 2004). The IRA, while going through a major split 
in 1969 (Bell, 1970), has remained the major militant group in the Irish conflict; this 
differs to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where suicide bombers come from a number 
of differing groups, predominantly Palestine Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigade (Hoffman, 2003). In addition to these factors, while these cases owe 
their allegiance to different religions, they maintain political ideologies that are at 
times often strikingly similar, especially on the topics of nationhood and foreign 
‘occupiers’ of their land.
The type of methodology that is used in this thesis is of course not without its 
drawbacks. For example, as a result of not undertaking primary research, such as 
conducting interviews, in the thesis, the research may ultimately be unable to add 
much to the existing knowledge on the subject. As such, without interviewing 
subjects to back up the theoretical material, the information on the illustrative cases 
thus also becomes limited to what is already in existence. However, this type of 
methodology is the most practical way to approach this topic because much of the 
research lies with an examination into past and present theoretical ideas about the 
8psychology of terrorism, and its relationship to actual terrorists and terrorist groups. 
In sum, despite the criticisms discussed above, a historical/comparative methodology 
is the most suitable approach for this thesis as it captures the essence of what the 
research is about – a theoretical analysis of a major past, present and future world 
problem. 
Rationale:
Turning now to the reasons for this study, the research question that this thesis is 
essentially centred around is: what mechanisms exist that allow a person to 
knowingly inflict violence upon another person? In addition to this important 
question, it also then becomes pertinent to ask to what extent is disinhibition an 
important factor in the psychology of terrorism as field of research? This thesis 
therefore has its grounding in investigating both of these questions, with emphasis on 
the first.
Disinhibition is a concept that has classically been used to research into and unearth 
factors behind mass violence. However, its application to terrorism has the potential 
to be just as important. Understanding how, psychologically, someone is able to 
perpetrate terrorist acts is as significant as understanding what pushes or motivates 
them to do so. Understanding the role of disinhibition in terrorism may also prove to 
be a key to more effective counter-terror initiatives because of the deeper 
psychological understandings it can offer. For example, an awareness of the role that 
dehumanization plays in releasing inhibitions to kill can potentially help to curb such 
processes. Also, understanding the effects of disinhibition can, for example, shed 
light on how terrorist organizations and groups are able to indoctrinate their members.
Because of the lack of literature available, and since most of the existing literature 
concentrates on violent acts other than terrorism, this thesis will be able to add a 
significant amount to the knowledge available on the psychology of terrorism because 
of the different viewpoint it offers, as mentioned previously. Because disinhibition 
9points to the origins of violent behaviour; that is, it examines what psychological 
mechanisms permit a person to feel justified in harming someone else, it is able to 
provide a greater understanding of how and why terrorist acts are perpetrated. 
As this thesis is essentially theoretical in nature, the use of illustrative cases to apply 
the theories covered will add validity to the thesis and its conclusions. As discussed in 
the above section, the IRA and Palestinian suicide bombers have been chosen to fill 
this role. These two cases have been chosen instead of other terrorist groups and 
organizations not only because of their contemporary and historical relevance, but 
also because of their contrasting cultures, methods, and geographical distance. In 
addition, it seemed pertinent to choose cases that have a significant amount of 
information available about them, and in this case there was plenty of readily 
available information on the IRA and Palestinian suicide terrorists in comparison to 
many other terror groups and organizations.
Literature Review of the Psychology of Terrorism: 
One problem that has been the driving force behind much of the literature on the 
psychology of terrorism is discovering the degree to which psychology is a necessary 
aspect to understanding terrorism as a phenomenon (Reich, 1990). The available 
literature on the psychology of terrorism has mainly focused on motivations for 
terrorism with a lesser extent of analysis on the release of inhibitions (see, for 
example, Moghaddam and Marsella, 2004; Kressel, 1996; Reich, 1990; Laqueur, 
1987). Interestingly, Marsella (2004) notes that psychologists did not take much of an 
interest in the psychology of terrorism up until September 11, 2001, after which 
research and literature on the topic began to grow significantly, and currently holds a 
very important place in the study of terrorism as a whole.
When examining motivations, most scholars concentrate on such factors as the 
perception of injustice or oppression, as well as the repercussions of feelings of 
hatred, revenge and retaliation. For instance, Kressel (1996) posits that “only when 
people view their situations as unacceptable and as the result of injustice will anger 
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prevail” (p.248). Kressel puts forth a list of twelve possible motivations for why 
people participate in terrorism, but stresses that this list is not exhaustive (p.259). 
Amongst this list are such motivations as being “committed to an ideology of hate”; 
wanting “revenge for real or imagined offenses”; or something as simple as having a 
“lack [of] awareness of the consequences of their actions” (p.259). Indeed, revenge 
has been classed as an important motivator of terrorist acts because of the fact that 
many “friends, fellow cadres from the would-be attacker’s organization, or relatives” 
have been killed by who potential terrorists would consider their enemy (Tal, 2002). 
An illustration of wanting revenge for real or imagined offenses can be seen through 
Sean MacStiofain, a former active and significant member of the IRA. When asked 
about why the IRA decided to take attacks out on English soil, MacStiofain replied, 
“to make sure that the establishment would see that they must pay dearly for the north 
of Ireland… [their] policies and the prison” (“The IRA and Sinn Fein”, 2004). 
Other research has argued that religion is a “primary incentive” for undertaking 
terrorist acts because of the way in which some religious groups are able to 
manipulate notions such as jihad (Tal, 2002; Esposito, 2002). Indeed, religion can act 
as a motivator for violent acts in that defence of ‘religious truth’ may not only be seen 
as justifying violence but that it may also see violence as a duty – “to some believers, 
this undoubtedly entails killing as many enemies as possible [in order] to establish the 
superior justice of the right cause” (Larsson, 2004, p.112). 
Despair and frustration, too, have been argued to act as important motivators. Citing 
such factors as “severe economic decline, closures, curfews, and roadblocks”, Tal 
(2002) argues that indoctrination of potential perpetrators of attacks is in many cases
unnecessary because despair and frustration exist to such a high degree in some 
societies that not much else is needed to motivate people to join terrorist 
organizations. In illustration of this, Eyad El Sarraj, a Palestinian psychiatrist, argues 
that despair and “hopelessness” are potentially two of the biggest motivators for 
Palestinian suicide terrorism, maintaining that “desperation is a very powerful 
force… it propels people to actions or solutions that previously would have been 
unthinkable” (“Suicide Bombers”, 2002). 
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One approach that has been used in the literature is the argument that motivation for 
terrorist acts stems from a paranoid worldview: “many drawn to the path of terrorism 
have a paranoid disposition and find the externalising rhetoric attractive” (Robins and 
Post, 1997, p.103). The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ attitude is prevalent in this situation, where 
terrorists fight for what they assert is a “righteous cause against ‘them’, the corrupt 
establishment” (ibid, p.102). From a paranoid mindset, those undertaking acts of 
terror believe they are oppressed and that their would-be victims are the oppressors 
(ibid, p.102). This mindset can then lead to the potential terrorist psychologically 
separating themselves from an “empathic connection” with their “enemy” (ibid, 
p.104). Following from this, “with this psycho-logic, it becomes morally permissible, 
indeed morally imperative, to destroy those seen as representing the establishment, 
for they are the source of society’s (and the terrorist’s) problems” (ibid, p.104).
The frustration-aggression hypothesis (see Berkowitz, 1962) as an approach to 
understanding terrorist motivation has also been considered as important in the 
literature on the psychology of terrorism; however, its validity has been questioned by 
some (Laqueur, 1987, p.158-9). The frustration-aggression hypothesis essentially 
argues that frustration “produces an emotional state – anger – which heightens the 
probability of the occurrence of aggression” (Laqueur, 1987, p.158). This hypothesis, 
although a “relatively simple model and… in accordance with common sense”, has 
been criticised because of research that has indicated that “frustration did not 
invariably lead to aggression, which could occur without frustration, [and] that threat 
and insult could evoke more aggression than frustration” (Laqueur, p.159). 
Frustration-aggression theory has also been criticised on the grounds that it lacks any 
inclusion about the social psychology of hatred in its analysis (Wilkinson, 1974, 
p.127). 
Apart from the general motivations of terrorism examined here, such as feelings of 
oppression and frustration, literature on the psychology of terrorism has also 
examined the release of inhibitions as an enabler of terrorism, but not to a great extent 
(see, for example, Beck, 2002, Bandura, 2004). 
As previously stated, disinhibition is characterized in this thesis as the release of an 
inhibition, and will be described as a process that psychologically enables someone to 
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do something that they are normally inhibited from doing (Boakes and Halliday, 
1972). For instance, if a person believes he or she will have no part, or at most a very 
insignificant part, in the harming or death of someone else, this may release their 
inhibitions for undertaking a violent act against them, as their perceived level of 
responsibility is low or non-existent (Bandura, 1990). 
The literature on disinhibition seems to concentrate mainly on culture and the effect 
of belonging to a group (Crenshaw, 1988; Post, 1987; Bandura, 1990). Amongst 
others, belonging to a group allows a person to diffuse or displace responsibility for 
perpetrating a terrorist act (Bandura, 1990; 2004). Post, Sprinzak and Denny’s (2003) 
work seems to add confirmation of the importance of group dynamics in perpetrating 
terrorist acts. For example, their analysis of their interviews with imprisoned Middle 
Eastern terrorists showed that, amongst other findings, the “fusion with the group 
seems to provide the necessary justification for their actions with an attendant loss of 
felt responsibility for the individual member – if the group says it is required and it is 
justified, then it is required and is justified. If an authority figure orders an action, 
then the action is justified”. Belonging to a group has also been found to provide a 
sense of anonymity for a would-be terrorist (Diener, 1977).  
In examining culture, many scholars, especially recently, have tended to examine the 
effect of religion (Esposito, 2002; Rapoport, 1987), and how undertaking an act “in 
the name of God” is able to act as a disinhibitor to violence (Robins and Post, 1997; 
Beck, 2002). There are many examples of this to be found amongst Palestinian 
suicide bombers. For instance, Gaza’s second suicide bomber said in his farewell 
tape, in response to his friend’s attack earlier that year, “when I heard the news of 
your martyrdom, God was telling me at that moment what to do… I am getting ready, 
Ali. I am preparing to meet you in heaven” (Andoni, 1997).  Other scholars have 
analysed the extent to which cultural ideologies and socialization into a culture are 
able to release inhibitions. For example, Zimbardo (1999) argues that socialization is 
key in the creation of a state or nation’s enemy, especially if the socialization process 
is begun early in an individual’s life.
Aside from culture and the effect of the group upon an individual, a large amount of 
the existing literature analyses dehumanization; that is, how a person can come to 
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view another person or group of people as subhuman or nonhuman. Dehumanization 
can be achieved through such means as depicting the enemy as an aggressor, as a 
“beast, reptile, insect, [or] germ”, or even a “barbarian” (Keen, 1986). Through 
dehumanization, there is high potential for a person to “kill without guilt” or 
“slaughter without shame” (Keen, 1986). To give one example, members of the IRA 
have at times referred to the British as, for instance, “the aggressor in 
Ireland…morally and inescapably responsible for all loss of life and bloodshed in this 
Irish conflict” (MacStiofain, 1975, p.vii-viii) and have often depicted their enemy in 
cartoons as aggressive and bloodthirsty (Keen, 1986). Recent research has shown that 
dehumanization has a higher chance of taking place if “the target group can be readily 
identified as a separate category of people belonging to a distinct racial, ethnic, 
religious or political group that the perpetrators regard as inferior or threatening” 
(Waller, 2002, p.245). Dehumanization has been theorized to be very important when 
trying to understand how a person is psychologically capable of killing others for a 
number of reasons. For example, Waller (2002) argues that dehumanization “ensures 
a degree of psychological distance” that is necessary between a potential perpetrator 
and victim, and it also is able to justify and rationalize “extraordinary evil” (p.248-
249). Dehumanization is able to justify extreme violence because it emphasizes that 
the potential victims are such a great threat to the potential perpetrators, and in some 
cases even deserve to be destroyed, and at any cost (Waller, 2002).
A more extensive literature review on the disinhibition literature and its relation to 
terrorism is examined and discussed in the next chapter. 
Backgrounds of Illustrative Cases:
The Irish Republican Army (IRA)
The IRA was formed from a collection of Irish political and military groups during 
the Anglo-Irish conflict of 1919 (Smith, 1995, p.xiv). During the early years of the 
IRA, the organization undertook mostly guerrilla-type operations that included such 
targets as soldiers, police and police barracks (Coogan, 1995, p.26). This early 
campaign took the lives of an estimated 600 people. Before the IRA’s internal split in 
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1969, the organization was well known for such attacks as the bombing of Britain 
campaign in 1939 (Bell, 1970). This bombing campaign in Britain tragically resulted 
in a significant amount of civilian loss of life and injury. In London, targets such as 
train stations and power stations were attacked; and in Liverpool, a jail was the target 
of a bombing (Bell, 1970, p.188-189). The most shocking of these attacks occurred in 
August of 1939, in Coventry. In this incident, a bomb was intentionally left on a 
bicycle outside a shop in a busy street, and was responsible for killing five people –
including an elderly man and a teenage boy – and injuring around fifty others 
(Coogan, 1995, p.127).
As well as attacks on buildings in civilian areas, military targets, and groups of 
civilians, the IRA is well known for assassinations on particular people; for example, 
that of Sir Henry Wilson in June of 1922. Wilson was a key advisor militarily to the 
government in Northern Ireland, and had long been disliked by the IRA (Coogan, 
1995, p.127).
Despite these attacks and assassinations, it was not until the internal split in the 
organization in 1969 that the IRA began more frequent and terrifying violent attacks 
against civilians. The IRA’s internal split was in response to disagreement over 
whether to recognize the existence of the two Irish governments and that of 
Westminster (Bell, 1970, p.430). The organization broke into two factions following 
this heated issue, these being the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA (commonly 
known as the ‘Provos’ or PIRA). The Provisional IRA decided that the IRA’s goal 
should still be a free and united Ireland without British interference in the Northern 
counties, and were therefore against recognition of two Irish governments. Implicit in 
the Provisionals’ existence was the belief that a militarily active Army was needed for 
the “eventual achievement of the full political, social, economic and cultural freedom 
of Ireland”, whereas the Official IRA focussed more on what they termed a “political 
policy” for achieving their aims for Ireland through a socialist/Marxist philosophy 
(Bell, 1970, p.430-1). The Provisional IRA has, over time, become known as merely 
the IRA, while the Official IRA has faded into the background of Irish politics.
Since the formation of the Provisional IRA, the group have conducted terrorist 
operations in Ireland and England, taking approximately 1800 lives in the process, 
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nearly a third of these being civilian (Lavery, 2002). One of the most tragic attacks to 
take place occurred in 1972 in the middle of Belfast. Twenty-two bombs were 
detonated in what was later called “Bloody Friday”. This resulted in the deaths of 
nine people and injured a hundred and thirty (Lavery, 2002).
In the past ten years, however, the IRA has agreed to two ceasefires, the first one put 
in place in 1994. Unfortunately, this ceasefire only lasted until February of 1996, 
when the IRA and Northern Irish loyalists resumed their campaigns against each 
other (O’Doherty, 1998, p.89). In 1997, another ceasefire was called for and is still in 
place, with various peace agreements made and talks continuing on the IRA’s 
disarmament. Since this ceasefire, the IRA has even published a public apology –
despite it being criticised by some as “half-hearted” – to the “families of non-
combatants” that it has killed during the past thirty years of violence (Lavery, 2002). 
Despite this, an unaffiliated splinter group calling themselves the Real IRA have kept 
up a campaign of violence, one notable attack of theirs being the Omagh bombing of 
1998 in which twenty-nine people were killed (Burns, 1999). 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers
The use of suicide bombing by Palestinians is a reasonably recent phenomenon, only 
beginning to occur in the early to mid 1990s (see Kimhi and Even, 2004; Esposito, 
2002). The main three groups that perpetrate this kind of attack are Hamas, Palestine 
Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (a militant wing of the Fatah 
organization). Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas were established in Palestinian 
areas in the late 1980’s, Hamas being an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
originated in Egypt (Esposito, 2002, p.94-95).
Hamas claims that the major turning point in its strategy towards Israel occurred very 
early in 1994. In February of that year, an Israeli extremist – Dr Baruch Goldstein –
entered a mosque in Hebron and shot dead almost thirty Muslim worshippers 
(Milton-Edwards, 1996, p.166). Hamas instituted its first suicide attack, followed 
closely by an attack by Palestine Islamic Jihad, in April of 1994 (Milton-Edwards, 
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1996, p.166-7). This attack by Hamas killed seven Israelis, and was asserted as 
revenge for Goldstein’s attack (Esposito, 2002, p.98-99). 
A relatively perplexing aspect of suicide bombing, and one which has surprised 
many, is its recent incorporation of women as suicide attackers, a change from earlier 
strategy where men were the only ones allowed to undertake such an act (Victor, 
2003, p.70). Wafa Idris, a Palestinian woman from the Al-Amari refugee camp near 
Ramallah, became the first woman suicide bomber on January 27, 2002, when she 
blew herself up in Jerusalem, killing one person and injuring 131 (Victor, 2003, 
p.20).  In 2003, three other women also followed Wafa’s lead and died as suicide 
bombers (Victor, 2003, p.54). The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade has even opened special 
“squads” in the name of Wafa Idris specifically for women who want to become 
suicide bombers (Luft, 2002). Indeed, groups with a more secular orientation, such as 
the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, have been the ones able to attract women to become 
suicide bombers because of the religious restrictions that Islamist groups place on the 
participation of women in times of war or conflict (Schweitzer, 2000).
Between 1994 and 2002, well over one hundred Palestinians have become suicide 
bombers, and between January and April of 2002 alone, nine suicide attacks were 
perpetrated, killing thirty-three people and injuring 464 (Hoffman, 2003). Throughout 
the time of its use in Israeli and Palestinian areas, members of Palestinian extremist 
groups have attempted over 250 suicide attacks, a high proportion of these being 
undertaken by Hamas (Kimhi and Even, 2004). Although a ceasefire – albeit an
extremely fragile one – was put in place in 2005 between the Palestinians and Israel, 
tensions still remain very high between the two communities, with bursts of violence 
still occasionally breaking out between them.
Thesis Outline:
While the current chapter provides a broad overview of the problem of terrorism and 
its relation to this thesis, the next chapter focuses on the concept of disinhibition as an 
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aspect of the psychology of terrorism. It begins with an examination of previous and 
current literature on this subject, and looks in depth at the effects of dehumanization, 
cultural sanctioning of violence, religion, and the influence of the terrorist group upon 
an individual. Following from this review, the chapter also lays out a discussion of 
how disinhibition is related to the study of terrorism, and emphasizes Bandura’s 
(1990) model of self-regulating influences and terrorist behaviour. Lastly, the chapter 
presents an analysis of how the process of disinhibition can be controlled by self-
regulation; in other words, it discusses the ways in which inhibitions against violence 
may be put in place or maintained.
The third chapter of the thesis concentrates on how inhibitions against killing are 
released through the process of dehumanization, and looks also at how feelings of 
hate can also fuel a process of disinhibition. It begins, however, with an examination 
of how one of the main inhibitors of violence, empathy, is able to be easily overcome. 
For instance, it considers how attributing blame to one’s enemies can remove feelings 
of empathy and compassion toward intended victims of terrorism, thus making it that 
much easier to commit acts of violence against them. Throughout this chapter, 
examples from the two illustrative case studies will supply real-world evidence of the 
theoretical material. 
The next chapter provides a discussion of and investigation into the effect that 
belonging to a culture has on an individual. Because cultural sanctioning plays such a 
large role in releasing inhibitions in general, this chapter looks at this issue through an 
analysis of the effects that socialization, education, cultural myths and cultural 
ideologies have on encouraging aggressive and violent behaviour. It builds on the 
previous chapter in the way that it points out how cultures can facilitate such 
processes as dehumanization of other groups, either through promoting certain 
ideologies or through socialization. The illustrative cases are of much significance in 
this chapter because they clearly demonstrate how cultural sanctioning can help to 
release inhibitions against terrorism.
Following from this, the fifth chapter devotes itself to understanding the role that 
religion plays in disinhibiting terrorism. While this is related to culture in many cases, 
religion will be considered as a separate chapter because of its significance to 
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terrorism, especially over the past few decades. In addition, religion also warrants a 
separate chapter because of its ability on its own, irrespective of culture in many 
instances, to affect inhibitions against violence. As well as an examination of the 
psychology of religion in relation to the release of inhibitions, and the role it plays in 
the two illustrative cases, the chapter begins with a description of the prevalence of 
religion in terrorism and a discussion of the nature of the relationship between culture 
and religion.
The sixth chapter brings many of the aspects of the third, fourth, and fifth chapters 
together as it centres on an analysis of group dynamics, deindividuation, and 
obedience to authority. It therefore discusses group cohesion, collective decision-
making and uniformity of ideas, as well as diffusion and displacement of 
responsibility and the dynamics of obeying an authority. The IRA and Palestinian 
terror organizations are of much interest in this chapter because they show the ease 
with which groups can help to release an individual’s inhibitions against violent 
behaviour.
The last and concluding chapter of this thesis draws the main points from chapters 
three through six together and from this essentially seeks to offer a theoretical model 
that shows the significance of disinhibition in psychologically allowing someone to 
participate in terrorism. This model will be drawn from the arguments and 
conclusions of the previous chapters, and will be able to act as a general model for 
terrorism, not just for particular types of terrorism and terrorist groups. Aside from 
this model, the chapter also notes any implications of the thesis for further research in 
the field of the psychology of terrorism as a whole. 
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE CONCEPT OF DISINHIBITION
Disinhibition, as defined previously, is the process whereby an inhibition a person has 
becomes sufficiently weakened so that he or she acts in a way that they normally do 
not. This thesis is concerned with inhibitions on the subject of aggressive or violent 
behaviour, and as such this chapter focuses on this aspect of disinhibition. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the available literature concerning the role of 
disinhibition in terrorism is not vast. This is because most of the disinhibition 
literature relating to violent behaviour focuses on acts of large-scale violence such as 
genocide as well as behaviour in war, and because much of the terrorism literature 
focuses on motivations for terrorism rather than inhibiting or disinhibiting 
mechanisms. However, much of the existing literature on disinhibition and violence 
can be applied to terrorism because the theories involve the psychology behind how a 
person becomes able to kill or seriously injure someone else. The literature review in 
this chapter focuses on the themes that are relevant to this thesis, and it will therefore 
review research on dehumanization, culture and belief system, religion, and the effect 
of a group upon an individual.
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Literature Review 
Within the existing literature, a significant amount of research focuses on the effect of 
dehumanization. Dehumanization, as briefly examined in chapter one, is a process 
whereby a person is categorized by others as either subhuman; for example, a kind of 
animal, or inhuman; for example a monster (Waller, 2002, p.245). It is an important 
process as it is able to cultivate different ways of thinking about and perceiving 
others, with one of the main consequences of this way of thinking being that “people 
enlist moral justifications for punitive conduct directed toward individuals who have 
been deprived of humanness, but they disavow punitive actions and condemn them on 
moral grounds toward individuals depicted in humanized terms” (Bandura et al., 
1996). Many experiments have been undertaken to analyse whether dehumanization 
has a significant effect on aggressive behaviour, arguably the most famous of these 
being Bandura’s 1975 experiments. In these experiments, the targets of aggressive 
behaviour were characterized by the experimenters in either “humanized, neutral, or 
dehumanized terms” to the participants (Bandura, 1975, p.256). The experiments 
succeeded in showing that when people are characterized as non-human or subhuman, 
a person’s propensity for aggressive behaviour against them increases substantially 
(ibid, p.266). This experiment also found that dehumanization is “especially 
conducive” to aggressive behaviour when some level of diffusion of responsibility 
exists for the action and its consequences (ibid, p.266). 
Earlier research on dehumanization has, amongst other findings, pointed to some of 
the conditions under which the process of dehumanizing others can take place. For 
example, Kelman (1973) argues that if a person is accorded “identity” and 
“community” there is a higher probability that they will not be dehumanized. For 
Kelman, according someone identity means to see them as an individual, 
“independent and distinguishable from others”, and according a person with 
community means to see them as a “part of an interconnected network of individuals” 
(1973, p.49). More recent research on dehumanization has indicated, as outlined in 
the first chapter, that the process of dehumanization has a higher tendency to take 
place when a group of people are viewed as completely separate or distinct by another 
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group of people, as well as when they are perceived to be either threatening or 
inferior (Waller, 2002).
Aside from dehumanization, aspects of a society’s culture and its belief system can
also play a significant role in releasing inhibitions to kill. For example, in the case of 
suicide terrorism at least, cultural factors are able to substantially affect behaviour by
setting norms about if and when a person is permitted to commit suicide, as well as 
by “influencing people’s concepts and expectations” about what will happen to them 
after death (Merari, 1990, p.197). Indeed, cultures often also lay the ground rules for 
their members on matters such as when violence may be approved, as well as who it 
is justified against. Interestingly, Baumeister (1999) is careful to point out that in 
many cases it is not necessary for a culture to directly promote violent behaviour –
“all the culture has to do is stop restraining [violent tendencies], and these tendencies 
will emerge” (p.276-277). However, as Marsella (2004) notes about the relationship 
between culture and terror, a “culturally constructed reality” is able to provide the 
necessary evidence for a terrorist or potential terrorist’s beliefs about violence and 
participating in terrorism, such that the person gradually gains a “sense of 
righteousness” and moral justification for harming others (p.42). 
A large amount of the literature on culture as a disinhibitor of violence explores the 
repercussions of historical cultural myths and cultural ideologies on a nation or 
society (Hirsch, 1985; Merari, 1990). Much of the research on this aspect of culture 
has been examined in light of the Nazi era in Germany before and during World War 
II. The historical cultural myths, for example about the history, superiority and 
destiny of the Aryan race, “functioned effectively” in dehumanizing the Jews and 
justifying their genocide (Hirsch, 1985, p.45). Indeed, the language that is used in 
portraying cultural myths and ideologies become “powerful cultural weapons” 
because of the result they are able to achieve on members of a society (p.46-47). 
However, Hirsch (1985) points out that cultural myths and their effects on a nation 
take place over a gradual period of time before becoming “embedded” within a 
culture (p.47).
Closely associated with cultural myths and ideologies is the process of socialization, 
the effect of propaganda, and the dynamics and effect of the education system on a 
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society. Socialization “shape[s] the values and ideas of the next generation” 
(Zimbardo, 1999), and has been shown to be a particularly effective way for those in 
power to “spread their ideas and agendas across generations to create a youth that will 
fight and die for their cause” (Zimbardo, 1999). Earlier research on this topic has also 
shown that aggression can at times be linked to socialization. For example, Bandura 
(1973) argues that socialization into a culture is able to have a significant effect on 
the level of aggressive behaviour on the members of that society. To illustrate this, 
Bandura points to previous studies on socialization and aggression that account for 
“markedly different characteristics” between Native American tribes. For instance, 
these studies noted that Comanche and Apache tribes used socialization methods that 
“raised their children to be warriors”, while tribes such as the Hopi employed 
socialization practices that “reared children with gentle dispositions” (Bandura, 1973, 
p.112). Indeed, Moghaddam (2004) also argues that the socialization of particular 
political messages into the general populace can often serve to promote those 
messages as significant cultural values, which in turn bolsters groups within that 
society that had already held the same value. In discussing martyrdom, Moghaddam 
notes that much of the terrorism in the Algerian war of independence was made 
possible because the value of sacrifice was so highly culturally sanctioned by much of 
the nation (2004, p.114-115).
The examination of education practices in different societies has also received some 
attention in the literature. Whether at school or within the family, education is a key 
aspect in creating a negative image of the ‘enemy’ (Zimbardo, 1999). In this respect, 
much of the literature focuses on the Nazi use of education, especially in schools. For 
example, textbooks distributed during the Nazi era aligned Jews with the devil, 
described them as extremely ugly, and claimed they were inferior to the ‘noble 
Aryan’ (Zimbardo, 1999), while the textbook given to Nazi youth contained twelve 
commandments which included the necessity of obeying authority at all times, as “the 
leader is always right” (Waller, 2002, p.182). Socialization and cultural belief 
systems have also been understood in the literature as self-perpetuating; once they 
become “institutionalised with authorized sanctions” they are able to affect attitudes 
and beliefs in a society well after the “historical determinants” of such beliefs and 
attitudes have ceased to exist (Bandura, 1973, p.112). 
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Strongly related to culture is the effect religion may have on aggressive behaviour. In 
the study of terrorism, religion has been examined in terms of its ability to be a 
motivator of violence as well as a disinhibitor (Esposito, 2002; Robins and Post, 
1997). Although many scholars have considered religion only as a part of culture (for 
example, Merari, 1990), this thesis argues that it is such an important and complex 
concept that it will be considered separately from, although still complementary to, 
culture as a whole.
One theme that the existing literature considers is how religion is able to polarize 
groups of people or their beliefs in such terms as good versus bad or Satan versus 
Allah or God (Beck, 2002). Characterized in this way, religion can act as a 
disinhibitor because potential aggressors can frame their violent acts as being 
undertaken for a ‘higher purpose’; in other words, in the name of God. This 
justification is one of the strongest ways to make inhibitions against killing or 
harming less effective at restraining behaviour (Beck, 2002). Indeed, as Ranstorp 
(1996) argues, “religions have gradually served to define the causes and the enemies 
as well as the means, methods and timing of the violence itself”. 
Related to this, much of the existing literature also examines the way in which 
religion is able to legitimate particular causes by providing people with a sense of 
divinity or righteousness about the group to which they belong (Hirsch, 1985). In this 
way, religion can be used to rationalise acts of violence because, from the viewpoint 
of the perpetrator(s), “after all, if you are descended from, or inspired and protected 
by gods, your actions are not questionable because they are not merely normal human 
acts” (Hirsch, 1985, p.44). 
Another theme prevalent in the literature is how religious leaders, as well as religious 
followers generally, are able to manipulate or distort religious doctrines so that their 
interpretations of particular duties, obligations or commandments within their religion 
may deviate from the usually accepted understandings (Esposito, 2002). For example, 
Esposito (2002) refers to passages from the Koran, such as “if you are killed in the 
cause of God or you die, the forgiveness and mercy of God are better than all that you 
amass” (p.69) as illustrations of how easily people are able to interpret religion 
differently to justify acts of terrorism. For example, some may see this as meaning 
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that suicide attacks are sanctioned if not even honourable practices, or that they at 
least are a stepping stone to being in God’s favour, as the phrase “killed in the cause 
of God” can be manipulated into including acts of suicide terror if such actions are 
promoted as divine. Valenty (2004), as well as many other scholars, points out that a 
basic reading of the Koran actually shows that living for Islam is better than dying for 
it, and any other reading of it amounts to a “clear misinterpretation of Koranic 
principles” (p.17).
Religion can also contribute to the dehumanization process in the way that it is able to
negatively characterize other religions and those who belong to it – for example, 
Hirsch (1985) argues that Martin Luther’s depiction of the Jews as, amongst other 
things, “bloodthirsty hounds”, helped to dehumanize them and provide a religious 
justification for their harm (p.45).
So far this review of the literature has encompassed three out of the four themes that 
this thesis examines: dehumanization, culture and belief system, and religion. The last 
section of this review focuses on some of the psychological effects of an individual 
belonging to a group, and considers such factors as group dynamics and 
deindividuation, as well as why many individuals obey an authority when it comes to 
perpetrating or helping to perpetrate violent acts against other human beings. 
Group dynamics and the effects that a leader may have on the thoughts and actions of 
an individual are subjects that have received much attention in the literature (Kelman 
and Hamilton, 1989; Zimbardo, 1999). In examining group dynamics, much research 
has focuses on how an individual is able to submerge their individual identity into 
that of a group. For example, Staub (1999) argues that individuals join groups for 
“identity and connection”, and that in turn, groups “provide a new understanding of 
reality” (p.182). Staub also argues that people join groups in the first place because of 
“psychological reactions” to living under difficult life conditions (p.182); however, 
like other scholars, stresses that group violence “evolves over time… the personality 
of individuals,  social norms, institutions, and culture change in ways that make… 
violence more likely” (p.182). 
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Like other groups, the dynamics of terrorist groups essentially enable members to feel 
justified in any actions they undertake, while providing “a sense of belonging, a 
feeling of self-importance, and a new belief system that defines… the group’s goals 
as of paramount importance” (Hudson, 1999). 
The concept of deindividuation within a group setting has also been widely 
researched. Deindividuation “refers to a state of relative anonymity in which a person 
cannot be identified as a particular individual but only as a group member” (Waller, 
2002, p.216). Recent research on deindividuation seems to affirm earlier research in 
that it has found that when a person feels anonymous, and views their victim as 
anonymous, such a situation often “facilitate[s] aggression” (Zimbardo, 1999). 
Deindividuation, like dehumanization, can be a gradual process, whereby certain 
conditions are able to make it more likely to happen. For example, Zimbardo (1999) 
describes five conditions that he argues help to bring about deindividuation. These 
are: firstly, remove a person’s “sense of uniqueness”; secondly, put them in a group; 
third, put them in uniforms; fourth, if possible disguise them; and fifth, “reduce their 
information processing, and cognitive functioning capacities, by encouraging 
emotional, physical, high intensity responding and by altering their state of 
consciousness through… immersion in present-oriented activities” (Zimbardo, 1999).
Paradoxically, one school of thought sees deindividuation as a cause of uninhibited
behaviour, whereas the other sees it as a result of such behaviour (Diener, 1977, 
p.145). Diener (1977) argues that anonymity “may at times produce an internal 
deindividuated state but this evidence is thus far indirect” (p.147). However, Diener 
points to earlier research that shows that anonymity does produce unrestrained 
behaviour in the form of aggression. For example, a 1970 experiment, in which the 
group behaviour of university students was analysed, found that a deindividuated 
state did have a strong relation to aggressive behaviour, and it also found that once in 
a deindividuated state, the participants “were less discriminating in their aggression 
level toward [perceived] ‘nasty’ and ‘nice’ victims” (Zimbardo, 1970; cited in Diener, 
1977, p.147). As well as anonymity, other factors, such as ‘altered responsibility’, 
also seem to have a bearing on bringing about deindividuation; however, not too such 
a substantial degree as anonymity. For example, Diener (1977) argues that “no 
significant relation emerged” during a study on the subject in 1975, and that his own 
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as well as others’ findings may indicate that “altered feelings of responsibility may be 
a result of deindividuation and not a cause of it” (p.149).
Equally as important as group dynamics, obedience to authority is also a significant
factor in releasing inhibitions to kill or harm others (Milgrim, 1974; Kelman, 1973; 
Zimbardo, 1999). An authority is able to provide legitimacy to a group’s thoughts and 
behaviours (Kelman, 1973, p.39) while also providing a “different kind of morality” 
that can ignore the normal moral principles that usually “govern human relationships” 
(p.39). As Bandura et al. (1996) note, “when everyone is responsible, no one really 
feels responsible… people behave more cruelly under group responsibility than when 
they hold themselves personally accountable for their actions”, as belonging to a 
group allows a person to either diffuse or displace responsibility away from him or 
herself personally (p.366). One of the most often cited pieces of research on 
obedience to authority and its effects on violent behaviour is Stanley Milgrim’s 
obedience experiments (Berkowitz, 1999; Zimbardo, 1999). In Milgrim’s 
experiments, randomly-chosen participants were told they – as the ‘teacher’ – were to 
give their ‘student’ electric shocks, stronger the more mistakes they made, when or if 
any errors on the student’s behalf were made in a word association test (Zimbardo, 
1999). Even after the shocks were so high that the students were “yelling and 
screaming” (Zimbardo, 1999), sixty-five percent of the teachers persevered in their 
task, at the request of the experimenter, shocking the student to the highest voltage 
possible (Milgrim, 1974), demonstrating that obedience to authority can indeed 
significantly affect a number of inhibitions against harming others.
This review of the literature has focussed on dehumanization, culture and cultural 
sanctioning, religion, and finally the fusing of the individual with the group. The 
available literature has proved to be valuable to this thesis in that it provides both 
theoretical and empirical evidence for the arguments that are presented in the 
following chapters. Influential scholars such as Bandura and Zimbardo, as well as 
experiments such as those by Stanley Milgrim, are important to the theoretical base of 
this thesis, and inform a significant part of this work. Despite the importance of such 
scholars, one gap in the literature remains – much of the disinhibition literature tends 
to be researched and applied to violent behaviour other than terrorism. For example, 
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Hirsch (1985) applies his work to instances of mass murder, and mostly focuses on 
the Nazi extermination of the Jews; Kelman (1973; 1989) applies his work to what he 
labels “sanctioned massacres” – instances where soldiers, or those part of paramilitary 
groups, carry out excess violence; and Zimbardo (1999) focuses on the Holocaust and 
wartime violence. In spite of this, these works are still able to be applied to this thesis, 
because, as is demonstrated in the following chapters, much of the psychology 
involved in harming other people is the same for terrorists and terrorist groups as it is 
for wartime violence and other forms of political violence that involve the harming or 
killing of others. 
Connecting Disinhibition with Terrorism 
As argued in the first chapter, an understanding of the psychological mechanisms that 
allow people to overcome inhibitions to harm other people is just as important as 
understanding the motivations behind these acts. Bandura (1990; 2004) has been an 
important scholar in explaining the link between disinhibitory processes and 
terrorism. 
Bandura’s (1990; 2004) model consists of a description and analysis of eight 
psychological mechanisms through which disinhibition of aggression can occur. He 
argues that although “these psychosocial mechanisms of moral disengagement have 
been examined most intensely in relation to political and military violence”, the 
mechanisms examined in his model “operate in everyday situations in which decent 
people routinely perform activities that further their interests but have injurious 
human effects” (Bandura, 1990, p.162). The model, which in Bandura’s earlier works 
had been applied to aggressive behaviour generally (see, for example, Bandura, 
1973), can also be applied to terrorism because terrorist acts require “more powerful 
machinations of moral disengagement” (Bandura, 1990, p.162-163) than other forms 
of political violence such as guerrilla warfare. 
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Figure 1: Bandura’s Self-Regulation Process
The eight mechanisms of what Bandura terms moral disengagement are (as shown 
above): moral justification; palliative (or advantageous) comparison, in which a 
perpetrator may rationalize their act as legitimate by comparing it with an act far 
worse than their own; euphemistic labelling of a violent act; distorting the 
consequences of a violent action; dehumanization of the victim(s); attribution of 
blame to the victim, displacement of responsibility; and diffusion of responsibility. 
These mechanisms do not “instantly transform a considerate person into a ruthless 
one who purposely goes out to kill other human beings. Terrorist behaviour evolves 
through extensive training in moral disengagement and terrorist prowess… The 
various disengagement practices form an integral part of the training” (Bandura, 
1990, p.185-186). In addition, Bandura also states that “escalative self-disinhibition is 
accelerated if violent courses of action are presented as serving a moral imperative 
and the targeted people are divested of human qualities” (1990, p.186).
As well as Bandura, Beck (2002) also applies disinhibition to terrorist acts, arguing 
that “built into the whole system of idealized hate is the notion that violence against 
certain individuals is desirable – even ennobling”. Beck argues that this factor is 
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prevalent in terrorism, as much of the terrorist acts that have taken place in the past 
few years at least have been perpetrated under religious guises (2002). Indeed, many 
recent justifications for terrorism have been phrased in such terms as “I am doing this 
for God” or “I am doing this in the name of God” (Beck, 2002). Beck also argues 
along the same lines as Bandura in that he points out that disinhibition takes place as 
a gradual process rather than merely occurring ‘overnight’.
So far this chapter has presented a literature review of the themes and factors that this 
thesis focuses on in the following chapters, and has presented an argument for the 
way in which the process and theory of disinhibition is related to understanding the 
psychology behind acts of terrorism. The next part of this chapter focuses on an 
interesting and theoretically valuable aspect of disinhibition – what factors have the 
potential to control the disinhibitory process. 
Controlling Disinhibitory Processes:
“We all know that not everybody who is angered punches an antagonist in the mouth 
or shoots up a restaurant. No matter how strong, the urge is subject to restraint” 
(Beck, 2002).  With this statement in mind, the central question for this section is: 
what mechanisms are able to keep inhibitions against violent behaviour in place? 
Following from this, why do some people react to certain situations with aggression 
and violence while others do not? Self-regulation of aggressive behaviour has been 
analysed in the literature in terms of such themes as empathy and the fear of 
punishment (Bandura, 1990; Miller and Eisenberg, 1988). This section of the thesis 
concentrates on how disinhibitory processes are controlled through such factors as 
individual morality, empathy and compassion, and the fear of the consequences of 
perpetrating a violent act against another person or people.
Individual moral codes, acting as “self-censuring restraints” (Bandura, 1990, p.164), 
are one factor that may inhibit someone from perpetrating violent acts against others. 
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A person’s sense of morality is developed through socialization by “direct tuition, 
evaluative social reaction’s to one’s conduct, and exposure to the self-evaluative 
standards modelled by others” (Bandura et al, 1996). Once the construction of a 
moral code is complete, the code acts as a “guide and deterrent” of behaviour because 
“people regulate their actions by the consequences they apply to themselves” 
(Bandura et al., 1996). Indeed, as Beck (1999) notes, “we are generally pleased with 
ourselves when we live up to our ideal self-image, and displeased when we deviate 
from it… we make a considered decision to control a hostile impulse, not because of 
shame, guilt, anxiety or self-criticalness, but because we know it is personally 
unacceptable” (p.20).
A person’s moral standards are kept in place by what some scholars title a “self-
regulatory system” (Bandura et al., 1996). This system, although it does not “create 
an invariant control system within a person”, allows people to “behave in accordance 
with their moral standards” (Bandura et al., 1996), and works through three sub-
functions; these being the self-monitoring function, the judgemental function, and the 
self-reactive function. According to Bandura et al. (1996), the system operates thus: 
Self monitoring of one’s conduct is the first step toward exercising control over it. Action 
gives rise to self-reactions through a judgemental function in which conduct is evaluated 
against internal standards and situational circumstances. Moral judgement sets the occasion 
for self-reactive influence. People get themselves to behave in accordance with their moral 
standards through anticipatory positive and negative self-reactions for different courses of 
action.
Beck (1999) also considers a biological approach to understanding the effectiveness 
of morality on self-regulation, stating that some of the literature suggests that 
“evolutionary pressures have helped to develop socially desirable characteristics. 
There seems to be an innate program that reinforces sociable behaviour” (p.24).
Individual moral codes are therefore able to have a significant impact on controlling 
the process of disinhibition as they can act as important regulators on behaviour.
Apart from individual moral codes, a feeling of empathy or compassion for the 
“object of hostility” has also been argued to control disinhibitory processes (Beck, 
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1999, p.19). According to Beck (1999), empathy is “often sufficient to inhibit the 
aggressor from inflicting an injury in the first place” (p.19). Humanizing a person or 
feeling empathy for them or their situation has been shown in numerous studies to be 
a self-deterrent to aggressive behaviour (Bandura, 1990, p.182). According to 
Bandura, Underwood and Fromson (1975), the power of humanizing potential 
victims is such that it becomes very difficult to harm others if the potential perpetrator 
sees them as similar to him or herself (p.267). Indeed, the results of Bandura, 
Underwood and Fromson’s (1975) experiments affirm that humanization, as well as 
personalization, “can serve as an effective corrective against aggression” (p.267). 
Furthermore, in a review of previous research and experiments on empathy and 
aggression, Miller and Eisenberg (1988) hypothesized that “aggressive behaviour, 
including physical and verbal aggression, as well as abusive behaviour, should be 
negatively related to empathy”. After both qualitative and quantitative analyses, the 
authors found “modest but not entirely consistent support for the notion that empathic 
responsiveness may be an inhibitor of aggression” (Miller and Eisenberg, 1988). 
However, Miller and Eisenberg point out that research on empathy and aggression 
had thus far been limited in that it needed to have been “conceptually clearer” and 
with more consistent models from which to analyse the phenomenon, and they note
that the relation between empathy and aggression would have been stronger if this 
had been the case.
In a more recent experiment on empathy and attitudinal change, conclusions also
seemed to point toward a relationship between empathy and aggression (Batson et al., 
1997a). In this study, Batson et al. set up experiments to find out the effect feelings of 
empathy had on changing people’s attitudes toward “stigmatised” groups of people. 
They found that “inducing empathy for a member of a stigmatised group could 
improve attitudes” toward the person, and, interestingly, “improve attitudes toward 
the group as a whole” (p.113). From the above experiments, it is clear that empathy 
and humanization have a significant effect on inhibiting aggressive behaviour. As 
Waller (2002) notes, “humanizing, decategorizing, or personalizing others all create a 
powerful self-restraining effect. It is difficult to mistreat a person who has an actual 
identity, with flesh and blood and family” (p.274).
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Besides an individual’s moral code and the effect empathy and humanization have on 
aggressive behaviour, having a fear of the consequences or being threatened with 
punishment may also inhibit a person from undertaking violent acts. Berkowitz 
(1993) argues that “the threat of punishment does appear to reduce the rate of violent 
offenses to some degree, at least under some circumstances” (p.315); however, that it 
is “certainty of punishment that appears to be of greater importance” (p.319). Having 
a fear of the consequences of acting violently is able to inhibit aggressive behaviour 
as it brings about feelings of anxiety within a person – fearing the consequences could 
include fearing retaliation by the intended victim, for example, or the fear of being 
caught, and as mentioned above, the fear of being punished (Beck, 1999, p.20). 
Bandura (1973) posits that “negative consequences [of aggressive behaviour] may 
involve either withdrawal of rewards or administration of aversive effects” and that 
“punishment is rarely employed as the sole method of modifying aggressive 
behaviour. Rather, it is applied in conjunction with positive influences” so that 
inhibitions against aggression are strengthened (p.298). For example, a person may be 
inhibited from acting aggressively by both the threat of punishment and the 
withdrawal of rewards.
Feeling a sense of responsibility for one’s actions is also an inhibitor of aggressive 
acts because a person will have an increased fear of the consequences if they feel 
solely responsible for undertaking violent or aggressive acts – “people are especially 
prone to minimize injurious effects when they act alone and thus cannot easily escape 
responsibility” (Bandura, 1990, p.177). 
Apart from such fears as getting caught or punished, what is also able to serve as a 
“self-restraining” influence is being able to view or hear the consequences of their 
actions on their victims. It is “relatively easy to hurt others when their suffering is not 
visible and when causal actions are physically and temporally remote from their 
effects”; however, seeing others suffer is able to inhibit aggression because of the 
effect that viewing human suffering can have (Bandura, 1990, p.177). An example of 
this can be found in Milgrim’s obedience experiments, where Milgrim “obtained 
diminishing obedience as the victim’s pain became more evident” (Bandura, 1990, 
p.177).
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Inhibitors to aggressive behaviour, such as the ones examined above, are able to exert 
a significant amount of control over our actions. Unfortunately, and as Bandura et al. 
(1996) note, “self-reactive influences do not operate unless they are activated, and 
there are many psychosocial processes by which self-sanctions can be disengaged 
from inhumane conduct. Selective activation and disengagement of internal control 
permits different types of conduct with the same moral standards”. Many scholars 
note the ease with which seemingly “normal” people are able to commit such 
horrifying actions as mass murder, genocide, or terrorism (Zimbardo, 1999; Waller, 
2002), and the next four chapters of this thesis are devoted to understanding and 
analysing what psychological mechanisms and situations are potentially able to 
overcome any inhibitions a person has against violent or aggressive behaviour.
Conclusion: 
Disinhibition has been shown throughout this chapter to have a significant effect on 
contributing to aggressive and violent behaviour, including terrorism. The literature 
review that was provided demonstrated the importance of the release of inhibitions to 
understanding terrorism, and especially highlighted the significance of 
dehumanization, culture, religion and group dynamics. Bandura’s (1990; 2004) model 
also draws attention to this fact, showing concisely how self-regulating functions are 
able to be overcome in the case of terrorism. While it is important to examine how 
inhibitions against killing or harming other people are released or at least lowered, the 
way in which inhibitions are kept in place should also be discussed, which is why a 
section of this chapter concentrated on understanding what can inhibit people from 
acting violently. In this section, crucial inhibitors such as empathy, being able to see 
or hear the painful consequences of violent actions upon victims, as well as the threat 
of punishment were put forth as significant inhibitors to violence. However, as noted, 
the rest of this thesis details the ways in which these inhibitors can often be 
overcome, starting with an examination of empathy and dehumanization, and shows 
that they can indeed be surpassed to an alarming degree in many situations and by 
many different people, regardless of culture and religion.
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CHAPTER THREE:
EMPATHY, THE CREATION OF HATE, AND 
DEHUMANIZATION 
While the previous chapter provided an analysis of disinhibition literature and its 
relation to terrorism, this chapter examines in greater depth the concepts of empathy, 
dehumanization, and the creation of hate in order to gain a greater understanding of 
how inhibitions to kill are overcome. Building on material from the literature review, 
this chapter therefore supplies a discussion and analysis of such processes as ‘us 
versus them’ thinking, how feelings of empathy are overcome, the power of 
dehumanizing the enemy, and the significance of such justifications as blaming the 
victim for terrorist actions.  A comprehensive examination of the above concepts is 
essential in working toward a thorough understanding of how terrorists are 
psychologically able to harm or kill others because of the way in which those 
concepts are able to produce sufficient psychological distance for the perpetrator from 
their victim or victims, as well as provide the foundation to create a negative 
construct of the ‘enemy’. Through the illustrations of the Irish Republican Army and 
Palestinian suicide bombers, this chapter shows that the concepts of empathy, 
dehumanization, and the creation of hate are integral in creating many of the 
conditions that help in releasing inhibitions to kill.
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Empathy and Compassion:
As examined in the previous chapter, empathy and compassion are important 
inhibitors of violent behaviour. Not only can empathy inhibit aggressive behaviour 
before it begins, it is also important in that it can help to stop people from aggressing
in the future (Miller and Eisenberg, 1987). While it was shown in the preceding 
chapter that emotions such as empathy are significant in inhibiting violent behaviour, 
this section of the chapter looks at the ways in which feelings of empathy and 
compassion are overcome or avoided so that disinhibited behaviour can occur.
Empathy has been described as “an other-oriented emotional response congruent with 
another’s perceived welfare” (Batson et al., 1997a, p.105). As such, an empathic 
response may include a feeling of sympathy or compassion (ibid, p.105). Empathy is 
developed over the course of a person’s childhood and youth, and as a consequence 
there are vast discrepancies in the amounts that different people come to possess 
(Baumeister, 1999). In other words, some people may develop a large capacity for 
empathy, while some may only develop a small capacity for it. To explain this 
variation, Baumeister (1999) contends that empathy is developed through a 
combination of “cognitive development and the influence of teaching and 
socialization” (p.223). It can, therefore, be argued that the amount of empathy a 
person develops depends to a great extent on what, and how, a person learns while 
growing up and into adulthood.
Although empathy is usually examined in terms of its ability to encourage positive 
behaviour toward others, there are some important ways in which feelings of empathy 
can be surpassed or quashed. The main way in which empathic responses towards 
others can be reasonably easily overcome is if a person views their potential victim as 
different, dissimilar to themselves, or simply “not like us” (Baumeister, 1999, p.315), 
so that an ‘us versus them’ mindset comes into play. Indeed, as Robins and Post 
(1997) argue, “to maintain the sense of group – and self – cohesion we must 
differentiate ourselves from strangers. Strangers, then, are necessary for our process 
of self-definition” (p.91). Just belonging to a certain group may therefore help 
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towards viewing others as different and thus less deserving of empathy, because the 
group to which they belong helps define who should and should not be empathized 
with.
The argument that feelings of empathy can be avoided or overcome if a person holds 
the view that their potential victim or victims are dissimilar to him or her self can be 
put forth for other possible reasons. For example, there is an evolutionary argument 
which holds that the “mechanism of kin selection” favours the existence of an 
altruistic mechanism that serves to “protect the interests of those that share our genes” 
(Pizarro, 2000, p.363). Because we naturally feel a connection to those we share our 
genes with, this serves as an explanation as to why those who appear to have different 
characteristics to ours are less likely to elicit empathic responses from us (ibid, 
p.363).
Alternatively, there is also a social psychological argument that can help to explain 
the existence or non-existence of empathy. This argument states that feelings of 
empathy originate and develop in “early infancy when the boundaries of self and 
other are diffuse”, and that an empathic response toward others is more likely to 
occur as an adult if potential victims are seen as similar because of the mechanism of 
‘self-other merging’ (Pizarro, 2000, p.363). The social psychological concept of self-
other merging posits that empathy brings about a perspective in which the distinction 
between oneself and others is decreased (Batson et al., 1997b). Pizarro argues that the 
distinction between the self and the other is heightened when a person comes across 
someone they perceive as different, and argues that “it is probably easier to lose sight 
of self-other boundaries with others that are more like the self than with others that 
are not at all like the self” (2000, p.363). Taken to the extreme, having a lack of 
empathy through regarding others as different can lead to dehumanization, a topic 
that is covered in greater depth in a later section of this chapter. 
Apart from viewing others as dissimilar to oneself, one other main way that feelings 
of empathy and compassion can be avoided or overcome is by attributing to the 
potential victim blame for his or her own situation. Put quite simply, “individuals are 
less likely to feel empathy for targets to which they have attributed blame for their 
predicament” (Pizarro, 2000, p.363). Attributing blame to one’s intended victims not 
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only serves as a mechanism for avoiding feelings of empathy, but also acts as an 
important justification for violence against other people. This argument is echoed by 
Bandura (1990), who maintains that perpetrators of terrorism bypass feelings of 
compassion for their intended victims by framing their violent actions as not of their 
own making and attribute blame elsewhere, which therefore not only excuses their 
own behaviour, but also lets them “feel self-righteous in the process” (p.185). For 
example, Milgrim’s obedience experiments show how attributing blame to the victim 
for their predicament let the subject of the experiment feel justified in shocking him 
or her and justified also in heightening the maltreatment, as many subjects expressed 
such rationalizations as “he was so stupid he deserved to get shocked” (Waller, 2002, 
p.251). Indeed, one consequence of avoiding empathy by blaming the intended victim 
for any actions taken against them is that it becomes easier – and, in a perpetrator’s 
mind, more justifiable – to continue violence against them, as putting the blame on 
some other actor also allows the real perpetrators to further derogate their enemy 
(Bandura, 1990, p.185). Often in cases of terrorism, perpetrators attribute 
responsibility for their violence to the governments of the people they have attacked, 
however they do not often differentiate between a government and its citizens when 
deciding on targets because they view them as one in the same. 
One other important way in which empathy can be overcome is if a considerable 
amount of anger exists toward a particular person, or more generally toward a group 
of people. This anger usually comes from what people perceive as a genuine and 
valid grievance about something (Beck, 2002). In the case of terrorism, anger often 
derives from a perceived political grievance. This grievance may be due to an 
economic, social or political situation, and may have been in existence for a
significant amount of time (Moghadam, 2003). In any case, anger is able to surpass 
feelings of empathy towards other people because it allows people to believe they 
have been wronged and therefore have a legitimate grievance against others that can 
be used to justify violence against them (Beck, 2002).
In addition to the above arguments, one problem that arises in relation to empathy is 
that much of the research on the subject finds that empathy is usually “felt for 
individuals as individuals, not for groups or abstract classes of people” (Batson et al., 
1997a). That is, even if a person feels a degree of empathy toward a potential victim, 
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they may still feel no empathy towards the group to which the individual belongs; in 
which case any empathy afforded to the individual will be of little value because the 
empathy is not generalised to their group as a whole. In this situation, it may well be 
that the victim is perceived by the terrorist not as an individual person but merely as 
an outgroup member, which is what often results from an ‘us versus them’ way of 
thinking. As highlighted throughout this thesis, this kind of thinking is pervasive in 
terrorist organizations.
So, to reiterate, overcoming or avoiding empathy is often achieved through 
perceiving another person or group as people as different from oneself, or 
alternatively, seeing them as deserving of any violent actions taken against them. 
Possessing a lack of empathy may also be derived from the biological argument noted 
above, which claims that we naturally maintain a lack of empathy toward those we 
are not physically similar to, or the social psychological argument, which posits that 
we learn who is similar to us and who is not from a very young age, and tend to be 
more empathetic towards those that are more like ‘us’. Aside from these, anger too 
also often holds an important place in being able to surpass feelings of empathy 
towards others. 
The IRA and Palestinian Suicide Bombers
Turning to the cases mentioned earlier, one of the most noticeable ways in which 
inhibitions to kill are surpassed by IRA members is that they regularly attribute blame 
for their terror away from themselves. Following the Enniskillen bombing, in which 
eleven civilians were killed while attending a war remembrance service, the IRA 
firstly tried to claim that the bombing and resulting deaths were not their fault but that 
of the British, and argued that the British Army’s radio signals had set off the bomb, 
explaining that it was actually meant to go off at another time of the day (Sharrock 
and Devenport, 1997, p.256). Sean MacStiofain, a high-ranking official in the IRA 
for some time, rationalized the ‘Bloody Friday’ bombs of 1979 (which killed eleven 
people) as a direct result of British officials – he claimed that “the blame was [on] the 
people who [had] deliberately not given the warnings to the public” (‘The IRA and 
Sinn Fein’, www.pbs.org).
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Cases of IRA terrorism where only one person has been the target have also seen the 
IRA blame their victim. For example, a man deliberately shot and killed by a group of 
IRA gunmen was targeted because he was seen as helping the ‘enemy’ due to his job 
as a supplier of fruit and vegetables to the British security forces, alluding to the fact 
that he may still have been alive had he not been employed in such a job 
(McGartland, 1997, p.254). Indeed, as the IRA’s ‘Green Book’ comments about who 
is classed as part of the ‘establishment’ they are fighting and thus who is an ‘enemy’, 
“the establishment is all those who have a vested interest in maintaining the present 
status quo… politicians, media, judiciary, [and] certain business elements” (Coogan, 
1993). Hence, any empathy for such victims is deemed unnecessary because they 
have brought their predicament upon themselves. 
Another example of the IRA blaming the victims of their terrorism is the reasons they 
give for attacking British officials. One IRA member has remarked on this matter that 
“we’ll always select individual members of the British establishment for assassination 
because they make themselves part of this war. They advocate shooting and hanging 
our people. That makes them legitimate targets” (Dillon, 1994, p.222). This kind of 
belief can be illustrated by the IRA’s bombing of the British Conservative Party’s 
conference in Brighton in 1984, which killed and injured a number of civilians, when 
Gerry Adams announced after the bombing that the attack was an “inevitable result of 
the British occupation of the six counties” (Irish News, 1984; cited in Wright, 1990, 
p.31).
Like the IRA, Palestinian suicide bombers also appear to hold an obvious lack of 
empathy towards those they target. As one would-be suicide bomber (whose 
explosives malfunctioned at the last minute) answered when asked if he was upset 
that he failed in his mission to kill Israelis, “naturally one feels sad because the 
operation [did] not come off and Jews were not killed” (Simon, 2003). Nasra Hassan, 
who interviewed members of Palestinian terror groups, has also noted the significant 
lack of empathy that is evident in suicide bombers’ attitudes to those they target: 
“they all talked matter-of-factly about the bombings, showing an unshakable 
conviction in the rightness of their cause and their methods. When I asked them if 
they had any qualms about killing innocent civilians, they would immediately 
respond, ‘the Israelis kill our children and women. This is war, and innocent people 
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get hurt’” (Hassan, 2001). This shows that there exists a distinct lack of empathy 
towards perpetrator’s victims because of the way in which they do not seem to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets – if innocent civilians happen 
to get hurt, this can be justified in their eyes by the claim that there is a war on and, 
therefore, these kind of things are inevitable and should not be entirely blamed on the 
terrorist group.
Closely tied to this lack of empathy amongst Palestinian terrorists is the fact that 
Israel and Israeli authorities are overwhelmingly blamed for suicide attacks. Indeed, 
Israeli civilians are often blamed for the terrorism perpetrated against them because 
they elected particular Israeli governments into office. An official from Fatah 
epitomized this attitude of deflecting blame way from the terror organizations for 
violence when he argued in an interview that “Prime Minister Sharon’s terror 
policy… is responsible for the victims on both sides. The Israeli victims are victims 
from his policy as well as the Palestinian victims” (Davis, 2003, p.103). Indeed, the 
father of a suicide bomber echoes this sentiment by arguing that Sharon was to blame 
for suicide bombings: “he is continuing the policy of killing our people, and my son 
succeeded in carrying out a suitable response” (Davis, 2003, p.131). 
Similarly, an Islamist military official stated that “if our wives and children are not 
safe from Israeli tanks and rockets, theirs will not be safe from our human bombs”. 
An imprisoned Palestinian terrorist also comments along the same lines, arguing that 
it was “kind of conduct” Israelis used against Palestinians that left “no choice but to 
strike at you [Israelis] without mercy in every possible way” (Post, Sprinzak and 
Denny, 2003, p.178). Spokesmen from Palestine Islamic Jihad argue closely to this, 
stating that “we believe that Israel actually forces us to have the kind of strategies we 
have. We’re not going to sit and be spectators to what Sharon and his government are 
doing here and not answer them in their own language” (Davis, 2003, p.140). 
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The Creation of Hate: 
Linked to empathy and compassion, the creation of hate is also central in helping to 
remove inhibitions to kill (Bandura, Underwood and Fromson, 1975). Essentially, 
hate can be defined as an “extreme dislike” of a person or group of people, and is 
often coupled with “aggressive impulses” against those toward which the emotion is 
directed (Sternberg, 2003). There are numerous ways in which this hate can be 
cultivated, and it is an issue that has received much attention in the literature on 
human violence (see, for example, Sternberg, 2003; Sanford and Comstock, 1971). 
One way that hate may be created is by frustrating certain human needs. According to 
Staub (1999), such human needs are psychological in nature, and consist of such 
needs as self-efficacy, the need to connect to the world around us, and the need to feel 
a sense of security in everyday life (p.181). If people are not able to have these needs 
fulfilled, they will employ particularly “destructive psychological processes and 
actions” to fulfil them (Staub, 1999, p.181). These destructive processes often include 
the devaluing and dehumanizing of others, which demonstrates the relation between 
the creation of hate and the dehumanization of the enemy, an important disinhibitor of 
violence. 
A Model for the Development of Hatred
Sternberg’s (2003) model on the development of hatred toward others is particularly 
relevant to this thesis, as it highlights the relation between hatred and the 
psychological origins of terrorism. The model argues that there are three components 
which make up hate, and that these components can appear in “different ways on 
different occasions”. The first component is negation of intimacy. It is argued here 
that if a person feels such emotions as repulsion or disgust toward a person or people, 
they will tend to psychologically distance themselves from them. Although this 
process is reasonably slow to develop, it is also reasonably slow to disappear – the 
main effect of this process of distancing being cementing feelings of hatred. 
Distancing is usually achieved through depicting the enemy in dehumanized terms, as 
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either a subhuman or nonhuman creature. As demonstrated in an upcoming section of 
this chapter, dehumanization and its effects are substantial disinhibitors for terrorism.
The second component of hate is passion. This component “expresses itself as intense 
anger or fear in response to a threat”, however while it arises quickly it fades just as 
fast. It helps to make feelings of hate more concrete within a person because it 
encourages the ‘us versus them’ mentality, and it can be created by perceiving or 
viewing these ‘enemies’ as people to be feared. This fear may spring from any 
number of reasons, for example because of a person or group’s real or imagined 
danger to ‘us’ or because they are simply inherently evil and are thus to be feared if 
for no other reason (Sternberg, 2003). In this way, often if hatred is combined with 
anger a lack of empathy will exist toward those the hate is directed at, which in turn 
helps release inhibitions to kill.
The last component of the model is what Sternberg terms “decision-commitment in 
hate”. This component works in the way that it changes the “thought processes of the 
preferred population so that its members will conceive of the targeted group(s) in a 
devalued way” (Sternberg, 2003). In line with the first component, this may be 
achieved by presenting the targeted group of people in dehumanized terms, and is 
often extremely successful in encouraging and reinforcing hate because it allows 
people to think in a certain way that perpetuates a person’s already existing feelings 
of hatred or hostility. Sternberg also asserts that there are a number of factors that 
help produce this decision-commitment in hate, two of which seem pertinent when 
discussing terrorism. The first factor is simply to view one’s own group as more 
favourable than the targeted other. The second factor builds on the first, and requires 
viewing members of the targeted group as “largely homogenous” rather than 
composed of differing and unique individuals (Sternberg, 2003). While these two 
factors may seem obvious, they are nonetheless important to note because they result 
from the ‘us versus them’ thinking that was previously mentioned to be evident in 
terrorism. Finally, the model argues that the three components previously described –
negation of intimacy, passion, and decision-commitment in hate – work  best as a 
triangle, where the most effective method of fomenting and reinforcing hatred is to 
employ all three (Sternberg, 2003). 
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The Myth of Pure Evil
In addition to the above model, capitalizing upon such beliefs as the ‘myth of pure 
evil’ can also stir up feelings of hate. The myth of pure evil is a particular myth that 
people tend to believe about other groups of people whom they already treat with 
some level of suspicion or hostility, and it essentially allows people to believe that 
those they are fighting or aggressing on some level against are purely evil 
(Baumeister, 1999). Beliefs such as this one are particularly important as they can act 
as both an introducer and reinforcer of hate. Although people tend to automatically 
perceive the group to which they belong as ‘good’ while another is ‘bad’, the stronger 
the tendency is to see themselves as good, the more chance this will inevitably result 
in viewing the other as evil, largely because the opposite of good can be nothing other 
than this (ibid, 1999, p.67-68). Indeed, as Keen (1986) points out, feelings of hostility 
and hatred are developed more fully once stereotypes are set in place. Hate is 
therefore concreted the more a group believes they hold “positive, inclusive, and 
desirable” values while the other group does not (Baumeister, 1999, p.182). 
Inevitably following from this, it may then become almost an obligation to hate those 
who seem to conflict with these values (ibid, p.182). Viewing people in this one-
dimensional manner (simply as evil and nothing else) also serves as a method for 
dehumanization as it lets people believe they are dealing with people who do not 
think or feel like other, good human beings. 
Hatred clearly plays a large part in disinhibiting terrorists to act violently because, as 
noted previously, much of the time this hatred comes from feelings of anger, which 
helps people to surpass feelings of empathy. As Sternberg’s model demonstrates, 
feelings of hatred can help enormously in breaking down inhibitions against violence, 
especially in terms of ‘us versus then’ thinking and dehumanization. Indeed, Dillon 
(1994) notes that while “it would be incorrect to claim that all members of the 
Provisional IRA share a hatred of the English” it can still be stated that “such an 
element does exist within the IRA psyche” (Dillon, 1994, p.210). For example, as one 
IRA member explains, “we fought the English to liberate part of this country, yet 
they… allow their underlings… to treat the Catholic population like shit…The 
English people have their army on our soil killing our people… Ask people who were 
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colonized what they think of the English and they will be the same as me. Ask the 
English and the hatred is mutual” (ibid, p.210).  Martin McGartland, an ex-IRA 
member, illustrates the existence of such hate, noting that even as a young person 
when he and his friends would attempt to attack British Army vehicles and succeed in 
stopping them they would cheer and feel “exhilarated” at what was seen by them as a 
triumph over the “hated enemy” (1997, p.23). Anger throughout the Catholic Irish 
community was also especially noticeable whenever they believed they were being 
treated unfairly or perceived they had been attacked by their ‘enemy’. For example, 
after the death of Bobby Sands, an imprisoned IRA member who succeeded in 
deliberately starving himself to death while in prison, it was observed that “the anger 
throughout the community was almost tangible” and many people had become “so 
passionate and bitter” about the issue (McGartland, 1997). On this issue, much of the 
anger and hatred was centred on the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and 
following the hunger strike situation, one member of the republican movement 
commented that he was “heartbroken when Thatcher wasn’t killed in the Brighton 
bomb”, explaining that her policy toward the hunger strikers had caused him feel this 
way (Toolis, 1995, p.349).
Hatred is also very much present in Palestinian suicide bombers’ justifications for 
terrorism against Israelis. One convicted Palestinian terrorist argued that his hate 
toward Israelis was in reaction to the way Palestinians perceive they have been 
treated: “You Israelis… adopted methods of collective punishment, you uprooted 
people from their homeland and from their homes and chased them into exile. You 
fired live ammunition at women and children. You smashed the skulls of defenceless 
civilians” (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003, p.178). Indeed, the interviewers of the 
imprisoned terrorists noted that the feeling of hate toward Israelis throughout the 
interviewing process was “remarkable” (ibid). Others argue in a similar line of 
reasoning. For example, Eyad El Sarraj, a Palestinian psychiatrist working in Gaza, 
notes that “anybody who is living in this area… would have seen the rise of 
temperature, the rise of hatred, the rise of anger every year after year” of both militant 
and non-militant Palestinians (Simon, 2003), especially since the beginning of the 
uprising in 2000. Often this intense anger and hatred is in response to the killing of a 
friend or family member, as in the case of Hanadi Garidat, who went on to blow 
herself up in an Israeli restaurant. Both Garidat’s brother and cousin had recently 
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been killed by Israeli forces, and she was known to have remarked shortly after their 
deaths that “the killer will pay the price… If our people cannot live in freedom and 
dignity, then let all the world be destroyed” (Kimhi and Even, 2004, p.18).
The first two sections of this chapter have sought to show how a lack of empathy and 
harbouring hate towards a person or group of people are able to create the conditions 
for the process of disinhibition in relation to killing to occur. The remainder of this 
chapter looks at the concept of dehumanization, its importance to understanding 
disinhibition in terrorism, and its relation to the other concepts that have been 
examined in this chapter.
Dehumanization:
Dehumanization, as characterized in previous chapters, is a process whereby a person 
comes to view others as either subhuman or inhuman. This can mean regarding 
another person (or more generally a group of people) as, for example, a “crazed killer, 
sadistic torturer, rapist, barbarian, gorilla, saber-toothed monster, reptile, rat or devil” 
(Beck, 1999, p.204). Bandura (1990) states that “the strength of self-censuring 
reactions to injurious conduct depends partly on how the perpetrator views the people 
toward whom the harmful behaviour is directed… it is difficult to mistreat humanized 
persons without risking self-condemnation” (p.180).
One of the main reasons dehumanization is able to accelerate disinhibited aggressive 
behaviour is because it alleviates the necessity to feel guilt about violence against 
others (Baumeister, 1999). In other words, there is far less of a chance that a person 
will feel guilty about harming something non-human than they will human because 
any “human connection” between the terrorist and their victims will have been 
severed (ibid). As Bernard, Ottenberg and Redl state about the dehumanization 
process and viewing others in dehumanized terms, “if they are [seen as] subhumans 
they have not yet reached full human status on the evolutionary ladder and, therefore, 
do not merit being treated as human” (1971, p.105). Indeed, even if a person appears 
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to have a sense of morality, they may not feel any guilt over harming dehumanized 
others because “regarding others outside our universe of moral obligation, and, 
therefore, not deserving of compassionate treatment removes normal moral 
constraints against aggression” (Waller, 2002, p.245). Feelings of guilt are thus 
overridden because the perpetrator sees their victim as distinctly dissimilar to 
themselves and other people generally (Baumeister, 1999). 
The lack of a human connection between perpetrator and victim, as alluded to earlier, 
is also important to the disinhibiting process for terrorists, because there is a high 
degree of emotional detachment from the situation. This is because once a person 
begins to view others in dehumanized terms, their relationship to them becomes 
“stereotyped, rigid, and… unexpressive of mutuality” (Bernard, Ottenberg and Redl, 
1971, p.112). Thus, dehumanization is able to produce a state of “psychic numbing” 
because a persons’ capacity to make human connections to those they target is from 
then on severely reduced (Kelman, 1973, p.52). This state of psychic numbing lets a 
person lose their ability to “act as a moral being”, and can occur due to what was 
mentioned near the beginning of this chapter about what may happen if there exists an 
advanced lack of empathy toward another person or group. Kelman (1973) argues 
that dehumanization arises and is heightened by the degree to which a person does not 
perceive others as being “independent and distinguishable” from other people as well 
as denying that they are part of an “interconnected network of individuals” (p.48-49). 
These two aspects are thus able to further disinhibited behaviour because the injury or 
death of someone else is seen as unimportant, due to the fact that, in Kelman’s words, 
“their death does not move us in a personal way” (1973, p.49).
One important study that has shown the capacity that dehumanization has to 
disinhibit aggressive behaviour is that of Bandura, Underwood and Fromson (1975). 
Their study, as mentioned in chapter two, examined two variables – diffusion of 
responsibility and dehumanization of victims – in terms of their ability to affect 
disinhibited aggressive behaviour. The experiments in the study consisted of subjects 
that were presented with other participants who had been portrayed to the subjects in 
humanized, dehumanized and neutral terms by the experimenters. The subjects were 
informed that they had to shock the other participants as punishment when they did 
something that the subjects had been informed was a wrong response. Results clearly 
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showed that “dehumanized performers were treated more than twice as punitively” as 
the humanized participants, and noticeably more harshly than those not characterized 
as either (Bandura, Underwood and Fromson, 1975, p.266). This study also 
highlighted the ability that viewing others in dehumanized terms has on escalating 
aggression, as the experimenters noted that “when punishment usually failed to 
eliminate errors, aggression was precipitously escalated to extreme levels with 
dehumanized performers; it increased gradually then levelled off at a moderate level 
with neutral performers; and, after an initial rise, it deescalated and fluctuated around 
a low level of punishment with humanized performers” (ibid, p.265). Interestingly, 
the study also noted that while dehumanization on its own is not able to fully 
disinhibit violent behaviour, when it was combined with other mechanisms, 
especially diffusion of responsibility, disinhibition as a process came about far more 
quickly and was able to yield harsher behaviour (Bandura, Underwood and Fromson, 
1975). In the case of terrorism, this experiment shows just how simple dehumanizing 
others can be, as well as demonstrating its link with continued and harsher violence 
against others.
Dehumanization by IRA Members and Palestinian Suicide Bombers
Within the IRA and amongst Palestinian suicide bombers, examples of 
dehumanization are not difficult to find. Indeed, republican ideology from its 
beginnings has continuously viewed the British in Ireland as “representatives of an 
occupying force” rather than as people (Drake, 1998). The IRA have also been known 
to view their enemies as ‘types’: for example,“ ‘corner boy’ ex-servicemen, ‘black’ 
Orangemen or freemasons, dirty tramps and ‘tinkers’” (Hart, 1999). Those who were 
seen as belonging to such categories would often be “denounced as ‘informers’, or 
‘enemies of the republic’ and shot, burned out, or intimidated” (ibid, p.230). The 
comments of Maria McGuire, a former IRA member, also indicate the extent to 
which dehumanization was evident within the organization: “I admit that at the time I 
did not connect with the people who were killed in … explosions. I always judged 
such deaths in terms of the effect they would have on our support” (McGuire, 1987, 
p.103).
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An obvious example of the IRA’s dehumanization of the enemy can be found in one 
particular propaganda poster distributed by members of the organization. This poster 
depicts the British as pigs with blood dripping from their exceptionally large fang-
like teeth, with the words “British Pigs!” in capital letters below the dripping blood 
(Keen, 1986, p.113). Interestingly, one IRA gunman was also known to have 
described the shooting of his ‘enemies’ in Ireland as like “aiming at the moving ducks 
in a fairground shooting gallery” (McGuire, 1987, p.75). In addition to the above 
examples, in 1992 IRA gunmen set out to shoot and kill a part-time UDR man named 
Eric Glass while he was off-duty and at his day job. After this mission failed and one 
of the IRA men was killed instead, the dead IRA man’s family argued that their son 
would have set out to kill Glass as an “enemy”, and would not have been attacking 
him “as a person” because Glass would have been seen as a “representation of the 
British occupation” of Ireland and nothing more (Toolis, 1995, p.356-358).
Dehumanization of the enemy in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers also appears 
to be important for disinhibiting aggressive and violent behaviour. Militant 
Palestinian groups constantly refer to Israelis as the “Zionist enemy” (Karmon, 2003), 
the “Zionist Occupier” (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003), or similarly as the “Zionist 
foe” (Abu-Amr, 1994). The Hamas charter itself states that it is imperative for all 
young Palestinians to meticulously study “the enemy and its material and human 
potential; to detect its weak and strong spots” and also teaches about Israel and 
Israelis – characterizing the Israelis not as people but as a concept – that “the Zionist 
invasion is a vicious invasion. It does not refrain from resorting to all methods, using 
all evil and despicable and repulsive ways to achieve its desires” 
(www.hamasonline.com , 2004). This description of the ‘enemy’ clearly serves to 
depict them in such dehumanized terms as a merciless aggressor or simply as some 
kind of evil, monstrous, non-human entity.
One imprisoned Palestinian terrorist exemplifies how dehumanization is able to 
disinhibit violent behaviour as he views his victims not as people but instead as a 
faceless body count: “the main thing was the amount of blood. The aim was to cause 
as much carnage as possible” (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003, p.183). A clear 
illustration of dehumanization of the enemy can be found in a chant that went up in a 
crowd shortly after the news of a suicide bombing perpetrated by Islamic Jihad, 
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where the casualties of the attack were referred to by those in the crowd as “the death 
of twenty monkeys, the injuries of sixty pigs!” (Robins and Post, 1997, p.146). Other 
clear examples of dehumanization of the enemy can be found in the suicide notes that 
bombers leave behind. For example, in the will of a Palestinian suicide bomber, who 
committed an attack in 1995, it was written that “I am going to take revenge upon the 
sons of monkeys and the pigs, the Zionist infidels and the enemies of humanity” 
(Brooks, 2002, p.19).
Euphemistic Language
One of the most important avenues leading to and reinforcing dehumanization is 
euphemistic language. Euphemistic language is not only able to reinforce 
dehumanization but it is also central in creating the essential psychological distance 
for the perpetrator from their victim. In explaining the role that euphemisms play in 
disinhibition of aggression, Bandura (1990) writes that “activities can take on a very 
different appearance depending on what they are called. Euphemistic language thus 
provides a convenient device for masking reprehensible activities or even conferring 
a respectable status upon them” (p.170). Euphemistic language also allows 
perpetrators of violence to escape confronting the real meaning of the words they use, 
and is able to suppress any “moral revulsion” that using the normal words would 
provoke (Kelman, 1973, p.48). Although euphemistic language is referred to in 
upcoming chapters, it has special importance to this chapter because of its ability to 
use language to transform people into subhuman or inhuman objects. 
An illustration of euphemistic language used in terrorism is when terrorists describe 
themselves as “freedom fighters” who fight in response to repressive forces, or when 
they refer to the deaths of those who were not their intended targets as, for example, 
“collateral damage” (Bandura, 1990, p.170). When using euphemisms to label other 
people or the violent acts themselves, there are usually two types of euphemisms that 
are most often employed to dehumanize victims (Baumeister, 1999).  Firstly, there is 
the ‘extermination’ metaphor, where it is stated that “to say the enemy must be 
exterminated is to reduce the enemy to the status of subhuman vermin” (ibid, p.317). 
Once the subhumanity of the victim is established, killing them is much more easily 
justified as it is presented as the disposing of “worthless, troublesome pests” (ibid, 
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p.317). Secondly, there is also a ‘medical’ metaphor (Baumeister, 1999). The most 
common example of the use of this metaphor is the “analogy of amputation”, where 
the victims of violence are presented as something along the lines of a diseased body 
part, which if cut off or removed will save what remains of the body (ibid, p.317). 
Interestingly, the usage of this medical metaphor to create euphemisms also 
encourages the perception that the victims are deserving of any violent actions taken 
against them. This is because they end up being depicted as “carriers of disease who 
pose the risk of infecting the rest of the societal body. They may look like ordinary 
human beings, but in fact they are dangerous” (Baumeister, 1999, p.317). 
Within the IRA, euphemistic labelling plays a subtle yet evident role. Virtually all 
IRA members refer to their violence against those they target as, for example, an 
‘armed struggle’, or a “military war of national liberation” (Coogan, 1993) and 
particular missions themselves as an ‘operation’, often shortened to just an ‘op’ 
(McGartland, 1997, p.176). As well as this, the killing of people is often referred to as 
‘stiffing’. For example, one IRA member commented that for one operation in 
particular it should be possible to “stiff at least a dozen” of their enemy (ibid, p.253). 
While not regarding themselves as terrorists, those belonging to the IRA prefer to 
label themselves in such terms as revolutionaries (MacStiofain, 1975) guerrillas 
(Dillon, 1994) or freedom fighters (McGuire, 1987). 
Euphemisms are prevalent to a higher degree amongst Palestinian suicide bombers. A 
news item on the official Hamas website, for example, often refers to its suicide 
bombers as “martyrdom bombers” who succeed in carrying out “operations” within 
Israel against “Zionist” targets such as buses (www.hamasonline.com , 2004). Indeed, 
the clearest illustration of the use of euphemisms in the Palestinian terrorism context 
is that an act of suicide terrorism is always reworded into such terms as a “martyrdom 
operation”, which obviously takes away from the fact that suicide bombings are 
designed not only to kill the bomber but to take away the lives of as many ‘enemies’ 
as possible. As well as this, senior Hamas military commanders claim that suicide 
attacks are so effective because they guarantee that a “large number of the enemy” 
will be “affected”, rather than mentioning they would be killed or maimed (Hassan, 
2001). In another example of euphemistic language, this time in accordance with the 
medical metaphor approach that was described earlier, one imprisoned Palestinian 
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terrorist recalls that “the sheik… used to explain to us the significance of the fact that 
there was an IDF military outpost in the heart of the [refugee] camp. He compared it 
to a cancer in the human body, which was threatening [the camp’s] very existence” 
(Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003, p.177).  
Conclusion: 
Releasing any inhibitions a person has against violence toward other human beings 
has been shown to be reasonably easy to achieve if a person harbours a sense of 
hatred towards a particular person or group, has a distinct lack of empathy towards 
them, or views them in a dehumanized manner. While this may seem simplistic, the 
psychological processes behind hatred, empathy and dehumanization should not be 
underestimated. As this chapter demonstrated, a lack of empathy is related to 
attributing blame to others for one’s own violence, an important disinhibitory 
mechanism, as well as the perception of dissimilarity between people who really are 
not that different, and also has a close link to anger. The creation of hate toward 
others was also shown to have a relationship with anger, and just as importantly, to 
beliefs such as the myth of pure evil. Dehumanization, which often stems from a 
complete lack of empathy for particular people or groups of people, is perhaps one of 
the most important disinhibitors of violent behaviour when it comes to terrorism, as 
exemplified by the two illustrative cases. Dehumanization is such a significant 
disinhibitor for the reasons emphasized in this chapter; namely, its ability to absolve 
people of feelings of guilt for violence and its ability to provide a substantial amount 
of psychological distance between a perpetrator and their victim(s). Dehumanization 
is also often reinforced through the use of euphemistic language, as shown clearly 
through the examples of the IRA and Palestinian suicide terrorism. The following 
chapter, while focussing on cultural belief systems and the processes associated with 
them, also highlights many of the points emphasized in this chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
CULTURE AND BELIEF SYSTEM
Belonging to a culture provides for its members a history, a sense of values and 
morality, and above all, a sense of identity. This chapter seeks to understand how a 
culture and its belief system are able to act as agents of disinhibition in relation to 
terrorism. As such, it analyses socialization, education, and cultural myths and 
ideologies. It discusses what socialization is, why it is important, and looks at what 
the ‘agents’ of socialization are, for example, parents and family members. Although 
education is a form of socialization, it will be looked at as a separate section because 
of its importance on its own in being able to affect people’s thoughts and actions. 
This section looks at such influences as school and government teachings as well as 
the role of the media in shaping attitudes and beliefs. The importance of cultural 
myths and ideologies should not be underestimated, which is why this chapter 
devotes a section to it as well as the above concepts. This later part of the chapter thus
looks at the prevalence, importance, and effects that historical cultural myths and 
cultural ideologies have on those living within a culture. Like the previous chapter, 
examples of the concepts and ideas discussed will be taken from the IRA and 
Palestinian suicide bombers in order to provide a fuller picture of the importance that 
cultural processes and cultural sanctioning of particular beliefs and behaviours play in 
disinhibiting aggressive and violent behaviour. 
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Socialization: The Family and Social Group:
It is through a process of socialization that an individual comes to learn cultural 
norms and appropriate rules of behaviour. Essentially, socialization can be defined as 
“the process by which the infant learns the ways of a given social group and is 
molded into an effective participant” (Dager, 1971, p. ix-x). It is a process that passes 
on “the lessons of the past to the current generation” and it also provides a model of 
what the culture says is the correct way to act in order to become a good citizen and
person (Zimbardo, 1999). One main reason it is such an important process for 
releasing inhibitions for participating in terrorism is because it is able to affect 
thoughts and behaviour gradually, often perhaps unnoticeably. To illustrate this point, 
Bandura (1990) argues that terrorist behaviour develops through an “extensive” 
socialization process, instead of “emerging full-blown”. As such, “the path to 
terrorism can be shaped by… the conjoint influence of personal predilections and 
social inducements. Development of the capability to kill usually evolves through a 
process in which recruits may not fully recognize the transformation they are 
undergoing” (ibid, p.185-6). While a significant amount of terrorist groups appear to 
observers to be out of line with that particular culture’s values, it seems pertinent to 
note that in cultures where conflict against some other ethnic group is the norm, 
cultural sanctioning of terrorist actions, whether implicit or explicit, can help to lower 
people’s inhibitions against participating in violent activities, as the illustrative cases 
demonstrate further on in this chapter.
Social learning theory (see Windmiller, Lambert and Turiel, 1980) puts forth the 
argument that “human nature is characterized as a vast potentiality that can be 
fashioned by social influences into a variety of forms” (Bandura, 1973, p.113). 
Because of this, socialization is theorized to exert a very powerful influence on an 
individual. Indeed, according to social learning theory, psychologically every human 
being is a “clean slate on which society writes the experience for the individual. The 
family, the social class, the institutions, and the culture into which one is born 
determine to a great extent the life of the individual” (Windmiller, 1980, p.4). 
54
Parents and other family members have an especially influential role in socializing 
the culture’s norms and values to their children. Indeed, social learning theory
assumes that values and morals are primarily attained from the influences of parents 
through such practices as modeling and imitation, which are “then gradually 
internalized in early childhood… Reinforcement, whether positive or negative, and 
punishment help determine which of the learned moral behaviours will be 
internalized” (Windmiller, 1980, p.22). In social learning theory, then, the parental 
role is a crucial one in “directly inculcating” the principles and morals of the culture 
(ibid).
 Even outside of social learning theory, it is also argued that family members 
(especially parents) are one of the main ways in which a person learns the appropriate 
social behaviour of a given culture. In this way, it is noted that the prospects for 
people, and especially children, to “learn from and imitate other family members” are 
vast, and that “even when there are strong negative overtones, their influence cannot 
be denied” (Barner Barry and Rosenwein, 1985, p.93-94).The immediate social and 
peer group to which one belongs is also a significant agent of socialization and is 
closely related to the effect that family members have on socializing beliefs. It is 
theorized that once children become adolescent or even pre-adolescent, there is a 
propensity to look out for and identify with role models – Barner-Barry and 
Rosenwein argue that within peer groups “there is a definite tendency toward 
contagion” in relation to certain behaviours, and note that the power of peer groups is 
such that their influence does not stop when a child becomes an adult (1985, p.97).  
Indeed, while children grow and learn with their friends, adults have their “friendship 
groups… professional groups, and work groups, as well as religious, fraternal, sports, 
and civic organizations”, which also serve as socializing influences for a culture’s 
norms and values (ibid, p.97).  
Part of the IRA’s tradition of violence can be attributed to the influence of family 
members and the wider social group. For instance, even in the mid-1990s, in smaller 
rural communities in Ireland at least, “it is still true that a certain amount of emotional 
satisfaction is derived from having a known IRA man living in the neighbourhood; 
and people will do good turns for him even though they publicly disown his methods” 
(Moxon-Browne, 1993, p.151-152). From this example, it can be seen that IRA 
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members do indeed hold some sort of revered place in certain communities and social 
groups. This kind of cultural sanctioning helps give legitimation to the IRA as an 
organization, as it permeates through the community the message that supporting and 
participating in the organization is to some extent morally justified, or at the very 
least morally permissible.
An example of the influence of social and peer groups on attitudes and behaviours 
can be found in certain games and activities many young Irish children participated in 
while growing up. As former IRA man Martin McGartland writes, “stopping the 
Saracens [British Army vehicles] became one of our favourite sports. The stronger 
boys would steal aluminium beer kegs from the pub … When the Saracens were a 
few yards away, they would all hurl the kegs at the same time. The kegs would 
usually bounce off harmlessly but sometimes the Saracens would be brought to a 
halt… Stopping the Saracens…. would be the talk of the school playground for days” 
(1993, p.23).  From these kinds of games, children were able to learn about who their 
‘enemy’ was as well as learning that what they were doing brought them not 
punishment but a higher social status amongst people of their own age. This may in 
turn have also helped to lower others’ inhibitions to joining in with such activities.
Additionally, there are some communities in particular throughout both the North and 
South of Ireland which help to fuel support for and legitimate IRA violence. Within 
these communities, the entire population contributes toward ‘the struggle’ in some 
way, often either assisting the IRA in a financial sense or by becoming an active 
member (Apter, 1990). Growing up and living in such an atmosphere can clearly 
affect attitudes toward violence and the ‘rightness’ of the IRAs cause, and may also 
therefore lower inhibitions to joining the group and taking part in its activities, as 
such behaviour is seen as culturally sanctioned. Indeed, in some towns and 
communities there are even “murals on outside walls [which] juxtapose Che Guevara, 
IRA Provisionals and the guns and berets of the Black Panthers”, while in others 
“everyone has scrapbooks, objects, letters and poems involving prison and the 
struggle” (Apter, 1990). In these kinds of cases, socialization is able to culturally 
sanction and legitimate the IRA and its activities, which therefore also helps to lower 
inhibitions to taking part in the organization’s terrorist activities, as it becomes 
socially acceptable and even praiseworthy to do so.
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It is also pertinent to note that, particularly early on in the twentieth century, those 
joining the IRA did so more often than not with friends or relatives, and that it was 
“these relationships that determined who became members and activists” (Hart, 1999, 
p.228). In Cork, during the same period, almost half of the areas’ IRA members were 
either next-door neighbours or members of the same family (ibid, p.228). Joe 
McManus, an IRA man shot dead while on an Army ‘operation’, was clearly 
influenced by family members and their attitude toward the IRA. Explained his father 
in a press statement shortly after Joe’s death, “we respect his decision to join Oglaigh 
na hEireann [the IRA]… Joseph believed as we do, that our country will never have 
peace until Britain leaves Ireland and its people are free to decide their own future. 
We are deeply proud of him” (Toolis, 1995, p.361-362). Interestingly, a number of 
Irish families (though of course not all) seem to have held similar views about their 
own children or family members joining the organization.
In Palestinian areas, it appears that suicide bombing is culturally sanctioned to such a 
high degree that there exists a “cult of the suicide bomber”, to the extent that it is 
believed “there is no higher calling” than becoming a suicide bomber for Palestine 
(Simon, 2003). Such an environment clearly paves the way for surpassing inhibitions 
against terrorism, as suicide bombing is not only culturally sanctioned; it has been 
revered by a large majority of society. The influence of particularly parents and 
siblings is especially important in the case of Palestinian suicide bombing, as family 
is vitally important in Palestinian culture as a whole (Shinar, 1987, p85). For 
example, one captured would-be suicide bomber remarked that if his mother had
learnt of his death as a ‘martyr’, she would have “burst with joy” (Simon, 2003). 
Munir al Makdah, a trainer of Palestinian terrorists, has even remarked that 
Palestinian youths come to him from their parent’s homes “already imbued with a 
certain sense of wanting to fight” (Davis, 2003, p.154). Other families promote 
cultural symbols of suicide bombing throughout their homes, such as displaying 
posters of green birds flying through a purple sky (Hassan, 2001). A Palestinian 
woman, with two young sons, argued that it was the “duty of every Palestinian 
mother to encourage her sons and daughters to become martyrs” (Victor, 2003, 
p.102). 
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Perhaps nowhere else is this sentiment more acute than in the example of Um Nidal, 
the mother of a male suicide bomber who she encouraged throughout his life to 
become a martyr for the Palestinian cause. When he and her other children were 
young, Nidal harboured a Hamas commander for well over a year in her home, in 
which time her son was able to learn about Hamas and essentially became his “pupil” 
(Victor, 2003, p.166). Years later, after Nidal’s son would go out with a gun at 
different times in order to shoot Israelis but come back without success, his mother 
would calm her son and tell him that “an opportunity would happen and to be patient, 
plan well” in readiness for his impending martyrdom (Victor, 2003, p.167). After her 
son had finally succeeded in a suicide attack, the entire family boasted of their son 
and brother’s attack, his mother proudly justifying it by saying “jihad is a 
commandment imposed on all of us” (ibid, p.166). While this may seem a somewhat 
extreme example, the views of Nidal and the values her family hold can be seen in 
many Palestinian families (Davis, 2003).
Aside from family, one significant influence for young Palestinians to participate in 
terrorist activities is their friends and wider social group – as one imprisoned 
Palestinian terrorist explained at the time he joined a terrorist group, “everyone was 
joining”, and, during that time at least, it was often friends who recruited each other 
(Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003). When someone joined a group, they were then 
“treated with great respect” by those in their community and received “better 
treatment than unaffiliated kids” by their social group (ibid, p.178). On top of this, it 
was remarked that anyone who did not join during the most recent intifada was 
“ostracized” by the rest of their friends and social group as a whole. In Gaza 
especially, where Hamas enjoys plenty of popular support from all different age 
groups, suicide terrorism appears to be culturally sanctioned without question, as 
Hamas flags fly from many homes and workplaces throughout the region, 
complemented by vast amounts of graffiti celebrating the many suicide bombers and 
martyrs that have died in the name of Palestine (Davis, 2003, p.108). 
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Socialization: The Education Process:
Apart from the socializing influence of families and social groups, perhaps the most 
significant socialization agents are those in the service of educating their citizens; 
namely schools, governments, and in many cases, the media. These agents of 
socialization are able to help people to surpass inhibitions to kill others because they 
often – although in some cases unwittingly – further culturally sanction the path to 
terrorism.
Schooling
What a person learns while at school about their culture and social values, as well as 
the world that surrounds them, has a lasting effect that in many cases is carried into 
adulthood. The school system is able to endorse current social values and thereby 
perpetuate and solidify such values in the culture for a new generation. One main way 
the school system is able to indoctrinate, condition, and thus socialize people is 
through manipulation of what is, and also what is not, learned. This is usually decided 
by government authorities, and is able to have an enormous effect on a person’s view 
of their own culture as well as the wider world.
 While “all nations educate children to learn information that the state believes it is 
vital for them to know”, educational processes can become “distorted” so that, for 
example, children are taught falsities about their culture’s history – some history 
teachings may even fail to mention the history of their violence or aggression against 
other nations, or for that matter, their own military defeats (Zimbardo, 1999). This 
clearly has an effect on the way in which citizens of a state view themselves and 
others. Zimbardo (1999) uses Nazi Germany as an example of how governments and 
government agencies are able to influence and to an extent control the education of its 
citizens, explaining that some textbooks given to children in particular focussed on 
perpetuating invented stereotypes of Jews as “the lecherous villain… the heartless 
landlord… [and] the thieving doctor”. The end of such texts would then instruct the 
reader on ways in which to help Germany be rid of Jewish people by commanding
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“kick them out of your school” or even “expel them from your country” (ibid). From 
examples like these, it is obvious that such methods of education are important in 
cultivating hatred and stereotypes of different groups of people, as well as helping to 
begin the process of dehumanizing an ‘enemy’. In cultures where terrorism and 
conflict are widespread, then, education can serve as a very important tool for 
sanctioning violence and thus lowering inhibitions against participating in it. An 
interesting example of this can be seen in the ‘madrassas’, clandestine religious 
schools in Pakistan, where many current Islamist militants and militant leaders across 
the world are known to have studied (Ahmed-Ullah and Barker, 2004). Madrassas are 
run by “politically powerful clerics” and essentially teach a particular version of 
Islam and its values that promotes intolerance of others and sanctioning of violence 
for certain causes. Interestingly, the madrassas are funded by wealthy Muslims from 
around the world, and teach an estimated 1.5 million people a year (ibid). While some 
claim that these schools do not teach militant ideas, the madrassas are nonetheless 
known to be one of Al Qaeda’s main recruiting bases (ibid). 
Differing to such an example, the IRA has been, and to a high degree still is, an 
underground organization, and as such the movement as a whole has not been 
propagated through the school system. However, the school curriculum in the 
Republic of Ireland can be viewed at times as a subtle vehicle for nationalism, which 
can, in conjunction with other forces, give rise to violence. During the mid twentieth 
century, the education of Irish children was such that it instilled in children a “strong 
anti-British bias” and taught them little about the conflict and divisions within their
own society (Coogan, 2002, p.246). For example, history lessons were essentially 
composed of teachings about invasions by the English of Ireland, the movements to 
counter them, and the Irish potato famine, leaving out anything after 1921, and 
included only a “smattering” of the history of the rest of Europe (ibid, p.246-247). 
This process of socializing served to devalue the English and consequently led Irish 
children to grow up believing a very one-sided view of what many believed to be 
their enemy.  In the current school system, it is interesting to note that primary 
school children are still taught about Wolfe Tone, an Irish cultural hero whose ideas 
the IRA heavily draws on, as well as other Irish cultural icons such as Michael 
Collins (www.scoilnet.ie, 2005). In Northern Ireland, the divisions and sectarian 
tensions are far more acute than in the South, and it is still the norm for Catholic 
60
children to go to Catholic schools and Protestants to Protestant schools, and both 
perceive their identities and cultures as distinctly different 
(www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/educ.htm, 2004). This apparent segregation provides the 
opportunity for ‘us versus them thinking’ to become entrenched, knowingly or 
unknowingly, from a very young age.
The way in which schools educate young Palestinians clearly plays a role in lowering 
inhibitions against terrorism. This education process starts when the children are very 
young; for instance, even in some pre-schools, children get dressed up as suicide 
bombers for particular activities, while even younger ones are taught to chant 
previous bombers’ names (Valenty, 2004, p.11). This serves to establish and 
legitimate particular cultural values, and can often then result in a lowering of 
inhibitions against certain violent behaviour later on in life. Some primary schools 
endeavour to carry on practices such as this, serving to entrench the legitimation of 
terrorism to their students. Palestinian children’s textbooks (written in Egypt and 
Jordan and distributed to schools by the Palestinian Authority), for example, have 
taught and reinforced such cultural beliefs through such teachings as “know, my son, 
that Palestine is your country… that its pure soil is drenched with the blood of 
martyrs” (Burdman, 2003, p.99). These kinds of teachings culturally sanction 
martyrdom and help to affirm the cultural belief that Israel belongs to Palestinians, 
and as such also help to further the release of inhibitions against violence. 
Devaluation of Jews is also very much present in such textbooks. In one standard 
textbook, entitled Islamic Education for Eighth Grade, it teaches on the topic of 
racism that “mankind has suffered from this evil both in ancient as well as modern 
times, for indeed Satan has, in the eyes of many people, made their actions appear 
beautiful… such a people are the Jews…” (ibid, p.99). This can affect disinhibition of 
behaviour as it demonizes Jews by aligning them with satanic forces.
While textbooks distributed after the year 2000 are notably less obvious in their 
incitement of violence, the newer books still stress how Palestinians have an 
“obligation to fight and regain” historic Palestine, and at the same time promote the 
value of martyrdom for the nation on a regular basis (Burdman, 2003, p.100). In 
addition to textbooks, after the first female Palestinian committed a suicide bombing 
in 2002, schoolchildren throughout Palestinian areas were instructed to chant the 
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suicide attackers name at the beginning of classes for some time after her death 
(Victor, 2003, p.54). 
During summer breaks from school, many children in Palestinian areas – some as 
young as eight – have attended “summer camps”, where they learn about suicide 
bombers and are taught military drills (Brooks, 2002). According to Burdman (2003), 
it has been estimated that close to 50,000 children have been enrolled in such camps. 
The children are dressed up in military uniforms, and older children learn to assemble 
guns while younger ones recite phrases similar to and including “children of my 
country… I am the suicide squad” (Burdman, 2003, p.104). Both these summer 
camps and the school system as a whole appear to be directed by the Palestinian 
National Authority (Burdman, 2003). In addition to this, Al Najah University in 
Nablus is very much influenced by its Student Council, which is controlled by 
members of both Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (Victor, 2003, p.155). Over 135 
suicide bombers have been at one time enrolled in this institution, and it is commonly 
known throughout Israel to be the “most radical” of Palestinian tertiary institutions 
(ibid). Growing up around such influences as the ones described above clearly shows 
how cultural sanctioning of terrorism gradually serves to break down inhibitions 
against participating in it.
Governing Bodies
The importance of government and government agencies extends further than just its 
role in schools. One method by which political regimes can educate and socialize 
their citizens to a particular cause or belief is to evoke feelings of nationalism. By
appealing to its citizens in the form of ‘this is in the national interest’, governments 
and national leaders may be able to elicit new attitudes toward particular issues or 
questions, especially if there already exists an element of nationalism or patriotism in 
the culture. Interestingly, and as Bar-Tal (1997) argues, a sense of patriotism “can be 
found in every ethnographic group that lives in a geographic space” throughout the 
world (p.246). Combining patriotism with the need for violent action, then, may act 
as a disinhibitor for terrorist actions. For instance, especially in situations of war or 
conflict, leaders or governments in general are often able to “socially construct” the 
nation so that it becomes an “object of… attachment” for much of the populace 
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(Stern, 1995, p.229). Socializing to particular attitudes or beliefs, then, may be 
achieved by national leaders through “a long-term investment in parades, holidays, 
and other collective events that classically condition positive responses to national 
symbols like flags” (ibid, p.229). 
Of course, national leaders’ main avenue to socialize certain attitudes or beliefs in 
order to permeate a culture is through a campaign of propaganda designed to promote 
one’s own culture while devaluing others. As above with evoking nationalist 
attitudes, this is most often used, and is most effective, when mobilizing for war or in 
times of conflict. The main advantage of propaganda is that it is able to create and 
permeate through a culture a “universal image of the enemy”, which is reinforced 
throughout society by way of  “posters, cartoons, and magazine illustrations” usually 
depicting the enemy in dehumanized or demonized terms, for example as a reptile or 
a “demonic enemy of God” (Waller, 2002, p.248). 
Devaluation as a process often frequently develops into being part of a culture, but 
can vary in its “form and intensity” (Staub, 1999, p.183). A state may educate and 
socialize their citizens to devalue “different” groups of people, whether those they 
devalue live in the same national borders or further abroad, or simply just maintain 
the attitudes and measures of devaluation that already exist within the culture.
Devaluation is important because once it becomes part of a culture, 
Its literature, art, and media are perpetuated in social institutions, and, especially once it gives 
rise to discrimination or other institutionalized forms of antagonism, it becomes highly 
resistant to change. Even when its public expression is relatively quiescent for a period of 
time… it often remains part of the deep structure of the culture and can re-emerge when 
instigating conditions for violence are present (Staub, 1999, p.183-4).
Indeed, as articulated in the previous chapter, devaluation plays a significant part in 
furthering the disinhibition process as it often helps to advance the dehumanization of 
particular groups or individual people. In a cultural context, devaluation is usually 
promulgated by categorization of individuals. Described as a “pervasive cognitive 
process”, categorizing others as, for instance, simply either “good” or “evil” helps 
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potential terrorists or terrorist groups to lower their inhibitions against harming others 
they see as inferior or bad because a detached or dehumanized view of others is made 
possible. As Moghaddam (2004) notes, “in such contexts, people are not treated as 
individuals who share characteristics with all humanity… Consequently, the only 
thing that matters is whether a person is Catholic or Protestant, Black or White, Arab 
or Israeli, and so on” (p.109).
Apart from the schooling system examined above, many Palestinian leaders 
themselves have effectively sanctioned terrorism by praising both ‘resistance’ against 
their Israeli enemy as well as ingraining the moral value of martyrdom. For example, 
in a public speech directed to Palestinian women and girls early in 2002, Yasser 
Arafat spoke of the need for what he termed as his “army of roses” to sacrifice 
themselves in the struggle against Israel, just as Palestinian men had done for decades 
(Victor, 2003, p.20). He announced that they were “the hope of Palestine” and told 
them they were to “liberate [their] husbands, fathers, and sons from oppression” by 
sacrificing themselves for their family and the nation (ibid, p.20). He then coined the 
phrase “shahida” (the female version of the word martyr or shahid) and began a chant 
that the crowd listening to him carried on: “shahida all the way to Jerusalem” (ibid). 
That same day, the first female suicide bomber carried out an attack, and since then at 
least three others have done the same (Victor, 2003). In addition, Arafat also framed 
one suicide attack on a Tel Aviv youth disco, in which twelve people lost their lives, 
as “an act of sacrifice for Allah and for the homeland” (Kimhi and Even, 2004, p.21).
 Marwan Barghouti, head of Fatah under Yasser Arafat, also helped to encourage 
suicide terror in the way that he claimed that Hamas and Islamic Jihad were 
legitimate organizations in Palestinian culture because of the ‘necessity’ to continue 
fighting Israel, commenting that these groups were “part of our national liberation 
movement” (Davis, 2003, p.102) and hence Palestinian governing bodies would not 
seek to silence them. Barghouti claimed that, even as a Palestinian leader himself, he 
was “ready to sacrifice” himself for the nation if need be (ibid, p.103). Interestingly, 
some of those in Arafat’s former government in 2001 were appealing for Hamas to be 
made part of the Palestinian Authority because of the organization’s popularity 
among Palestinians (ibid, p.99-100). By making these groups effectively legitimate 
influencers in Palestinian politics, inhibitions to joining them may further be released 
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as doing so would be justifiable, perhaps even honourable, as it would be sanctioned 
by the culture’s leadership.
Media
The ability of the mass media in a given society to act as an agent of socialization is 
also an important cultural influence and helps to further disinhibition toward 
terrorism. Put simply, in many cases the media is able to instruct people as to “what 
to think about, how to think about it, sometimes even what to think” (Paletz and 
Entman, 1981). Generally speaking, political regimes have the power to exert a 
considerable amount of control  over the mass media as a whole (Barner-Barry and 
Rosenwein, 1985, p.88), indicating that they are able to educate their citizens of all 
ages on, and then maintain, desired cultural values. While much of the media is to 
some extent controlled by government forces, especially in terms of issues such as 
censorship, sometimes particular groups or organizations are able to infiltrate their 
own journals, magazines or other mediums into mainstream society to get their own 
message across. 
Although the IRA itself does not constitute a political power, its political wing Sinn 
Fein does, as it maintains a sizeable and consistent political following, albeit more so 
in the Republic of Ireland. Sinn Fein itself distributes the weekly magazine An 
Phoblacht (or Republican News) in both Northern Ireland and the South, having done 
so since 1970 (Kingston, 1995, p.205-6), and claims it is “Ireland’s biggest selling 
political weekly” with about 15,000 weekly readers (www.anphoblacht.com, 2005). 
Although only a minor percentage of this magazine is dedicated to legitimizing IRA 
violence, the subject is still “reported regularly” and receives “prominent display” 
(Picard, 1991, p.96). Much of the publication devotes itself to political news such as 
pro-Republican speeches and advertisements, or to stories that help in maintaining the 
perception of ‘loyalists’ and ‘security forces’ as victimizers of Catholics and 
republicans (ibid, p.95). There is also a section, though only a small percentage of the 
publication, that extols martyrdom, where obituaries and commemorations of former 
IRA and Sinn Fein members are listed (ibid, p.95). 
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Differing quite substantially from Ireland, the Palestinian media is essentially 
controlled by Palestinian governing bodies and appears, in terms of television 
especially, not only to sanction violence toward Israelis but in some instances clearly 
acts as a “directive for children toward violence” (Burdman, 2003, p.103). For 
example, clips aired on Palestinian Authority-controlled television stations included 
an interview with adolescent girls waving Palestinian flags while one girl states that 
children must pull together “to expel the enemy Israel… we on our own, the children, 
the boys and girls, will go and kill them, on our own, murder them, shoot them all. 
Just give us weapons” (ibid, p.103). As well as this, all farewell videos prepared by 
suicide bombers are broadcast on television after the suicide attack has taken place 
(Brooks, 2002). Additionally, many television programmes also serve to exalt 
martyrdom. For instance, a cartoon for younger children shows how becoming a 
martyr makes a person “stronger and powerful” (Victor, 2003, p.180).  In this 
cartoon, a child is throwing stones at Israeli soldiers and is then shot and killed by 
them. Later, at his grave, a small white flower grows, purportedly a ‘symbol of 
rebirth’ – as this flower fades, the boy reappears, but this time with an exceptionally 
large rock instead of the stones he had previously. The narrator’s voice then cuts in 
and explains how the child has found “the perfect moment of unity” in paradise due 
to him dying a martyr’s death by fighting Israelis (Victor, 2003, p.180).
Aside from television, popular newspapers and other widely distributed publications 
also at times culturally sanction terrorist activities. An interesting example can be 
found in the death notices of suicide bombers. Much of the time these notices use 
euphemistic language to describe the deaths, and as such these deaths are reported as 
weddings with God. For example, many read like this one : “with great pride, the PIJ 
marries the member of its military wing… the martyr and hero Yasser Al-Adhami, to 
the ‘black-eyed’” (Feldner, 2001; cited in Moghadam, 2003, p.73), the ‘black-eyed’ 
being a reference to the beautiful virgins male suicide bombers believe they will 
receive once in paradise.
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Historical Cultural Myths and Cultural Ideologies: 
The previous two sections of this chapter have shown that socialization agents, such 
as the family and the school system, are imperative in creating a belief system that 
can be sustained through generations. Cultural belief systems are therefore formed to 
a great extent by socialization, and inhibitions against undertaking terrorism can be 
surpassed due to the influence socialization has on culturally sanctioning such 
activities. However, belief systems are also molded by historical cultural myths and 
are very much linked to cultural ideologies. This section of the chapter explains and 
analyses these two concepts and their relation to culture as a disinhibitor of violent 
behaviour. 
Historical Myths
Historical myths exist in every culture throughout the world. As Bennett (1980) 
states, “every political system has a collection of myths that illustrate how the nation 
was founded, the principles it stands for, the qualities of its heroes, the strengths of its 
people, and the wisdom of its laws and institutions” (p.259). An historical cultural 
myth has been defined as a “sacred story or an interpretation of history that tells how 
something important came into being or what it stands for (Bennett, 1980, p.259). 
Much of what people learn about hate and enmity is achieved through such kinds of 
stories: “stories tend to have two fairly stable roles: perpetrator (who is to be hated) 
and victim (who is to be the hater)” (Sternberg, 2003). Cultural myths are important 
disinhibitors of violent behaviour because they provide the opportunity for members 
of a culture to dehumanize and devalue other groups of people while promoting and 
validating their own superiority (Bennett, 1980). The resulting attitudes and beliefs 
about others from this process of dehumanization can be instilled in a culture and 
perpetuated through to later generations because “language becomes a powerful 
cultural weapon as it portrays entire groups of people as sub, or not quite, human” 
(Hirsch, 1985, p.44). As well as this, cultural myths often seek to explain where a 
culture or nation comes from, and as such, these cultural myths often “hold that the 
members of the group or the state descend from divine origins, or are protected by 
divine intervention” (ibid, p.44). To illustrate this, Hirsch gives the example of 
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Nazism and its Aryan mythology, commenting that their appeals to Christianity and 
“ideas of blood and soil” helped to justify notions of German supremacy (1985, p.44-
45).
While myths are able to elicit and sanction particular attitudes or beliefs, they are also 
important because they “create a powerful sense of group identification” (Stern, 1995, 
p.230). Although this topic of groups and group identification is covered in much 
greater depth in chapter six of this thesis, it is necessary to mention it here, as cultural 
myths are also significant in creating an awareness of national identity and national 
consciousness. This may therefore heighten feelings of nationalism, which may prove 
to be important in disinhibiting violent behaviour, especially in cases where terrorism 
is justified by perpetrators as in the name of the nation or national liberation. 
The taking up of arms for Ireland has been a celebrated and cherished occupation in 
Irish history (Heskin, 1980, p.85).  This has been made possible to a large extent by 
the importance that historical myths play in Irish culture. The main myth that exists in 
the Irish psyche, and that forms the main philosophy for the IRA, is the legacy of the 
1916 Easter Rising and its proclamation of independence for the Irish Republic. In the
Rising, Irish republicans revolted against British forces, but were “violently 
suppressed” by British soldiers, and the organizers of the revolt were executed soon 
after (Alonso, 2001, p.132). The leader of this revolt was Patrick Pearse, and the 
uprising included such other important names in Irish history as James Connolly, 
Eamonn De Valera, and Michael Collins (Coogan, 2002). Those executed in the 
revolt therefore became ‘martyrs’ and heroes, idolised by much of the Irish culture, 
and the myth of the 1916 rebellion has essentially proved to have “exerted a decisive 
influence on the republican mentality” for generations to come (Alonso, 2001, p.132). 
Gerry Adams himself, in the mid 1980s, stated that the IRA of the present day “takes 
its historical and organizational origins from the forces which engaged in the Easter 
Rising of 1916” (Adams, 1986; cited in Arthur, 1997, p.242). Indeed, as Kinsella 
(1994) writes, “those engaged in the revolutionary struggle feel no distance between 
themselves and the ‘hayros’ of the past. There is an intimate identification on the part 
of those who are fighting in the present with those who have fallen” (p.24-25). 
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Similarly, cultural myths in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers tend to focus on 
“one of the Palestinians’ most heralded martyrs” (Davis, 2003, p.100), Izzedine al 
Qassam, and the events of 1948, in which the State of Israel formally came into 
being. These cultural myths have helped to inform and maintain the cultural 
ideologies that now permeate Palestinian society and consequently the militant 
groups that exist within it.
Izzedine al Qassam was born in Syria and educated in Egypt early on in the twentieth 
century (Davis, 2003, p.100). He “claimed direct descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad” and often preached at mosques in Haifa, where in the 1920s he started 
to recruit men to join his already existing brigades of soldiers who were fighting the 
British Army and Jewish settlers in Palestine (ibid, p.100-101). He died in a 
confrontation with British soldiers in 1935 but left behind him a significant amount of 
Palestinian guerrilla cells which had been and continued to be relatively successful in 
targeting the British and Jewish settlers (ibid, p.100-101). His ‘martyrdom’ helped to 
create and later reinforce within the Palestinian culture a tradition of resistance, as he 
is known as the hero that “raised the banner of armed struggle instead of passive 
resistance” (Abu-Amr, 1994, p.99). His status as hero and martyr has been shown in 
the way that the military arm of Hamas was named after him, and is called “the 
Brigades of the Martyr Izzedine al Qassam” (ibid, p.100).
The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 is known to the Palestinians as the 
“nakbah”, or catastrophe (Nabulsi, 2003, p.481). To Palestinians of that generation, 
the creation of Israel sticks in their memory as a time of “devastation and total rupture 
of Palestinian society” (ibid, p.481), while in the current generation the myths that 
have grown out of and surround that era, and the 1967 war, construct the base of their 
legitimization of violence. For example, one imprisoned Palestinian terrorist argued 
that “the war and my refugee status were the seminal events that formed by political 
consciousness”, stating that this situation itself saw him try and do everything in his 
power to “regain our legitimate rights” (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003, p.182). 
Those that died as a result of the wars are held up as national heroes and idolized for 
future generations, in the same way as Qassam appears to be. One other cultural myth 
that circulates throughout Palestinian culture that is connected with the creation of 
Israel is the fictional The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This publication has served 
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as a justification for resistance particularly within Palestinian areas because it aims to 
confirm “the existence of a world Jewish conspiracy” to rule over all, especially since 
the publication lays out the fact that this will be staged from and based in Israel itself 
(Harkabi, 1971, p.230). Palestinian culture as a whole is aware of this apparent 
conspiracy, as it is studied in numerous mosques, schools, and in within the terror 
groups themselves as a way of justifying the need to fight against the Israelis. 
Historical myths, then, are able to provide a background for the disinhibition of 
violence because they highlight a culture’s values, and therefore sanction these values 
and their achievement. In the case of the IRA and Palestinian suicide bombers, it 
appears that such myths play a vital role in their justification and rationalization of 
violence against others.
Cultural Ideologies
Historical myths are inextricably linked to cultural ideologies. As Baumeister (1997) 
writes, those with a strong “ideological passion” for their cause often “assimilate their 
enemies” into such historical myths (p.185). Ideologies, according to Gerring (1997) 
are a “set of beliefs, values, principles, attitudes and/or ideals” and are often 
associated with a “deep, passionate, or emotional sort of commitment” (p.967 and 
977). In addition, Gerring characterizes ideology as being able to substantially guide 
political behaviour and thus also legitimate certain political actions (ibid, p.967 and 
972).
Cultural ideologies are particularly significant, then, when analysing terrorist 
psychology because of the way in which certain ideologies are able to legitimate 
different acts and beliefs depending on the values that the ideology consists of. In 
other words, certain ideologies can be interpreted by some as providing a moral 
justification for terrorism. This is because ideologies are powerful in the way that 
they are able to provide a sense of meaning as well as a sense of direction to a persons 
life, whether this is in a positive or a negative way (Waller, 2002, p.183), as well as 
being able to define how members of a culture view the world around them (Drake, 
1998).
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In addition to this, cultural ideologies may often be centred on hatred of another 
group of people and are “communicated through laws and courts, social learning, and 
propaganda distributed by the mass media” (Waller, 2002, p.184), indicating how 
socialization practices and the adoption of ideologies are inherently linked. Nazi 
ideology is an illustration of this idea, as it has been noted that from its inception in 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf, the ideology was able to sweep through the majority of the 
culture and become the dominant ideology by the late 1930s – thus, “perpetrators of 
extraordinary evil drew on this overarching ideology to justify and support their 
atrocities” (Waller, 2002, p.185). 
Ideology as a whole has also been shown to be a vital element for disinhibiting 
terrorist actions because it can help in releasing inhibitions about killing civilian 
populations in addition to military and political targets. In this way, ideology provides 
a “prism through which they [terrorists] view events and the actions of other people… 
ideology also allows terrorists to justify their violence  by displacing the 
responsibility onto either the victims or other actors” (Drake, 1998). On top of this, 
cultural ideologies also allow the perpetrators to see their victims as “representative 
symbols” rather than as people (Drake, 1998), which in turn creates psychological 
distance for the attackers from their victims. Cultural ideologies, therefore, may be 
able to explain “how being a member of a particular religion or race can make 
someone a target for attacks without the victim or victims seeming to have done 
anything blameworthy” (Drake, 1998). 
Aside from religious ideologies, which are examined in the next chapter, one of the 
main cultural ideologies that exists in many different nations throughout the world is 
that of a nationalist ideology. For this thesis especially, in light of its two illustrative 
cases, nationalism – while also a motivator for violence – is an important disinhibitor 
of terrorism because it evokes and sanctions such culturally important concepts as 
martyrdom and self-sacrifice in the name of the nation (Kelman, 1997). 
Nationalist ideologies are theorized to be so effective at shaping the beliefs and 
influencing the actions of citizens because they draw on the human inclination to 
“identify with, learn from, and favour groups to which one has strong emotional ties” 
(Stern, 1995).  Self-sacrifice for the nation, then, can be elicited by the “forces of 
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cultural evolution”, which are fuelled by capitalising on the “strong and pervasive 
human propensities for social learning” (ibid, p.227). In other words, if a culture 
values and teaches that the nation is more important than anything else, a strong sense 
of loyalty can be cultivated, including to the extreme of martyrdom, because “group 
membership and identification can exert strong forces on behaviour” (Stern, 1995, 
p.225). 
For both the IRA and the Irish culture generally, the overarching ideology is one of 
nationalism, where the main focus is on removing British influence from Irish affairs 
and Irish land. Forcing the English out of Ireland is more often than not viewed by a 
significant part of the culture as feasible only through armed resistance (Smith, 1995). 
Such ideology is framed around and draws on the cultural myth examined above, as 
well as even further back with Wolfe Tone and his 1798 attempted revolt (Coogan, 
2002), and the failed rebellion of 1848 where both Catholics and Protestants joined 
together to fight the English (Bell, 1992, p.71; Wright, 1990, p.27). Indeed, the 
history of Irish nationalism and resistance as a cultural ideology can also be seen as 
far back as the beginning of the fourteenth century, when Irish chiefs requested and 
received an army of Scottish troops to help them drive out the English from their 
lands at the start of what was known as the “Gaelic resurgence” in Ireland (Cronin, 
1980, p.5). Because much of Irish ideology sees the English, or more generally the 
British, as an oppressor and usurper of Irish land and culture, it is easy to see how 
members of the IRA and republican sympathizers in general are able to come to view 
their enemy in dehumanized terms, as the cultural ideology allows them to view 
enemies as “symbols rather than… flesh and blood human beings” (Drake, 1998).
 Irish nationalism as a cultural ideology has been used by the IRA to encourage and 
legitimate martyrdom for the nation, echoing what national hero Patrick Pearse 
claimed before he was executed after the Easter Rising: “life springs from death and 
from the graves of patriot men and women spring living nations” (Alonso, 2001, 
p.132). This phrase remains “deeply embedded” through Irish political culture and 
forms the ideological basis for Irish republicans and sympathizers, and consequently 
for the IRA as well (Toolis, 1995). The extent to which martyrdom is exalted in Irish 
culture can be seen through funerals for IRA members who have died “in the cause of 
Irish Freedom” (Toolis, 1995, p.337). At one funeral in particular, thousands of 
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people came to pay their respects to the fallen IRA man, including schoolchildren 
who came to the service bearing roses, one for each year of the dead man’s life (ibid, 
p.337). His friends and peers recited poems at the funeral written about Irish 
nationalism and martyrdom, and in the days before the funeral hundreds of local 
people from Northern Ireland crossed the border to visit his family (ibid, p.337). In 
the months following the funeral a committee managed to raise the sum of five 
thousand pounds from donations for an enormous headstone for the IRA man’s grave 
(ibid, p.337). 
Quite similar to the Irish example, Palestinian culture also draws heavily on a 
nationalistic ideology with much emphasis on martyrdom, with cultural heroes such 
as Qassam playing a large role in this. As Kimhi and Even (2004) write, there appears 
to be a “sympathetic atmosphere… that reveres self-sacrifice” within Palestinian 
culture (p.18-19). This ideology of nationalism and martyrdom is reinforced through 
activities such as “building monuments, naming a football tournament after a suicide 
terrorist, public assemblies at schools in memory of suicide bombers, [and] 
distribution of the cassette made by the suicide bombers before the attack” (ibid, 
p.20). Such nationalism is connected to as well as intensified by what is seen by most 
as the “overwhelming sense of humiliation” felt at the hands of Israelis since 1948 
(Moghadam, 2003, p.74). As Musa Ziada, a would-be suicide bomber who was 
stopped by the Palestinian police, noted about joining Hamas, “it was not difficult to 
be convinced” about becoming a martyr because he “had thought about it a lot 
before” (Battersby, 1995). The ideology of fighting and dying for the homeland can 
be seen through instances such as funeral processions for ‘martyred’ Palestinians, 
when the dead are carried through the streets amidst thousands of supporters crying 
out nationalist slogans glorifying the suicide bomber and those of the past while 
flying Palestinian flags (Victor, 2003). 
The role of ideology and violence in the name of the nation in Palestinian culture is 
starkly obvious when one considers polls from over the years on popular support for 
violence and, by the same token, martyrdom. In a poll taken in 2001 by the 
Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion, 70% of Palestinians said they supported 
suicide attacks, while in 2002 over two thirds of those asked said that they supported 
‘martyrdom’ operations, including suicide bombings (Moghadam, 2003, p.76). After 
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2000, terrorist groups are shown to have received more support shortly after each 
suicide attack was perpetrated, while in 2003 support for suicide attacks fluctuated 
between sixty and sixty-five percent (Bloom, 2004). Indeed, between April 1997 and 
October 2003, the lowest percentage support for suicide operations was in May of 
1997 when it was at 24%, and the highest percentage of support was in September of 
2001, when it reached 85% (ibid), demonstrating how support for suicide terrorism 
has been able to permeate itself through Palestinian culture in a relatively short space 
of time. In this way, it may well be true that “one can only understand the lone 
suicide bomber by considering the larger context from which he or she emerges and is 
often lauded as a martyr” (Moghaddam, 2004, p.117).
Conclusion: 
This chapter has sought to show the ways in which a person’s culture and resulting 
belief system can help to justify violent behaviour against other human beings. 
Although in most cases terrorism is perpetrated and defended by only a small 
majority of a culture, what people are brought up to believe about themselves and the 
world around them certainly does significantly affect their ability to justify and 
rationalize violence against other people. Indeed, as Moghaddam (2004) argues, “the 
most effective approach to understanding terrorism is through cultural and collective 
rather than [a] dispositional and individualistic analysis” (p.104). The “prearrival” 
stage to joining a terrorist group and participating in their activities, which can often 
occur through immersion in a particular culture, greatly affects a person’s beliefs 
about participating in violence, and is especially important if the particular culture 
socializes attitudes conducive to justifying violence. As Valenty (2004) argues, “the 
selection process [for terrorist organizations] is one that seeks out the individuals who 
have been best socialized to take on the goals and values of the organization itself” 
(p.12). This chapter has demonstrated, through an examination of socialization, 
education, and cultural myths and ideologies, the extent to which culture can play a 
role in the disinhibition of terrorism. Through socialization, a person learns the ways 
of the culture through their family members, communities and social groups. 
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Specifically, a person learns about appropriate behaviours for different situations, and 
about the world outside of their own culture. Once at school, this socialization 
process is heightened, and is further bolstered by government teachings and the 
messages of the media. Adding to this, the cultural myths that permeate through a 
society and the ideologies that are linked to them also serve as agents of disinhibition. 
This process results in cultural sanctioning of violent actions, and due to this, 
inhibitions against perpetrating terrorism are reduced because there appears to be a 
moral justification to undertaking violence, which helps to let terrorists affirm their 
belief in the rightness and justness of their cause and the means to achieve their 
objectives.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
RELIGION
Though its emphasis has fluctuated throughout the history of terrorism, religion is 
often a major feature in the ideologies and backgrounds of terrorist groups 
worldwide. From the Zealots and Sicari (Jewish sects who fought against their 
Roman occupiers) to Al Qaeda, aspects of religion have been used to justify violence 
and cruelty against other human beings, including acts of terrorism, for centuries. 
Closely linked to culture in many instances, the impact of religion in rationalizing 
acts of terror is one of the most obvious ways in which inhibitions against killing can 
be overcome. This chapter therefore examines how religion has become a main 
feature of both past and contemporary terrorist groups’ justifications for violence 
while also analysing its ability to surpass inhibitions to kill other human beings. 
Consequently, the chapter includes an examination of the role that religion can play in 
encouraging dehumanization and demonization, as well as how it may allow diffusion 
of responsibility to help justify violence. It will therefore also include a discussion of 
how notions such as the ‘just war’ theory and interpretations of ‘jihad’ help in 
sanctioning terrorism. In line with previous chapters, it additionally draws on 
examples from the Irish Republican Army and Palestinian suicide terrorism to give 
further validity to its arguments. 
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The Prominence of Religion in Terrorism:
As stated in the first chapter of this thesis, what is being labelled as the ‘new 
terrorism’ of the 1980s-1990s is terrorism which is predominantly religious in nature. 
That is, it involves terrorist groups who follow a certain set of religious beliefs and 
values and are guided by the accompanying religious aims and objectives, and who 
justify much of their violence in the name of their faith. While the importance of 
religion in political life is noted to have resurged with the Iranian Islamic revolution 
in the late 1970s (Juergensmeyer, 2004, p.36), examples of religious terrorism since 
this time have steadily increased, and by the mid-1990s had “exploded” to include 
terrorism perpetrated around the world by followers from almost every religion 
(Juergensmeyer, 2000a, p.158). The 1993 World Trade Centre attacks, the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, the activities of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and India, 
Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, and Hamas in Israel, as well as assassinations of such 
important political figures as Anwar Sadat and Yitzhak Rabin (Rapoport, 2001; 
Juergensmeyer, 2000a), for instance, all show how different religions have come into 
play in the phenomenon of terrorism. Indeed, in a 1998 United States government list 
of the thirty most “dangerous” rebel groups throughout the world, over fifteen were 
religious in nature, comprising a range of beliefs including Buddhism, Judaism and 
Islam (Juergensmeyer, 2000a, p.158).
While religious terrorism has thus ostensibly emerged with force over the last twenty 
years, it should be noted that religion has waxed and waned as a key element over the 
course of the history of terrorism. For example, religion was used as the chief 
justification for terror during an early spate of terrorism in the period between 1880 
and World War One; however this trend declined significantly after this period 
(Rapoport, 2001). Religion as a justification for terrorism was not overtly observed 
again, though it was noted to appear to a smaller extent during the period from the 
1960s to the 1980s, until this most recent resurgence appeared the world over after 
the end of the Cold War (ibid). As described above, religious terrorism has come 
from a wide variety of groups, and this latest resurgence has highlighted how this 
kind of religious-inspired terrorism is also able to transcend state borders because of 
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its ability to appeal to a wider audience – for example, members and allies of Al 
Qaeda are known to stretch from the Middle East to Africa to Asia, whilst also having 
sympathizers and financiers worldwide (Radu, 2002).
While a brief account of the impact of religion as a significant ideology in terrorism is 
necessary to begin this chapter, it is equally as necessary to examine why this most 
recent resurgence of religious terrorism came into being after the end of the Cold War 
and still continues today. According to most scholarly research, the main explanation 
for the current revival in using religion to justify violence is the effects of 
modernization and globalization after the Cold War period. Globalization has seen an 
enormous amount of changes take place in many, if not all, societies as well as the 
international system as a whole (Ranstorp, 1996). These changes have been social, 
economic, and political in nature, and in some nations the changes have been on an 
immense scale. Indeed, Juergensmeyer (2004) argues that a number of the most 
“intense movements for ethnic and religious nationalism” have come about in 
reaction to feeling a sense of exploitation about their role, or lack thereof, in the 
global economy (p.37). On top of this, many terrorist groups that have emerged 
harbour grievances and fears about the rise of multicultural societies and its effects on 
their own cultures, as well as suspicion and frustration about particular US foreign 
policies, especially those they perceive as helping to prop up certain regimes they see 
as corrupt (ibid, p.37).
 Essentially, the globalization and modernization of the world has exacerbated the 
“dissolution of traditional links of social and cultural cohesion within and between 
societies”, which in turn has caused a “sense of crisis” in many communities and 
societies because of threats this has created to their continued existence and identity 
(Ranstorp, 1996). This sense of crisis has in many cases seen societies look back to 
their pasts and to “their own cultural resources” (Juergensmeyer, 1996). Indeed, as 
Juergensmeyer (1996) writes, “politicized religious movements are the responses of 
those who feel desperate and desolate in the current geopolitical crisis. The problem 
that they experience is not with God, but with politics, and with their profound 
perceptions that the moral and ideological pillars of social order have collapsed”. 
Hence, terrorism in the name of religion may often be seen as justified by religious 
78
groups because it is perceived as the moral thing to do in order to correct the ills of 
both society and the world of today.
Culture and Religion:
For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘religion’ will be characterized as a 
particular set of beliefs and practices that a group of people follow which are based 
on the teachings of the leader and/or deity of that particular faith. In many societies, 
both past and present, the importance of religion remains tightly intertwined with 
culture. As Lincoln (2003) argues, religion is often a “central component” of many 
cultures because it has the ability to “stabilize vital human concerns by constituting 
them as transcendent” (p.56). In most cases, “religion provides the identity that makes 
a community cohere and links it with a particular place” (Juergensmeyer, 1996), and 
may often form the dominant cultural ideology of a nation, as in the situation of Iran. 
As well as this, many cultural myths for different nations are religious in nature, 
where in some cases the land a culture lives on is said to be “based on divine 
intervention” which serves to result in “divine protection” for those that inhabit it. In 
other cases, the people living in a certain area mythologize themselves to be 
descendents of God or Gods (Hirsch, 1985, p.44). For example, Palestinian Islamist 
groups believe that Palestine is an Islamic land “consecrated for future Muslim 
generations until Judgement Day” and that “it, or any part of it, should not be 
squandered; it, or any part of it, should not be given up” (www.hamasonline.com, 
2004). In this way, it can be seen that culture often serves to sanction certain religious 
beliefs, and vice versa, thereby gradually lowering inhibitions against participating in 
particular activities or undertaking certain actions.
Indeed, nowhere is this joining of culture and religion more clearly observed than in 
cultures with Islam as the predominant religion, as Islamic law itself does not 
recognize a separation between religion and politics. Called the Shari’a, Islamic law 
“governs all aspects of life – political, social, and cultural”, and includes rules about 
when and how people should engage in war against others (Robins and Post, 1997, 
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p.148). In this way, it is able to permeate through a culture so that religious law 
becomes the dominant societal influence. This can be seen today in many cultures, for 
example in Palestinian areas, as well as Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. In fact, 
religious symbols throughout such cultures are very easily found. In the case of the 
Palestinians, for example, one of the main cultural symbols is the Al-Aqsa mosque 
and the Dome of the Rock. A perceived assault on this is widely acknowledged to 
have set off the 2000 intifada (Hammami and Tamari, 2001, p.13). As well as this, 
Sheik Yassin, the former spiritual leader of militant religious group Hamas, was said 
to be “an important and honoured figure in Gaza”, being held in high regard by both 
Yasser Arafat and among less religious Palestinians (Laqueur, 1999, p.138). Even 
after his death, Sheik Yassin still remains an important cultural figure. Adding to this, 
most, if not all, acts of suicide terror are usually done both in the name of Palestine 
and God (Victor, 2003; Davis, 2003), emphasizing the extent to which religion makes 
up a significant part of the culture and its identity.
 Apart from Islamic societies, religion as the main foundation to culture can also be 
seen in the Northern Irish conflict, where the conflict itself is actually framed in terms 
of Catholic versus Protestant, Protestants especially seeing religion as central to the 
conflict (Juergensmeyer, 2000b).  Indeed, in Northern Ireland particularly, a person’s 
identity is based on which faith he or she adheres to – Catholicism or Protestantism. 
Hence, religion as a whole does play a large part in determining the culture of both 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. For example, it has been argued that in 
Irish culture, both north and south, nationalism and religion are essentially 
comparable to a pair of lungs as “one could scarcely exist without both, and not at all 
without at least one” (ibid, p.42). The IRA itself, through the activities of its political 
wing Sinn Fein, have tried to encourage a revival of ‘Catholic culture’ in Northern 
Ireland, while at the same time Protestant leaders have been encouraging ‘Protestant 
culture’. Due in part to this, it is claimed that the violence is thus “related to the 
renewed role that religion has come to play in Northern Ireland’s public life” 
(Juergensmeyer, 2000b, p.43). 
The above examples show the extent to which religion can constitute a substantial 
part of a nation’s culture. In this way, cultural practices can, and do – as demonstrated 
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in the previous chapter – serve to socially sanction religion and many of the ideas 
associated with it. 
The Psychology of Religion: 
The remainder of this chapter discusses and analyses how religion has the ability to 
be a powerful disinhibitor for terrorism. As Rapoport (1992) points out, religion has 
an “essential violence-reducing element”, but at the same time also has a “violence-
producing” element that is said to be “equally” as essential (p.118). While religion is, 
then, for most people often one of the greatest inhibitors for not undertaking violence, 
it can also be in certain situations both a motivator for terrorist actions as well as an 
important disinhibitor of them. Indeed, it is able to aid in the disinhibition process in 
terrorism for a number of different and significant reasons.
For instance, religion, by its very nature, has the capability to “inspire ultimate 
commitment” (Rapoport, 1992, p.119). In other words, it has the capacity to induce 
people into sacrificing themselves for a cause. It can and does “command” loyalty on 
behalf of its followers, even more so than appeals to nationalism. Due to this ability 
to inspire such an intense level of commitment, it is also able to trigger powerful 
emotional responses, especially in times of conflict or war (ibid, p.121). Interestingly, 
Rapoport (1992) notes that in terrorist groups whose ideology and justification are
primarily religious, violence is known to be significantly more “deadly” and intense 
(p.121). This finding was concluded after one of Rapoport’s earlier studies comparing 
religious and secular terror groups over the course of history, where it was found that 
even though some secular groups were more advanced in some areas, such as 
technology, religious terror groups fought longer and more injurious conflicts (ibid, 
p.121). 
Indeed, due to the ability of religion to bring about intense feelings of loyalty and 
commitment, religious language is often used, usually in a “manipulative” fashion, 
even by the non-religious to arouse emotions and emotional attachment for their 
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cause. For example, the group Fatah of the PLO (a secular organization), whose name 
itself means “a conquest for Islam” open all their military statements with “in the 
name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate” (Rapoport, 1992, p.124).
Apocalyptic Thinking and Cosmic Dualism
Religion also helps to disinhibit violence because it invokes a high level of 
apocalyptic thinking.  While the three major revealed religions – Christianity, Islam, 
and Judaism – all highlight the coming of the messiah, judgement day, and so forth, a 
smaller yet significant minority within these religions justify their violence by 
claiming they can “hasten the arrival of the messiah” by undertaking certain actions, 
including those violent in nature (Robins and Post, 1997, p.146). Indeed, it has been 
noted that while apocalyptic thinking by groups and organizations cannot by itself be 
the main reason for religious violence, it does however at least generate “an 
atmosphere conducive to the legitimation of violence”, and can therefore act as a 
crucial condition for disinhibiting violent behaviour (Mayer, 2001, p.368-369). This 
way of thinking may also justify “unlimited violence” in the way that it often results 
in people viewing themselves, as well as their “cause”, as “wholly righteous”, and in 
some cases can lead people to view themselves as gods (Rapoport, 1987, p.84). 
Apocalyptic, or messianic, justifications for violence usually entail heightened and 
more “brutal” acts of violence than violence in the name of other causes, as believers 
tend to see themselves at war with governing authorities or those who are perceived 
as having “corrupted” the religion, and accordingly the believer feels they are entitled 
to “respond in kind” to such enemies (Rapoport, 1992). Many of those who act in the 
name of religion believe that the “messianic process” has commenced already (ibid, 
p.133), and perceive that their own violent actions are helping to spur the process on
further. In this way, such people are uninhibited when it comes to perpetrating 
violence as they believe that what they are doing is religiously sanctioned and thus
also morally justified. 
Apocalyptic thinking is present within Palestinian Islamist terrorist groups to a 
notable extent. For example, the Hamas organization interpret and teach that certain 
chapters and passages in the Koran state that Allah promises to send people to kill the 
Jews living on Islamic land until the ‘Day of Resurrection’ (www.hamasonline.com, 
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2004). In framing the Israeli state as one based on oppression and an Islamic one as 
just, Hamas also argues that “states built upon oppression last only one hour, states 
based upon justice will last until the hour of Resurrection” (www.hamasonline.com, 
2004). In this way, destruction of the oppressive state of Israel paves the way for a 
just Islamic Palestinian state. Once an oppressive state is destroyed, then, this can be 
interpreted to mean that a just one may be believed to set the messianic process in 
motion. While in this case it may seem this can be construed as a motive for 
terrorism, it is also a significant disinhibitor because people may attach a moral 
justification for using violence, in that it will help bring about a new era, and that 
those who participate in terrorism are undertaking such actions for the benefit of all.
Closely tied to apocalyptic thinking is what is termed “cosmic dualism” (Larsson, 
2004, p.113). Cosmic dualism, and the resulting construction of a cosmic war, occurs 
when religious followers view a conflict not “in ordinary human terms” but as a 
conflict about something far greater and far more ancient – a battle between good and 
evil (Mayer, 2001, p.369). If people view their conflicts in this manner, it is almost a 
given that the conflict will take on violent characteristics, as in many cases such 
cosmic wars are perceived as endorsed by God and hence restraints over certain 
actions will not be seen as necessary, or will at least significantly weaken (ibid, 
p.369; Rapoport, 1987), as the ends are often seen as justifying the means in such 
situations. Juergensmeyer (1996) notes that the process of psychologically 
constructing a cosmic war begins as soon as an “enemy of religion has been 
identified”.
Essentially, in a cosmic war, believers are fighting for their version of religious truth, 
whatever it may be (Larsson, 2004, p.114). As such, cosmic dualism is absolute in 
that it sees the world in terms of “truth versus untruth”, which then gives rise to such 
religious concepts as holy war and jihad (ibid, p.115). As well as this, it is worth 
noting that because a cosmic war is framed in terms of good and evil or God versus 
Satan, compromise between the warring sides is doubtful, usually because “those who 
suggest a negotiated settlement are as excoriated as the enemy” (Juergensmeyer, 
2000b, p.154), as good cannot compromise with evil just as truth cannot compromise 
with untruth. When situations are framed in such oversimplified terms, inhibitions 
against violence become weakened, as moral justifications for violence are more 
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easily rationalized and the perception of the ‘enemy’ becomes very one-dimensional 
and allows distorted views of such enemies to come to the fore.
The Palestine Islamic Jihad provides an interesting example of this belief in a cosmic 
war. Essentially, this group believes that a correct interpretation of both history and 
the Koran shows that “Palestine is the focus of the religio-historical confrontation 
between the Muslims and their eternal enemies, the Jews” (Litvak, 2002).At the crux 
of this conflict is the belief that followers of Islam “represent the forces of truth” 
while their enemies represent “the forces of apostasy”, and believe that jihad against 
their enemies is thus necessary and morally justified, for both Palestinians as a people
and Islam as a religion (ibid). The Hamas organization appear to concur with this 
viewpoint as a basis for their violence, as they too argue that they, as followers of 
Islam, are the bearers of the truth and will therefore “spare no effort to implement” it 
in order to “abolish evil” (www.hamasonline.com, 2004). Indeed, Hamas leaders 
have often hinted that the Palestinian struggle against Israelis was an “expression of a 
larger, hidden struggle” (Juergensmeyer, 2000b, p.76). Their jihad against the Jews, 
who are described as mischievous, cunning, and “corrupted”, is said to be endorsed 
by God, and as proof of this Jewish evilness their “termination” by way of Muslims’ 
fighting in the name of God and truth is said to be foretold by the Koran 
(www.hamasonline.com, 2004). 
Demonization
Once the believer perceives themselves to be part of a cosmic war with identifiable 
enemies, inhibitions to kill are further released as the process of demonizing such 
enemies is heightened. This is because the ‘enemy’ in a cosmic war has “no 
redeeming features”, so is therefore continually seen as the opposite of the ‘good’ 
side, which inevitably is ‘evil’ (Larsson, 2004). Berlet (2004) writes that 
demonization is an important concept to note when thinking about the justification of 
violence as the processes associated with it allow “no acknowledgement of 
complexity, nuance or ambiguity in debates” and promote “hostility toward those 
who suggest coexistence, toleration, pragmatism, compromise or mediation” with 
those they deem to be inherently ‘evil’. Commonly, the demonizing of an enemy 
involves depicting people as devils, witches, perhaps even “fallen angels” (Keen, 
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1986, p.109). It also helps to fuel what was mentioned in the third chapter of this 
thesis about the ‘myth of pure evil’. Importantly, demonizing the enemy also helps to 
bring about another mechanism of disinhibition mentioned in the third chapter, that of 
attribution of blame. As Baumeister (1999) writes, 
A less obvious but still very powerful benefit of demonizing the enemy is that all the 
misfortunes and suffering on both sides can be blamed on the enemy. If there is conflict, then 
of course it must be blamed on evil, for the good side would never seek out or desire conflict. 
What the good side suffers is the fault of the evil side. By the same token, whatever the evil 
side suffers is also its own fault, because it brought it on itself by means of its evil activities 
(p.86)
While demonization in many cases occurs outside of religion, it has special relevance 
to religious violence and terrorism in the way that it is usually linked to situations 
where there is perceived conflict between the followers of God and those of the 
Devil. An excellent example of this can be found in Iran, where the Ayatollah 
Khomeini once labelled the United States of America the “Great Satan”, a phrase 
since which time has spread to other parts of the Islamic world as the main label for 
the country, and has been used as a basis for legitimating hatred and violence against 
the people that live there in recent years (Juergensmeyer, 1996). 
Religious Doctrines
While religion may be able to justify violence through apocalyptic thinking and/or 
belief in a cosmic war, religion may also sanction violence due to certain 
interpretations of religious doctrines, for example, those such as ‘holy war’ (or ‘just 
war’) and jihad. Often used as a justification for fighting a cosmic war, these concepts 
have been employed as part of religious rationalizations for violence, including 
terrorism, throughout history. Both the Islamist concept of ‘jihad’ and the Christian 
conception of ‘just war’ theory will be discussed in this section due to their relevance 
to the cases examined in the thesis.
 The just war theory, though often used by states secular in nature today, is derived 
from centuries-old Christian theory, dating back as far as the Middle Ages, in which 
certain criteria were set out to explain when violence and war could be made use of 
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(Gopin, 2000). Essentially, the just war theory provides guidelines for when war may 
be “permissible or obligatory” by Christians (jus ad bellum) as well as a set of rules 
for behaviour and conduct once a war has begun (jus in bello) (Gopin, 2000, p.232). 
The criteria for Christians to enter or begin a war effectively hinges on whether the 
war has been called for by a “competent authority”, whether it has “just cause”, in 
that it needs to be a war of either self-defence or in “protection of one’s rights”, and 
whether the intentions for the war are just (Silverman, 2002). Once part of a war, the 
theory dictates that non-combatants and other non-military targets must be left alone, 
while the means through which the war is fought must be proportionate to the state’s 
ends, and not excessive in nature (Silverman, 2002). As well as this, the ‘just war’ 
thesis also allows violence if “force” is the only option left for “effecting change”, but 
notes that “reconciliation must be sought as the ultimate end” (The Joint Group on 
Social Questions, 1976, p.61). Attaching such a sense of morality to the undertaking 
of violence in particular situations certainly has an effect on lowering inhibitions 
against terrorism. In other words, if a person deems violent actions to be sanctioned 
under the just war theory, by justifying their actions as “holy war”, any guilt or 
restraint they may have felt previously about partaking in terrorism is likely to have 
significantly lowered because view their actions as highly morally justified, while at 
the same time are able to hold no apparent empathy for their victims. 
Due to its prevalence in terrorism today, as well as its relation to religious violence in 
general, the concept of jihad in Islam and the accompanying idea of “shahadat”
(martyrdom) are also necessary to examine. The term jihad basically translates as a 
“struggle”, and can “refer to everything from striving to be a better person to waging 
war on behalf of God” (Silverman, 2002). Interestingly, the conditions under which 
jihad may be utilized are close to that of both the Jewish and Christian rules of war, in 
that jihad must be a defensive action and must be intended to “redress an unjust 
action” (ibid).  In addition to this, for jihad to be just, the person undertaking it is 
forbidden from responding to an aggressor in a “greater manner than he received” 
(ibid). The Prophet Muhammad is said to have distinguished between two types of 
jihad, these being the lesser jihad and the greater jihad (Esposito, 2002, p.28). The 
lesser jihad is the violent type of jihad, in which wars are fought and people killed, 
while the greater jihad is a different and far more crucial type of struggle, and is a 
struggle against “one’s ego, selfishness, greed, and evil” (ibid, p.28). Martyrs in the 
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Islamic tradition of jihad are held in extremely high regard. Indeed, the Koran devotes 
a significant amount of time to extolling the value of martyrdom, with many passages 
containing messages similar to and including, “never think that those who are killed 
in the way of God are dead. They are alive with their Lord, well provided for” 
(Esposito, 2002, p.33). As much of today’s Islamic terrorism is framed in the view 
that acts of violence are done for God, hence “killed in the way of God”, it becomes 
easier to see how people can interpret such phrases to think of terrorists as martyrs to 
be revered for their acts. 
Importantly, one of the main ways in which religion is able to disinhibit terrorism 
when there is a high chance, or indeed an apparent knowledge, that the terrorist will 
die is through the promise of the afterlife. As noted above, martyrs, in all religions, 
are seen as living on in heaven or ‘paradise’ after their death. Indeed, as Merari 
(1990) notes, religion can contribute to the perpetration of terrorism as it provides 
answers to such questions as what happens after death, and, in the case of suicide 
terrorism, when a person has permission to commit suicide. Even from a common 
sense point of view, it is more likely people will feel uninhibited in committing acts 
of terrorism that they know might or will claim their life if they are secure in the 
knowledge that there is life after their death, and specifically that they are going to 
heaven as a result of their acts rather than to hell.
While religions set out particular guides for conduct and rules of engagement in war 
or conflict, different interpretations of them have come about in all religions and have 
been used to justify many different types of violent behaviour towards others. For 
example, in the context of religious terrorism, many religious terrorists view their 
situations as an already existing state of war where they themselves, and their 
religion, are the victims of a great injustice or wrongdoing at the hands of some other 
religious group (Juergensmeyer, 2000b). Resulting from this viewpoint, joining in the 
war and attacking others may therefore be seen by the attacker as legitimate and even 
praiseworthy because such acts are framed differently - as self-defence rather than 
aggression; hence there is some kind of moral justification to their undertaking of 
violence. These concepts, especially jihad, are also often able to help disinhibit 
terrorism as well as other forms of violence because they teach that such violence is a 
“religious duty” as it is in the name of defending and promoting certain religious 
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‘truths’ (Robins and Post, 1997). In this way, such concepts are undoubtedly able to 
sanction, and thus disinhibit, acts of terror. 
Dehumanization and Diffusion of Responsibility
Aside from what has already been discussed in relation to religious sanctioning of 
violence, it is also pertinent to note that religion can play a substantial role in 
facilitating the process of dehumanization. Hirsch (1985) notes that Martin Luther 
helped to permeate through Christianity the apparent subhumanity of the Jews, as he 
labelled them, among other things, “thirsty bloodhounds and murderers of all 
Christendom” (p.45). Because religion is able to view certain situations and people in 
black and white terms, such as good or evil, this also helps in furthering 
dehumanization. Indeed, the “phenomenon of the faceless collective enemy” that 
religion can bring about in people’s minds “explains in large part why so many 
terrorist acts have targeted ordinary people” – in this way, a differentiation between 
combatant and non-combatant is not necessary because in the eyes of the perpetrator,
the ‘enemy’ includes both types of people (Juergensmeyer, 2000b, p.174-175). 
Religion may also invoke the mechanism of diffusion of responsibility as a way of 
lowering or surpassing inhibitions to kill. Because most religious terrorists see their 
acts as done in response to a divine order or something similar, this may help to 
overcome inhibitions because the person undertaking the violent actions can view 
themselves as not wholly responsible for its consequences. In this way, someone that 
is seen as carrying out such a divine order may even be elevated to an honourable 
status in society or within their religion. 
The Psychology of Religion in the case of Palestinian Suicide Bombers
Disinhibition through religious sanctioning in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers 
mostly arises from justifications based on jihad, and includes, to a degree, aspects of 
diffusion of responsibility. To many Palestinians volunteering for suicide attacks, 
jihad is ultimately perceived as a duty. For instance, one imprisoned Palestinian 
terrorist noted that the jihad against Israel “must go on”, while another characterized 
suicide attacks as “one of the more important articles of faith”, and the bombers as 
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“holy fighters” who have achieved the “highest level of jihad” (Post, Sprinzak and 
Denny, 2003, p.179). Hamas as an organization also teaches that jihad for Palestine 
and for God is a duty, and states that “nothing is loftier or deeper in nationalism than 
waging Jihad against the enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of 
the Muslims. And this becomes an individual duty binding on every Muslim man and 
woman” (www.hamasonline.com, 2004). The farewell tape of a West Bank suicide 
bomber echoes this belief, as he asserts, “to you the lovers of Allah, I write with my 
blood. Follow the path of martyrdom. Be the best example of our Islamic nation, the 
martyr” (Milton-Edwards, 1996, p.167). While perceiving violence as a duty may be 
viewed as a motive for undertaking terrorism, it also furthers the process of 
disinhibition as it helps people to believe that the violence is sanctioned in the eyes of
God, and thus also carries a moral justification for engaging in violence. 
Diffusion of responsibility is also present to the extent that many suicide bombers 
believe that the decision to kill others is not theirs, but instead is God’s. The belief 
that “it is Allah who selects the martyrs” (Hassan, 2001) to undertake acts of suicide 
terrorism is quite often shown through the families whose children were suicide 
bombers. As one mother remarked after her sons death, “from a religious point of 
view we have to accept he is a martyr and thank God” (Kushner, 1996, p.335). One 
suicide bomber, who killed himself in an attack in the mid 1990s shortly after his 
friend did the same, echoes this sentiment and said to his dead friend in his will that, 
“when I heard the news of your martyrdom, God was telling me at that moment what 
to do… I am getting ready, Ali. I am preparing to meet you in heaven” (Andoni, 
1997). In line with this belief, one imprisoned Palestinian terrorist commented on the 
matter of suicide terrorism that “those who carry out the attacks are doing Allah’s 
work” (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003, p.179). Murad Tawalbi, a young man who 
failed in his mission as a suicide bomber, recalled that on the way to the destination 
of where he was supposed to blow himself and others up, “I was just thinking about 
saving the Palestinian people. That’s all… I never felt so calm in my life. It was the 
will of God” (Simon, 2003). In this way, inhibitions against violence are significantly 
lowered due to the fact that guilt for killing others is seen as largely unnecessary 
because the choice for participating in violence was almost entirely made by someone 
else. 
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Religious Palestinian suicide bombers usually, if not always, construe their actions as 
a way of ensuring an entrance to ‘paradise’. As one imprisoned terrorist rationalized 
about suicide attacks, “this is not suicide. Suicide is selfish, it is weak, it is mentally 
disturbed. This is istishhad (martyrdom or self-sacrifice in the service of Allah)” 
(Post, 2005b, p.63). Indeed, dying a martyr’s death is, as mentioned, one of the ways 
in which inhibitions against dying for a religion can be overcome. As another 
imprisoned Palestinian terrorist, who attempted a suicide attack, explained when 
asked his feelings about the fact that his own brother had recruited him for the 
mission, “he wasn’t trying to make me wear an explosive belt. He was giving me a 
ticket to heaven” (Simon, 2003). Another Palestinian in a similar situation described 
his viewpoint in a related way, stating that “by pressing the detonator, you can 
immediately open the door to Paradise – it is the shortest path to heaven” (Hassan, 
2001).
In addition, religious leaders encourage and promote this way of thinking continually 
in many sermons in their mosques (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003; Simon, 2003). 
Hamas itself explains that martyrdom is lawful, and even admirable, as it is done out 
of “love for Allah and a desire to please Allah: to do what Allah has commanded, 
which in the specific instance of martyrdom operations is confronting and attacking 
the enemies of Islam, even if this means one’s own death” (www.hamasonline.com, 
2004). Furthermore, Merari (2005) notes that when group leaders prepare a suicide 
bomber for their mission, they concentrate on justifying the act by recounting to the 
would-be bomber about how acts of ‘self-sacrifice’ are “Allah’s will” as well as 
reinforcing the rewards in paradise to be gained from it (p.79). Intention also appears 
to be important in discussing whether suicide attacks are justifiable, as suicide alone 
is forbidden in Islam. Hence, these attacks are framed as “the highest sacrifice” for 
Allah, where the intentions of the bomber – the “mujahid” – are “pure, unselfish, and 
Muslim” (ibid). Indeed, Sheik Yassin commented on suicide attacks that “in Islam, it 
is always a question of intention”, and claimed that suicide bombers do not intend to 
kill civilians; however, when this did happen the bomber does not have to feel guilt 
because killing them is not his or her overall intention (Davis, 2003, p.109). 
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The Psychology of Religion in the case of the IRA
While on the surface it may appear that religion does not play that great a role in the 
justification of IRA terrorism, mostly because the Catholic hierarchy as a whole does 
not support the IRA’s violence, it is obvious that Catholicism and its teachings have 
had, and continue to have, a major influence on the organization. For instance, the 
IRA leadership has consistently argued that their violence is justified on the grounds 
that it is a ‘just war’, both in the religious and non-religious senses (Moxon-Browne, 
1993, p.154). From a religious point of view, the IRA believes that its members are 
entitled to undertake violence because the criteria to frame violence as a just war has 
been met by the situation in their country since it was partitioned. Firstly, “the 
minority Catholic population in Northern Ireland has been consistently denied basic 
rights by the Northern Ireland and British states”; and secondly, they regard the 
Protestant “forces of law and order” in the North as not ever sufficiently protecting 
the Catholic minority from “Unionists” (Bairner, 1986, p.638). Hence, the IRA as an 
organization view their violence as a war of defence. This viewpoint is further 
bolstered by the Catholic Church, who also plead for justice for the Catholic minority 
in that area (ibid, p.639). Indeed, even though the Church as such does not support 
IRA violence, it often aids in legitimating their actions, as church leaders often voice 
explanations as to why the IRA exists as well as also tending to publicly stress how 
badly Catholics have been treated in Northern Ireland by other groups (ibid, p.639).
Catholicism within the IRA itself is such that practically all members, especially IRA 
leaders, profess their devotion to maintaining a Catholic way of life. Ex-member 
Maria McGuire, although perhaps the exception in this instance, notes in her 
autobiography of her time in the organization that IRA leaders “realized the strength 
of Catholic feeling in the movement” and told her to keep it very quiet that she herself 
was not a practicing Catholic as it would have “upset too many traditional Republican 
supporters” (1973, p.71). She also mentions that one of the major leaders at the time 
“believed he had direct contact with God”, and states that he was not the only one to
hold this belief (ibid, p.71-72). Former IRA commander Sean MacStiofain also notes 
in his memoirs that religion was a significant part of his life. During his time in 
prison, for example, he writes that “we were also sustained by our belief in God and 
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in the practice of our religion, which I have always found to be a great consolation 
any time I have been in a tight spot” (MacStiofain, 1975, p.62).
Indeed, the entire basis for the IRA’s existence is very much tied in with religious 
overtones. The declaration of the Irish Republic that followed the Easter Rising in 
April of 1916 begins with the phrase “in the name of God and of the dead generations 
from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood” (Kinsella, 1994, p.25). In 
this way, those who took part in the Rising “saw themselves as fighting in a holy 
cause that was sanctified by God” (ibid). Thus, the IRA sees themselves as merely 
carrying this process on, and thus feel that their actions, though far more violent than 
the Rising, are also ‘sanctified by God’. The importance of Catholicism in the IRA 
can also be seen in the months preceding the split of the organization, when the then-
leader Cathal Goulding issued a memorandum to IRA battalion commanders asking 
them to discontinue the tradition of “the saying of a decade of the rosary” at IRA 
funerals (O’Brien, 1994, p.158). This was largely denounced by the majority of 
commanders, and even the Church disagreed with this request. Instead, members of 
the Church as well as local politicians and those disgruntled members of the IRA 
funded a new movement – the Provisional IRA, later to be known just as the IRA. 
This new “breakaway movement” was seen as “good Catholic nationalism”, unlike 
Goulding’s IRA (ibid, p.158).
Adding to the religious dimension in the IRA’s justification of violence is that 
individual members within the church’s leadership have come out in support of the 
organization and its actions at different stages, thereby further serving to help 
religiously sanction, and perhaps even give moral justification to, their violence. 
Indeed, it is now well-known that in 1972 a local priest had a significant role in the 
IRA bombing of the village of Claudy, which killed nine and injured many more 
(McTernan, 2003, p.29). Other priests have come out in support of the IRA by 
attaching Christianity’s just war theory as a justification for the group’s terrorism 
(ibid, p.88). Adding to this, Father Denis Faul has said in the past that Catholicism 
offers members of the IRA the capability to both kill and be killed, as death is viewed 
from a sacrificial point of view and the added chance of forgiveness “lessens the guilt 
involved in killing” (Juergensmeyer, 2000b, p.41). Indeed, this concept of forgiveness 
itself is able to heighten the process of disinhibition because it allows people to 
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believe that they are permitted to do just about anything if they ask forgiveness for it 
later on. In this way, a belief that forgiveness can be granted for almost anything 
clearly fuels the disinhibition process within a potential perpetrator of terrorism 
because there will exist a lack of fear about the consequences of undertaking violence 
as well as a lessening of feelings of guilt.
It is because of this profound sense of religiosity that martyrdom has been sanctioned, 
and to a high degree even revered, in Irish political culture, and accordingly in the 
IRA. Indeed, “for republicans, dying for Ireland is a sacrificial act akin to those 
religious acts of Christian witness” (Toolis, 1995, p.339). As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Irish historical cultural myths have extolled the value of martyrdom 
since the 1916 Easter Rising. This ideology of martyrdom and sacrifice fused with 
Catholicism can be noted in funerals for IRA Volunteers. For instance, the funerals of 
the 1982 hunger strikers prominently featured crucifixes and rosary-beads along with 
the Irish flag (O’Brien, 1994, p.171). Indeed, martyrs such as the ones who died as 
hunger strikers are revered within the IRA as almost divine-like, and are seen as 
“heirs to the Irish Catholic martyrs of old” (ibid, p.167).
Conclusion:
Over approximately the last 20 to 30 years the apparent outbreak of religious 
terrorism has seen some horrific acts of violence take place in a variety of different 
countries. Ranging from small and large scale suicide attacks to bombing and 
shooting campaigns as well as assassination attempts, the rise of religious terrorism
has shown just how brutal and destructive violence in the name of religion can be 
(Lincoln, 2003).  While religion is, at best, only a part of the picture for 
understanding terrorism as it also has enormous potential for inhibiting such 
behaviour, this chapter has sought to demonstrate the ways in which religion can 
facilitate disinhibited violent behaviour, and has done so by examining crucial factors 
such as the ability of religion to encourage and maintain a strong sense of loyalty to 
the values the faith stands for, how the interpretations of certain religious doctrines 
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can work toward inciting violence, and how certain ways of thinking can promote 
demonization and dehumanization. It has also been pointed out that the sanctioning of 
religious teachings occurs within many cultures, in some societies to a very high 
degree, and that this can serve to further entrench religious sanctioning of violence in 
many cases. The application of the two illustrative cases in this chapter – the IRA and 
Palestinian suicide bombers – have additionally provided contemporary examples for 
the arguments that have been put forth and examined, and have helped to show just 
how prevalent religious sanctioning of violence can be among terrorist groups. 
Having examined aspects of culture, religion, hatred and empathy in relation to 
disinhibition and terrorism, the next chapter turns its attentions to the psychology of 
the group in order to work toward a comprehensive understanding of the role 
disinhibition plays in terrorism.
94
CHAPTER SIX:
THE TERRORIST GROUP: DYNAMICS AND 
PROCESSES
Similar to belonging to a culture, being a part of a terrorist group both offers and 
provides a sense of meaning and identity for its members. Group membership 
consequently allows people to feel a part of something important and often leads to a 
strong sense of identification with, and loyalty to, other group members and the 
ideology to which the group adheres. Once a person has joined a terrorist group or 
organization, inhibitions against violence are gradually lessened due to the processes 
and dynamics that tend to occur whenever such groups are formed. This chapter 
therefore seeks to demonstrate and explain what these processes and dynamics are, 
and how they are able to lower inhibitions against undertaking terrorist actions.
Indeed, while the fourth chapter of this thesis discussed societal culture and its effects 
on an individual, this chapter focuses on organizational culture and its ability to affect 
inhibitions against violence. Amongst others, ingroup versus outgroup psychological 
processes are discussed, as well as an evaluation of groupthink in relation to terrorist 
groups. Obedience to authority is also analysed in substantial depth, so that an 
understanding of the relationship between a leader and group members is better 
understood in the context of terrorism and terrorist behaviour. Disinhibiting 
mechanisms such as diffusion of responsibility and displacement of responsibility for 
violent actions are also considered in this chapter due to their significance in a group 
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situation. Again, case illustrations from the IRA and Palestinian suicide bombers are 
highlighted to provide further evidence of the theoretical material. 
Group Dynamics: 
Group Cohesiveness 
The effect of a group upon an individual is such that many terrorist organizations are 
able to foster an intense level of group cohesion that results in a situation where an 
individual comes to view other group members as “a family for whom they are as 
willing to die as a mother for her child or a soldier for his buddies” (Atran, 2003b). 
Such group cohesiveness frequently develops in response to fulfilling certain 
psychological needs. Often, this is a need related to feeling a sense of belonging or 
the need to respond to a perceived “shared danger” (Post, 1987). 
While group cohesiveness is essential for the functioning of any kind of organization, 
in terrorist organizations this cohesiveness often helps to disinhibit aggressive and 
violent behaviour because it tends to allow somewhat of a “group mind” (Post, 1990) 
or collective identity to be cultivated (Beck, 1999, p.145). In the case of Palestinian 
suicide bombers, it has been argued that the group dynamics are such that once the 
group member “accepts their role as martyr, they have taken on the identity of the 
organization” and are “no longer psychologically separate” individuals but instead 
have “fused” their identity with the goals and attitudes of those of the organization 
(Valenty, 2004). Indeed, Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2003) noted from their 
interviews with imprisoned Palestinian terrorists that it was clear that many 
individuals came to define their identity as that of a group member above individual 
considerations, and identified the goals and ideologies of the organization as their 
own personal aims. For example, one imprisoned man remarked that “armed attacks 
are an integral part of the organization’s struggle… Our goals can only be achieved 
through force” (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003, p.179). 
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 In addition, McCauley and Segal (1987) note that in the context of terrorist groups, 
such cohesiveness permits a feeling of “reinforcement of the individual’s sense of 
mission and self-righteousness” (p.239), which in turn helps to create the kind of ‘us 
versus them’ thinking that was outlined in chapter three. In addition, what often 
results from this kind of group cohesiveness is that aggressive behaviour towards 
outsiders of the group grows to be “more extreme over time” (ibid, p.247). 
Interestingly, group cohesiveness can also be “intensified” depending on the extent to 
which there exists a sense of honour in being chosen to belong to a terrorist group and 
how successful the group is perceived to be (Valenty, 2004, p.14). As well as this, the 
smaller the group, the easier it is for group cohesiveness to be prevalent to a higher 
degree (ibid). In the case of Hamas, where terrorist cells are composed of 
approximately seven members with one leader (Battersby, 1995), group cohesiveness 
can thus be expected to be seen at a very high level. Group cohesiveness is further 
bolstered when the group comes into contact with other ones, especially if such 
meetings are in an adversarial manner, because this is able to “accentuate the positive 
bias” a person has toward their own group while reinforcing the negative view of the 
other group (Beck, 1999, p.144-145). 
This perception of ingroup versus outgroup is one of the main ways in which 
inhibitions against violence can be surpassed. This is because it allows for stereotypes 
and categorization of individuals to occur, which in turn paves the way for displaying 
a marked lack of empathy towards those members of particular outgroups. Indeed, as 
Beck (1999) writes, “as soon as boundaries are drawn around an outgroup on the 
basis of religion, race, or creed, its individual members are perceived as 
interchangeable… This kind of ingroup-outgroup division provides the matrix for 
biased thinking and prejudice” (p.151). Aggression and violence against those not 
part of the defined ingroup can be encouraged by belonging to a group for a few 
important reasons. Firstly, psychological blocks against violent behaviour can be 
passed over depending on the extent to which the ingroup believes they hold moral 
superiority over other groups (Brewer, 1999, p.435). The ‘us versus them’ thinking 
that is prevalent here leads people to view themselves as more virtuous and principled 
than members of other groups – hence, this attitude “provides justification or 
legitimization for domination or active subjugation of outgroups” (ibid). While it was 
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mentioned previously that the belief of a threat to a group makes that group more 
cohesive, this perception of a threat to “ingroup interests or survival” from outgroups 
can also allow people to behave aggressively toward outgroups (Brewer, 1999, p.435-
436). Violent behaviour may therefore be sanctioned by the group as a whole in 
response to such a threat or perceived danger. Indeed, this kind of situation “creates a 
circumstance in which identification and interdependence with the ingroup is directly 
associated with fear and hostility toward the threatening outgroup” (ibid, p.436). 
As has been shown in previous chapters, the degree to which a group feels cohesive 
and the extent to which a group mind develops may also help in fostering the process 
of dehumanization. As mentioned above, a considerable level of group cohesion 
encourages a lack of empathy toward members of outgroups, which in turn can also 
eventually endorse viewing others in a dehumanized manner. For instance, Struch and 
Schwartz (1989) argue that once there is a motive for “intergroup aggression” by a 
cohesive group, inhibitions to undertake violence can be lessened once people justify 
their violence by dehumanizing their opponent. They posit that “the stronger the 
conflict and hence the motivation to harm, the more the dehumanization”, and once 
an ingroup starts to dehumanize an outgroup, “the greater the aggression” the ingroup 
inflicts on its adversaries (ibid).  
Group cohesiveness in the IRA is directly encouraged by the organization’s 
leadership. The Green Book, for example, notes that one of the important ways in 
which to achieve the group’s aims and objectives of a free and united Ireland is to 
“build on a spirit of comradeship” between the IRA’s members (Dillon, 1994, p.266). 
Later on in the Green Book, it is also noted that if this “comradeship” between 
members “is lacking”, this can help in destroying both popular support for the 
organization and the general efficient functioning of it (ibid, p.279). Within Hamas, 
too, group cohesiveness is encouraged as necessary for ‘victory’. For instance, the 
Hamas covenant states that in order to “counter” the Jewish ‘enemy’, “the enemy 
should be faced by the people as a single body, which if one member should 
complain, the rest of the body would respond by feeling the same pains” 
(www.hamasonline.com, 2004). The organization goes on to say that once such a 
“spirit” exists within the group, “brotherliness would deepen, cooperation, sympathy 
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and unity will be enhanced and the ranks will be solidified to confront the enemies” 
(ibid).
Groupthink
In addition to the above arguments, one of the main ways in which group 
cohesiveness is able to disinhibit behaviour is through its ability to encourage and 
praise conformity of ideas in group situations. In this way, it is theorized that terrorist 
groups have the propensity for individual members to “submerge” their identity with 
that of the group (Post, 1987, p.309).This process of gradual conformity within a 
group often leads to what is termed “groupthink” (Janis, 1972).  Essentially, 
groupthink tends to occur when there is a situation of a “highly cohesive” group 
“coupled with directive leadership” (Chen et al, 1996). 
In terrorist organizations, groupthink appears to be demonstrated to an “extreme 
degree” (Post, 1990, p.36). Post (1990) suggests that this is because a terrorist group 
by its very nature has to perpetrate acts of terrorism so that it can “justify its 
existence” (p.36). Hence, any dissent in achieving this will necessarily be quashed 
because conforming to this aim is paramount. Although Irving Janis conceived of the 
concept of groupthink in relation to governmental political decisions; it has, as noted, 
become an element in understanding processes within terrorist groups also. Janis 
effectively argued that groupthink occurs when “member’s strivings for unanimity” 
take priority over realistic and rational decision making (1972, p.9). In essence, 
“groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral 
judgement” (ibid). Symptoms of groupthink, especially in the case of terrorism, 
include the following: a belief that the group is invulnerable, which leads to 
“excessive optimism and excessive risk taking”; the assumption that the group is of 
high moral character; a “one-dimensional” view of the enemy as “evil”; and a lack of 
tolerance for those members that attempt to question the “shared key beliefs” that 
from the core of the groups ideology (Post, 1990).
 Groupthink is therefore able to lower or remove inhibitions to kill because it permits 
those undertaking violence to “minimize decision conflicts between ethical values 
and expediency” (Janis, 1972, p.204). As well as this, the assumption that one’s own 
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group is of high moral character also helps in evading any feelings of guilt or 
embarrassment for having undertaken violence (ibid). Because group cohesiveness 
often leads to a lack of empathy for victims of their violence or the dehumanization of 
such victims, groupthink further aids this process as it helps confirm negative 
stereotypes and categorizations of opponents (ibid). 
In Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, examples of groupthink can 
be found from the soon-to-be bomber’s preparatory stages in the organization up until 
the day he or she actually commits the suicide attack. For instance, in the week 
leading up to the attack, a couple of “assistants”, higher up in the organization, 
remain with the would-be attacker twenty-four hours a day (Hassan, 2001). These 
assistants monitor and maintain the person’s sense of confidence and willingness 
about their impending attack and subsequent death, and if they perceive any “signs of 
doubt” from him or her, someone even more senior in the organization joins the 
assistants in order to influence the would-be attacker to proceed in carrying out their 
actions (Valenty, 2004). It is also worth noting that a lot of members of such groups 
seem to display groupthink in the way that many believe and argue publicly that if the 
group to which they belong says that a certain action is “required and justified, then it 
is required and justified” (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003).
Diffusion of Responsibility
The group and collective decision making are also important to disinhibition as they 
are often a precursor to utilizing diffusion of responsibility as a mechanism for 
disinhibiting violent behaviour. As Baumeister (1999) writes, “the larger the group, 
the less responsible any individual person feels… No one feels the pressure to say 
that a certain action is wrong. Indeed, the very fact that ‘everyone else is doing it’… 
seems to indicate that it is correct, or at least acceptable” (p.299). Diffusion of 
responsibility is therefore a powerful disinhibitor of violent behaviour because it 
allows those in a group to feel a distinct lack of accountability for any actions they 
undertake against others. Interestingly, Bandura (1990) notes that many organizations 
will go to immense trouble to formulate “sophisticated mechanisms” that eclipse or 
conceal individual responsibility for any decisions that result in harm to others 
(p.176). 
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The idea of diffusion of responsibility apparently first came about during the mid 
1960s after the murder of Kitty Genovese in New York City in 1964. The woman was 
brutally raped and murdered while approximately thirty-eight people either saw or 
heard what was happening but did nothing until after her murder (Waller, 2002). Two 
researchers theorized from this that those who did see or hear what was happening to 
Kitty probably decided that someone else will call, or already had called, the 
emergency services or helped in some other way (ibid, p.213). After experiments with 
this hypothesis in mind, it was found that “lone bystanders would often come forward 
to help a victim, whereas bystanders who believed they were part of a large group 
would not” (ibid). In a terrorist organization, where its collective ethos is inextricably 
linked to justifying the killing of people, there is no pressure to feel guilt about such 
killings due to the fact that there are so many others involved, from the planning 
stages right through to the execution of the actions themselves (Waller, 2002, p.213). 
An example of diffusion of responsibility can be seen in one of the members of the 
IRA who was on trial for his part in a bombing in Coventry, England, in the late 
1930s. When talking about his views on violence toward others, he stated that, “I am 
a soldier of the IRA. My job was to store explosives until they were needed by men 
who would call on me and ask for them. I did not know… [the other IRA members 
involved] intended to place the bomb in the centre of Coventry in the daytime” 
(Dillon, 1994, p.34). Thus, the person feels absolved of blame for the bombing as he 
believed that his role was of little consequence due to him being part of a larger 
overall group. In the case of Palestinian suicide bombers, diffusion of responsibility is 
most clearly seen in the religious examples provided in the previous chapter, where 
those in the organization (both members in authority positions and those who are not) 
attribute responsibility for suicide bombings to God – where the bombers are chosen 
by God and are carrying out divine obligations, hence they cannot be blamed when 
people are killed as a result.
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Deindividuation: 
Being part of a group, especially one where an ingroup-outgroup distinction is 
emphasized, additionally helps in creating the conditions for deindividuated 
behaviour to occur. The concept of deindividuation as a social psychological 
phenomenon is a relatively new idea, having only been developed in the mid 
twentieth century (Waller, 2002). This term is applied to the process by which people 
lose consciousness of themselves as individuals when they are part of a defined group 
or sometimes even just part of some kind of crowd (ibid, p.216). In essence, 
deindividuation theory claims that “under conditions where the member is not 
individuated in the group, there is likely to occur for the member a reduction of inner 
constraints against doing certain things” (Festinger et al., 1952, p.382; cited in 
Postmes and Spears, 1998, p.239). This reduction of inner constraints also applies to 
aggressive or violent behaviours.
Deindividuation is primarily able to disinhibit behaviour because it confers 
anonymity to a person. Following from this, a person may become less aware of 
himself or herself as an individual actor, and thus less able to regulate and evaluate 
their behaviour. Anonymity as part of deindividuation has been shown in previous 
research to have a considerable effect on disinhibiting behaviour. Diener (1976) 
argues that anonymity is an important variable because it instigates conditions that 
allow people to stop perceiving themselves and others as individuals, which therefore 
leads to deindividuated behaviour – “it has been found that anonymity may release 
such diverse uninhibited behaviours as stealing, aggression, and physical intimacy” 
(p.498).
Numerous experiments have been undertaken to better understand the phenomenon of 
deindividuation, most notably those of Zimbardo (1970) and Diener (1976). 
Zimbardo’s 1970 experiment used university students as its subjects and created 
certain conditions to test the effects of deindividuation and disinhibition: the identities 
of the students were obscured within a small group setting, with numbers substituted 
in place of their names; they were told to wear loose-fitting laboratory coats over top 
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of their clothes; and on top of this their faces were concealed by masks or hoods 
(Zimbardo, 2000). Once these conditions were created, they were then asked to shock 
other participants who were told they were taking part in a similar study on stress –
results showed that those experimented upon in the above described deindividuated 
conditions “delivered twice as much shock” as those tested in control conditions 
(ibid, p.18). Interestingly, Diener’s 1976 experiments, in which anonymity and 
aggression were tested both in and out of a group situation as well as with a degree of 
altered responsibility, showed that anonymity fostered a “lessened concern for social 
evaluation”, however it “produced only a nonsignificant trend in aggression” (p.503). 
Nonetheless, some of those who participated said that they “felt more anonymous” 
and unidentifiable while undertaking aggressive actions, and because of this, felt “less 
concern over what others would think of their behaviour” (ibid, p.505). Thus, these 
experiments essentially demonstrated that uninhibited behaviour can emerge when 
such variables as anonymity and a sense of altered responsibility exist (Diener, 1977, 
p.144). 
From what has already been discussed, it is clear that anonymity is able to further 
deindividuation and thus disinhibited behaviour because it permits a person to be less 
aware of their individual actions, or perhaps more aware of themselves as a group 
member instead of an individual. A diminished sense of self-awareness is theorized to 
bring about a minimization of self-regulation in people because the individuals 
involved are not as aware of “behaviour-norm discrepancies” (Diener, 1979, p.1169). 
As a consequence, and as Waller (2002) argues in the case of terrorism, “a loss of 
self-awareness may lead to a breakdown of such internalized controls as shame, guilt, 
or fear and result in increased levels of aggression” (p.217). 
Despite the reality that there is an abundance of theoretical material and sound 
evidence for deindividuation and its importance to releasing inhibitions, the concept 
has been criticized on a number of occasions. For instance, there is a debate over 
whether deindividuation is the cause of uninhibited behaviour, or if it is perhaps more 
correct to say that deindividuation is instead a result of such behaviour, as discussed 
in chapter two. This argument is theorized on the premise that those within a group 
“feel more similar as they perform unrestrained acts together” and as such then 
“become deindividuated as perceived similarity between group members increases, 
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that is, as they simultaneously perform the same activities” (Diener, 1977, p.145). In 
addition to this point, the other major criticism levelled against deindividuation 
theory is that variables such as anonymity do not have that great an effect on 
disinhibiting aggressive behaviour. For example, Postmes and Spears (1998) 
conducted a meta-analysis of past and present deindividuation research and found 
that, overall, there was not “strong support” that any of the variables discussed earlier 
overtly resulted in aggression or violence (p.250). In fact, they concluded that the 
conditions that produce deindividuation lead to “an increase in normative behaviour 
or, more specifically, to behaviour that is normative within the social context” (ibid, 
p.252). Interestingly, this finding can be directly applied to terrorism, as the 
normative behaviour in terrorist organizations is indeed that of violence against other 
human beings. In this way, deindividuation is important to terrorist groups as it 
essentially releases inhibitions to doing what the group does. 
Although there are not a lot of deindividuation examples to be found in the terrorist 
groups studied in this thesis, there are nonetheless a few that are of note. For example, 
in some Irish communities, IRA volunteers are sometimes seen in public wearing 
their “black face-masks, berets and uniforms” (Apter, 1990, p.168), which may give 
rise to deindividuation through the effects of their perceived anonymity. Heskin 
(1980) also contends that for a newcomer to the IRA, “not only will the new recruit 
have entered a formal structure, he will also have entered a role which will make 
specific demands on his attitudes and behaviour. The role is one of ‘guerrilla’, 
‘freedom fighter’, ‘revolutionary’, or the role favoured and promoted by the 
Republican movement, ‘soldier-politician’” (p.92). Being in this ‘role’ within the 
group may help to give rise to deindividuated behaviour because of the way in which 
the group member is made to feel less like an individual and more like an anonymous 
part of something much larger. As well as this, some of those involved in IRA 
bombing operations have been disguised to blend into where the operation was taking 
place (Silke, 2003a, p.50), which can also be argued to have provided the opportunity 
for deindividuation to occur due to the perception of anonymity that may have 
resulted from this.
Examples of deindividuation in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers can mostly be 
found in the processes that prepare the bomber to undertake their attack. In some of 
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the training sessions for would-be terrorists, “the men were dressed in camouflage 
uniforms and some had their faces covered in black masks, some in green masks” 
(Davis, 2003, p.151). As well as this, recruits at times marched in uniformity and 
were “draped in white capes and white masks that revealed only their eyes and 
mouths. Each mask was adorned with green (the colour of Islam) headbands” (ibid, 
p.151). Elements of deindividuation can also be seen at the time of the attack, as the 
suicide attacker will “often be disguised as a religious Jew, an Israeli soldier, or a 
tourist” (Moghadam, 2003, p.86), which may have lead to the attacker perceiving 
themselves as completely anonymous.
As a whole, deindividuation theory has been able to offer further insights into how 
inhibitions against violence are released. In spite of the criticisms discussed above, 
research on this subject has been able to show that there is at least an “increased 
tendency toward aggressive behaviour” when deindividuating conditions are present 
(Waller, 2002, p.216). Deindividuation is effectively able to encourage disinhibited 
behaviour because, as with dehumanization, it can provide a substantial degree of 
psychological distance between a potential perpetrator of violence and their victim(s) 
because of the effect that anonymity, and thus lowered self-awareness, can have on a 
person’s behaviour. 
Obedience to Authority:
One of the most central ways in which inhibitions to kill are overcome in a group 
situation is if a known authority sanctions the violent behaviour. According to 
Zimbardo (1999), research on obedience to authority and violent behaviour has found 
that there are certain conditions under which an authority can help to disinhibit such 
behaviours. For example, an authority can be crucial in legitimating a groups’ 
ideology. Additionally, since authorities usually set rules in regards to a group 
member’s conduct, they can also set “rules that channel behavioural options”, and, 
importantly, are able to displace responsibility for particular actions onto either 
themselves or someone else. Indeed, as Stahelski (2004) notes, the process of 
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lowering inhibitions to kill through conditioning within terrorist groups “centres on 
and builds from the power of the charismatic leader”.
Authorities in Group Situations
One notable way in which authorities in terrorist organizations can help to gradually 
release inhibitions against violent behaviour in group members is to slowly increase 
their members’ tasks within the organization. In other words, upon entering the 
organization, a person may at first be delegated “peripheral activities” that are non-
violent in nature, but will progressively be given tasks noticeably more violent in 
nature (McCauley and Segal, 1987). Labelled the “foot in the door phenomenon”, or a 
process of escalating commitments, this kind of socialization process within the 
group is essentially based on the premise that once a person has consented to 
undertake a seemingly minor task, they are more likely to then obey increasingly 
larger demands as time goes on (Waller, 2002, p.205). This is able to aid in the 
releasing of inhibitions because the journey to violence is a gradual one that is 
theorized to therefore “make later evildoing easier” (ibid). This is because such a 
situation brings about a new psychological environment: “once one has taken the 
initial step, one is in a new psychological and social context” that is more conducive 
to following larger and increasingly more difficult orders (ibid). Within Hamas, this 
process can be seen in the way that new recruits are at first taught about religion and 
politics, and later gradually this teaching turns to lectures extolling the virtue of 
martyrdom (Bartholet, 1995). In addition, new recruits to the organizations are given 
progressively more important tasks to do for the organization, usually to do with the 
delivery of weapons or information from one site to another, in order to “test their 
commitment” to the group as well as to gauge their obedience to authority 
(Moghadam, 2003; Kushner, 1996).
Following the orders of an authority can also be said to help release inhibitions to kill 
or harm others because of the structure that a situation of authority creates. According 
to Kelman (1973), such a structure allows for a different kind of moral code to be set 
in place, where normal moral principles are cast aside. This, in turn, makes it possible 
for justifications for violence to be accepted more readily – “when acts of violence 
are explicitly ordered, implicitly encouraged, tacitly approved, or at least permitted by 
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legitimate authorities, people’s readiness to commit or condone them is considerably 
enhanced. The fact that such acts are authorized seems to carry automatic justification 
for them” (Kelman, 1973, p.39). Indeed, when acts of violence are seemingly 
condoned or approved by a leader, this is able to break down inhibitions against 
violence because the sanctioning of such behaviour is able to afford “security and 
justification” to those who carry out the acts of terrorism (Keane, 2001; cited in 
Borum, 2004). In the case of religious terrorism especially, the group’s leader is “seen 
as the authentic interpreter of God’s word”, which not only helps in removing any 
hesitation about killing but also aids in “endowing the destruction of the defined 
enemy with sacred significance” (Post, 2005b, p.58).
Additionally, disinhibition through authorization is significant because it in turn helps 
to produce and maintain a sense of ‘routinization’. In a situation of routinization, 
group members become “involved in an action without considering the implications 
of that action, and without really making a decision” (Kelman, 1973, p.46). As people 
“become habituated” to their specific tasks, they proceed to view it as an ordinary job, 
which then results in the “nature of the task” becoming “completely disassociated 
from their performance of it” (ibid, p.47). 
The Duty to Obey and the Milgrim Obedience Experiments
One of the main ways in which group leaders and organizational authorities are able 
to elicit violent behaviour from other group members is through encouraging loyalty 
and cultivating a sense of duty to obey orders, whatever they may be. This is 
especially amenable in societies that socialize obedience to authority as a common 
value. Even in cultures that do not promote authoritarianism to any substantial degree, 
any kind of group situation can lead to the valuing of authority. As Kelman writes, 
“an individual in an authority situation characteristically feels obligated to obey the 
orders of the authorities… The basic structure of a situation of legitimate authority 
requires the individual to respond in terms of authoritative demands rather than 
personal preferences” (1973, p.39). Situations of authority generate this sense of 
obligation to follow the desires of a leader – without this feeling of duty it becomes 
problematic to “maintain a dependable and equitable social order” (Kelman and 
Hamilton, 1989, p.20). The belief in the duty to obey is therefore able to help lower 
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inhibitions against violence because it brings about a different perspective in which 
guilt for not undertaking violence becomes the norm rather than the other way 
around. In other words, inhibitions are lowered because violence is framed as a duty 
that has to be fulfilled, rather than the violence being seen as something that is 
immoral. A sense of duty, then, may be one of the most important avenues for 
obeying superior orders without question in a terrorist group.
This aspect of group processes, along with other obedience factors, is seen nowhere 
more clearly than in Stanley Milgrim’s obedience experiments. These experiments, as 
described in chapter two of this thesis, tested the conditions under which authority 
would and would not be obeyed, and had surprising results. The first experiment, in 
which the ‘teacher’ (subject) and the ‘student’ (the learner) could not see or hear each 
other, found that 65 percent of the teachers complied with the experimenters demands 
of shocking right up to the highest available level of voltage (Milgrim, 1974, p.32). 
Interestingly, the fifth experiment had the same percentage for shocking the student 
as the first. However, this experiment had differing conditions – unlike the first one, 
the teacher could see and hear the student, had physical contact with the student, and 
was made aware of a heart condition that the student had (Milgrim, 1974). 
To test convincingly whether obedience to authority was the main factor behind such 
high-voltage shocks, the seventh experiment tested the teacher when the authority 
was not present, and the eleventh tested what would happen if the teacher was to 
choose the level of shock to administer. Interestingly, only nine teachers (out of forty) 
chose to shock to the highest level when there was no authority present, while only 
one chose to shock to the highest level when the teacher was able to choose his or her 
shock level for the student (Milgrim, 1974, p.60-61). 
The belief in a duty to obey an authority is clearly apparent in these experiments. As 
Milgrim noted, “the ordinary person who shocked the victim did so out of a sense of 
obligation – a conception of his duties as a subject – and not from any peculiarly 
aggressive tendencies” (1974, p.6). Indeed, it appears as if a person does not lose their 
morality in an authority situation, but that the morality “acquires a radically different 
focus” (ibid, p.8). The morality now lies with the extent to which the person believes 
they are keeping up with the expectations that the leader or person in authority has 
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laid down for him or her to follow – for instance, in a military situation, a soldier may 
not experience feelings of guilt for the consequences of the missions they undertake, 
yet will “feel pride or shame depending on how well he has performed the mission 
assigned to him” (ibid, p.8). This can also be seen in terrorist groups, as obeying a 
leader and completing the set mission are of paramount importance. An obligation to 
obey those in authority can also be seen even in those who disobeyed Milgrim’s 
orders to shock the other participants. For example, Zimbardo (1999) questioned 
Milgrim on how the ‘teacher’ reacted in the experiment that tested what happened 
once the teacher learned that the ‘student’ apparently had a heart condition. When this 
student seemed to have a heart attack, Milgrim noted that none of the teachers got up 
to help the victim at this point, and those that did waited until the experimenter 
granted them permission to do so (Zimbardo, 1999). 
In applying this theory specifically to terrorism, the findings of the Milgrim 
experiments, especially on the duty to obey an authority, show that such behaviour –
framing acts of terrorism as a duty to obey superior orders – is also bound to occur 
within terrorist organizations. For instance, one imprisoned Palestinian terrorist spoke 
of how there did indeed exist a feeling of duty to obey all of the orders, without 
question, given by superior officers in the organization by those lower in the 
hierarchy (Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003). In the case of the IRA, Heskin (1980) 
has pointed out that recruits believe it is their duty to obey all orders in relation to 
violence because of their perceived role in the organization – as part of this, group 
members “will have technical and practical aspects of [their] activities on which to 
focus on and so diminish [their] moral concern” over undertaking such violent 
actions. 
Authority and Displacement of Responsibility
Aside from justifying violence as a duty to obey superior orders, an authority 
situation can also help to further the disinhibition process by allowing those obeying 
orders to attribute responsibility for their actions onto their leader or someone else of 
influence. In this way, if a person participating in harmful acts against others can 
displace responsibility for their actions and their action’s consequences, inhibitions 
against acting violently or aggressively will be significantly lowered. Indeed, 
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irrespective of the context and despite individual personality differences, “the basic 
structure” of any authority situation is such that “the individual does not see himself 
as personally responsible for the consequences of his action… Thus when his action 
causes harm to others, he can feel relatively free of guilt” (Kelman, 1973, p.39). This 
mechanism therefore works in the same way as diffusion of responsibility.
For instance, one conclusion from Milgrim’s experiments was that a subordinate in an 
authority situation comes to see his or her self as merely an “instrument for carrying 
out another person’s wishes” or an “agent of external authority” rather than an 
autonomous person responsible for their own actions (1974, p.xii and p.8). One of 
Milgrim’s experiments in particular highlights how authority and a loss of personal 
responsibility are intertwined. In this experiment, a different role was introduced for 
the teacher – while another person was brought in to actually press the button to 
shock the student, the teacher’s new role consisted of undertaking “subsidiary acts” 
that would help along the process yet “remove him from the actual act of depressing 
the lever on the shock generator” (ibid, p.121-122). As such, the person perceives 
themselves to be more legitimately absolved of blame and feelings of guilt over the 
action because not only has someone authorized violent actions to take place, they 
themselves are not the ones who have physically perpetrated such violence (ibid, 
p.122). 
Displacing responsibility for one’s own role in the perpetration of violence is 
therefore a powerful mechanism for disinhibiting aggressive behaviour in terrorist 
groups or otherwise because of its inherent ability to dismiss any “self-prohibiting” 
thoughts a person has against committing violence due to the strong belief that there 
actions are not their own (Bandura, 1990).  Adding to this, the use of authority to 
warrant the belief of a lack of personal responsibility is also important in that it 
additionally provides the conditions for those participating in group violence to feel 
less responsibility as well as a lesser “social concern” for the welfare of those 
“mistreated” by other groups of people (ibid, p.173).
Authoritarianism and obedience to authority in the IRA’s case is quite possibly the 
most noticeable aspect in their functioning as an organization. Before 1977, the 
structure of the IRA emulated that of a formal and hierarchical military organization, 
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and included large units and battalions (Wilkinson, 1982, p.146). After 1977, 
however, the group reorganized these units into smaller “cells”, headed by one 
person, which aimed to create a more secretive organization than before (ibid, p.146-
147). These in turn come under the jurisdiction of the Army Council and the IRA’s 
General Headquarters, who are also responsible for deciding effectively all of the 
IRA’s military and political policy (ibid). 
This seemingly authoritarian structure of the IRA has been noted to be evident 
throughout its membership, and has clearly played a role in helping to lower 
inhibitions against terrorism. For example, Heskin (1980) notes that there is a 
“common and pervasive” degree of authoritarianism amongst IRA group members, 
and also points out that the regulations concerning behaviour and even seemingly 
insignificant actions by members are watched over by the organization’s leadership to 
a considerable degree. Indeed, it is even specified in the Green Book that, for 
instance, “Volunteers are forbidden to undertake hunger-strikes without the express 
sanction of General Headquarters” (Dillon, 1994, p.272). In addition, the Green Book 
also stipulates that one of the conditions for joining the organization is that the 
member must “obey all orders and regulations issued… by the Army Authority and 
by… [any] superior officer” (ibid, p.266).
The Army Council itself conducts its meetings in an “extremely stiff and formalised” 
manner, where “military discipline is the norm, Christian names are banned and 
members are addressed by their full paramilitary titles despite long acquaintance and 
close friendship within the group” (Heskin, 1980, p.92). As a result of such practices, 
those new to the organization “enter a formalised structure in which orders are given, 
obedience demanded and disobedience punished harshly” (ibid). In this way, such 
obedience training helps the disinhibition process as it conditions certain responses 
and thus lowers inhibitions because following the orders of an authority, no matter 
how injurious or harmful, is seen as the appropriate and justified course of action. In 
addition, displacement of responsibility provides an added level of disinhibition, as 
there are less fears about the consequences of acting injuriously toward others 
because it is perceived that an authority is able take ultimate blame for it. 
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Differing only slightly to the IRA, Palestinian suicide terror groups also display a 
similar mindset when it comes to obeying an authority. Authoritarianism is displayed 
to such a high degree in Palestinian terror groups because of its prevalence in 
Palestinian society in general (Burdman, 2003). Thus, those who are members of such 
groups will ultimately be “comfortable with dogmatic, unequivocal opinions” and 
sustain “an incapacity to deal with choices” (ibid, p.109). The setup in such 
organizations for suicide attacks is apparently one that is divided into several different 
levels – at the top is the organizational leadership who are responsible for deciding 
the need for suicide attacks as well as all other decisions important to this process; 
and the next tier down consists of the person who is charged with recruiting the 
potential bomber and his or her aides. This person is also responsible for assembling 
the explosives and the detonator. In turn, the aides selected are the ones who source 
the explosives and arrange for transportation for the bomber to their target 
(Moghadam, 2003, p.85). Below this is the “martyrdom cell” (ibid), as described 
earlier, in which the bomber builds a close relationship with his trainers (the 
aforementioned aides) and with whose support he or she eventually carries out the 
attack. Even upon formally entering the organization, the potential bomber reaches 
the stage within the organization in which “obedience to a leader is now demanded 
and if not forthcoming will be coerced” (Burdman, 2003).
Obedience to a leader is clearly demonstrated by imprisoned members of Palestinian 
terror groups in Post, Sprinzak and Denny’s (2003) interviews. Throughout these 
interviews, the authors noticed a “stark absence of critical thinking concerning 
following instructions and carrying out actions” on the behalf of the members. For 
example, one explained that
The rank and file were ready to follow through fire and water. I was subordinate to just one 
person. My relations with him were good, as long as I agreed to all that was asked of me. It 
was an organization with a very clear hierarchy, and it was clear to me that I was at the 
bottom of the ladder and that I had to do whatever I was told. 
Another imprisoned terrorist, from a more secular group, also shows just how 
pervasive obedience to authority is within these groups. He remarks that “there was 
no room for questioning” in the organization, and also noted that “the commander got 
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his orders from his superiors. You couldn’t just take the initiative and carry out an 
armed attack without the commander’s approval” (ibid, p.182).
Conclusion:
The process that an individual goes through once part of a terrorist group has been 
shown in this chapter to result in remarkable changes to the person’s behaviour. 
While being part of such a group “affords a sense of identity and pride” to a member 
as well as giving them a “life that takes on new meaning” (Valenty, 2004, p.14), it 
also provides a pathway to destructive and violent behaviour. As examined in the first 
part of this chapter, the group dynamics within terror organizations allow a process of 
disinhibition to occur because of the effects of group cohesion, collective decision 
making and diffusion of responsibility. Linked to group dynamics is the process and 
resulting consequences of deindividuation. Deindividuation is linked to group 
dynamics in this instance as it is very much related to the perception of a discernible 
ingroup/outgroup distinction. Once the ingroup and the outgroup is defined, it may 
become easier for a person to invest themselves and their identity into that of the 
group. Though the influence of deindividuation has been questioned, it nonetheless 
seems to be an important factor in the context of terrorist activities. Aside from group 
dynamics and the influence of deindividuation, the processes involved in obeying an 
authority are perhaps some of the most important ways to disinhibit violent 
behaviour. As demonstrated, obedience to authority can facilitate disinhibition 
because it can lead to a sense of altered responsibility, which in turn can help to 
dismiss any fears the person has about the consequences of their action for 
themselves, as well as justifying violence on the grounds that the individual has an 
obligation to obey orders. The authorization of violence by a superior has been shown 
in this chapter to be a substantial force in influencing group members’ thoughts and 
actions. In addition to all of this, the influence of a group upon an individual has also 
been shown to have a part in facilitating dehumanization, a process that has been 
referred to throughout this thesis as very important in disinhibiting violent behaviour. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of terrorism has resulted in a horrific amount of suffering, fear and 
loss of life around the globe. With the resurgence of religious terrorism and an 
intensification of the use of suicide attacks throughout the world, we have seen more 
and more frightening examples of the brutality and destructiveness that human beings 
are capable of. This thesis, by applying a political psychology approach to the study 
of terrorism, has sought to show many of the ways in which terrorists justify and 
rationalize their violence, and has argued that disinhibition of behaviour is pertinent 
to gaining a deeper and more complete insight into the behaviour of terrorists and the 
psychological processes they undergo in order to commit violence. Through a 
comprehensive examination of disinhibitory mechanisms in relation to terrorism, it 
has been demonstrated that the extent to which a potential terrorist surpasses their 
inhibitions against violence is just as important as understanding his or her motivation 
for wanting to carry out terrorist activities.
The last chapter in this thesis brings together the most important aspects of chapters 
three to six in order to work toward building a useful model for understanding the 
role and significance of disinhibition in terrorism. After a discussion and examination 
of the model and its relevance to terrorism, the thesis draws to a close with a brief 
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overview of the implications of this work for the field of the psychology of terrorism, 
and points out any avenues for further research into the topic of disinhibition and 
terror.
Bandura’s Theoretical Model:
It has been emphasized in this thesis that terrorism must be looked at as a 
multidimensional phenomenon. Indeed, there are an abundance of factors that often 
work together to influence a person’s decision to become a terrorist and take part in 
terrorist activities, many of which have been examined throughout different chapters 
of this work. As such, an appropriate model for demonstrating how disinhibition 
works in terrorism is one that considers both individual and situational variables, as 
well as the relation between the two. Bandura’s (1990; 2004) model of self-regulating 
functions and terrorism has already been articulated in chapter two of this thesis, and 
will also serve as a guide for constructing a model in this chapter.
Displacement of 
responsibility
Diffusion of responsibility
Moral justification
Palliative Comparison
Euphemistic Labelling
Minimizing, ignoring, 
or misconstruing the 
consequences
Dehumanization
Attribution of 
Blame
Reprehensible 
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Detrimental 
Effects
VICTIM
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To reiterate from chapter two, this model clarifies certain disinhibiting mechanisms 
involved in terrorism, and is adapted from Bandura’s earlier work on disinhibition 
and violence (Bandura, 1986). The model essentially argues that there are eight 
mechanisms that help lower inhibitions to aggress against others, and that they justify 
both aggressive behaviour and the effects that the behaviour has on the victims. As 
such, these eight mechanisms cover both the perpetrator’s perception of their victim 
as well as their perception of the situation. 
To begin with, a moral justification may be a necessary disinhibitor for terrorism 
because it helps to convince those undertaking the violence that what they are doing 
is indeed the right thing to do, or is perhaps even a duty to do. In this way, construing 
an act as a moral one can also psychologically enable someone to act on any moral 
imperatives they may harbour. In addition to moral justification, comparing an act of 
terror to a greater violent act can also play a role in disinhibiting terrorism as it allows 
the perpetrator to trivialise their own act of aggression against others. As well as the 
above two mechanisms, euphemistic labelling of actions and behaviours is also able 
to push the disinhibition process further because it disguises the true meaning of the 
language used to describe violence against others. While these three mechanisms are, 
according to Bandura, used to justify “reprehensible conduct”, the main mechanism 
that follows from these is to play down, misconstrue or even disregard the 
consequences of any violent actions, which helps to allow perpetrators of violence to 
rationalize how their violence has affected their victims. Apart from these 
mechanisms, two others associated with situational disinhibition are diffusion of 
responsibility and displacement of responsibility. These help in releasing inhibitions 
as they let the perpetrator believe that responsibility for their violence and its effects 
ultimately lies with another person or group of people and not just themselves, and
can occur in a group situation, often as a result of either group decision making or the 
presence of a legitimate authority.
 The last two mechanisms of disinhibition in this model are linked to the perception 
of the victim, and have been shown in chapter three of this thesis to be of much 
significance in terrorism. First is dehumanization, which enables people to believe 
they are not harming humans but instead something far less important; and second is 
attribution of blame, where justifications for terrorism are said to come more easily if 
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the violence is perceived by the perpetrator to be of someone else’s, often their 
victims’, making rather than their own.
The model is extremely important for understanding the nature of terrorism because it 
provides a comprehensive examination of the underlying psychological mechanisms 
that allow people to participate in terrorist acts. However, while the model devised in 
this chapter of the thesis is based on the one above, it is comparably different in that it 
highlights how the dynamics of individual and situational disinhibitors work in with 
each other to release inhibitions to kill, as well as the way in which disinhibition is 
related to motivation in the overall process of undertaking a terrorist act. 
Examining Disinhibition in Terrorism – A New Model:
As described above, the model created in this thesis is interested in looking at both 
the individual and the situational factors involved in releasing inhibitions for 
undertaking terrorism as well as the link between these factors. As such, the model is 
divided into two sections that explain the different disinhibition mechanisms. Because 
all the elements put forth in the model are highlighted and examined throughout the 
chapters in this thesis, an explanation of the model will include a discussion of all the 
main points made in each of the chapters so that a coherent conclusion to this work 
can be clearly articulated. Essentially, the model seeks to demonstrate that the self-
regulation process is vital to understanding how someone with a motivation to harm 
others is actually enabled to do so through certain psychological processes. It sees the 
disinhibition process as containing two parts; one being the way in which the terrorist 
interprets the situation, and the other the way in which he or she interprets the 
individual(s) they are attacking. 
After the following explanation of the model, the research questions that have guided 
this thesis, as outlined in chapter one, will have been clearly answered. To reiterate, 
these questions are: firstly, and most importantly, what mechanisms exist that allow a 
person to knowingly inflict acts of terrorism upon another person; and secondly, to 
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what extent is disinhibition an important factor in the psychology of terrorism as a 
field of research?
Figure 2: The Disinhibition Process
Motive To Act
…
REGULATED
 BY:
Victim Interpretation:
• Blame Attribution
• Euphemistic Labelling
• Dehumanization
• Demonization
Terrorism
Situation Interpretation:
• Responsibility Attribution
• Moral Justification
• Euphemistic Labelling         
• Deindividuation      
• Blame Attribution
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As illustrated in the model, the process of disinhibition has two distinct parts – how a 
person interprets the situation, and how he or she perceives their intended victim(s). 
The double-headed arrow between the two parts shows that they are inextricably 
linked to each other and interact so that a person comes to feel justified about their 
behaviour, its effects, and about harming the particular victims they have chosen to
attack. It should also be noted that these processes often occur at the same time rather 
than separately. Once self-regulations are lowered, the person then becomes 
psychologically enabled to partake in the violence that they were previously 
motivated toward participating in. While some mechanisms come into play as a result 
of one or two others being present, this does not mean that all the mechanisms in the 
above model are required to be present for disinhibited behaviour to occur. Indeed, 
sometimes only two or three may be necessary for a person to lose certain inhibitions. 
As such, the above model is not arguing that all of its mechanisms must be present for 
terrorism to occur, but rather that disinhibited behaviour will often occur as a result of 
a combination of some or all of them. In positing this, though, it must also be noted 
that a potential terrorist must be disinhibited in both the situational sense as well as in 
his or her perception of the victim(s) to be psychologically enabled to participate in 
terrorism. Examined below are the two parts of the model that make up the bulk of 
the thesis – the interpretation of the situation, and the interpretation of the victim(s).
(1) Perception of the Situation
(a) Responsibility Attribution:
Where a person attributes responsibility for their actions has been discussed in several 
chapters of this thesis as an important disinhibitor for engaging in terrorism. For 
instance, in chapter five of this thesis it was noted that diffusion of responsibility can 
often help release inhibitions to kill because responsibility for the act and its 
consequences can be twisted by the perpetrator into being attributed to a religious 
deity; for example, “I am doing God’s work for him” (Beck, 2002) and “it is Allah 
who selects the martyrs” (Hassan, 2001). Responsibility attribution, either through 
displacement or diffusion, was shown most clearly in the sixth chapter of this thesis. 
In a group situation, diffusion of responsibility was shown to be relatively easily 
employed as a result of group dynamics and especially group decision making. 
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Displacement of responsibility was also shown in this chapter, primarily within the 
obedience to authority section, where it was argued that the mechanism comes into 
play most easily whenever a clear authority situation exists – in this way, a person can 
feel free from guilt about harming others as the ultimate responsibility for the 
violence is perceived by the perpetrator as lying with an established authority rather 
than with him or her self. 
(b) Moral Justification:
Reframing or perceiving acts of terrorism as morally justifiable has been shown in 
previous theory and in virtually all chapters throughout this thesis as a significant 
method for disinhibition. Put simply, viewing an action as morally permissible is able 
to help potential terrorists lower their inhibitions by, for instance, helping them to 
absolve feelings of guilt for any actions they undertake. In many instances, it is 
cultural and/or religious sanctioning that can give rise to such moral justifications for 
violence, most often through education, socialization, and interpretations of cultural 
or religious practices and beliefs.
(c) Euphemistic Labelling:
Distorting the meaning of people, concepts, and actions is imperative in 
understanding how terrorists are psychologically enabled to harm others. While this 
was referred to in different sections of the thesis, it was more clearly elucidated in the 
third chapter, mostly in relation to dehumanization. For example, it was noted in this 
particular chapter that euphemisms can help to justify an action as they aid in 
psychologically blocking out any moral disgust or confusion that the proper word 
may have aroused. Euphemisms revolving around terrorism that can serve to justify it 
in certain situations are usually noted to involve terrorists invoking the popular cliché 
“freedom fighter” as their title, which can then serve not only to justify the situation 
they are in as terrorists, but also to morally justify the actions such a person may then 
undertake. 
(d) Deindividuation:
The dynamics that being in a group often produces can have a significant effect on 
disinhibiting different types of behaviours. As described in the sixth chapter, 
deindividuation is especially applicable to terrorism, and was discussed as being able 
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to allow people to perceive others in terms of being part of a larger group rather than 
individuals, so that they come to be seen as a one-dimensional ‘other’ rather than 
multi-dimensional human beings. Deindividuation is also very important in the 
disinhibition process because it allows those undertaking violence, whether it be in a 
small or large group, to feel more anonymous as attackers and therefore have less 
concern over their behaviour. Thus, it provides a reasonably easy avenue for people 
to exhibit behaviours they normally would not display had they not been in a group 
situation.
(e) Blame Attribution:
Attributing blame for terrorism by a perpetrator away from themselves and onto 
others has also been explained as important for the process of disinhibition to take 
place. While displacing blame for terrorism is also articulated in the ‘victim 
perception’ section in this chapter, it also needs to be mentioned in the situational 
context because of the effect that blaming the situation can have on the disinhibition 
process. In this way, it is very similar to displacement of responsibility, and can often 
come to the fore in group situations. In chapter three of the thesis, it was noted that 
blaming others for acts of terrorism is perhaps one of the most important ways of 
removing inhibitions to kill, as guilt for violence is often viewed as not necessary 
when the blame for it can be laid elsewhere. A good example of this is one from the 
IRA, used in chapter three, where a bombing by the organization that killed a number 
of civilians was blamed by IRA leadership on the British Army, who they alleged had 
set off the bomb prematurely. Another example that can often be found is when 
terrorists claim that their violence is in reaction to a previous action directed against 
them by their ‘enemy’.
(2) Perception of the Victim 
(a) Blame Attribution:
The third chapter of this thesis demonstrated that perceiving one’s victim as deserving 
of their situation is a startlingly easy way to overcome feelings of empathy for them. 
This was clearly shown through examples of both the IRA and Palestinian suicide 
bombers, one important example being the seemingly general belief among 
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Palestinian terrorists that because of the “kind of conduct” they believe they are 
subjected to by Israelis renders no other option than to undertake terror against them 
(Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003). Attributing blame to victims for actions taken 
against them may derive from cultural or religious teachings, in which people may 
interpret, distort, or misconstrue certain beliefs about particular ‘enemies’ of that 
society and/or religious orientation.
(b) Euphemistic Labelling: 
Using euphemistic language to describe a victim in addition to perceiving a situation 
also significantly aids the disinhibition process, especially in terms of dehumanizing 
the enemy. For instance, this thesis used the example of employing different 
metaphors in describing victims of potential violence to show how euphemisms are 
linked to dehumanization of the enemy – describing the enemy as people who need to 
be “exterminated”, for example, thus aids in further dehumanizing them as it employs 
terms usually used to describe rodents or other pest-like animals while essentially 
denying their humanness.
(c) Dehumanization:
As detailed throughout this thesis, dehumanization is one of the most important 
avenues for disinhibiting terrorists to attack and kill others as it allows the terrorist to 
view others as inhuman, thereby helping him or her to lose normal moral restraint if 
or when harming them. A pertinent example of dehumanization can be seen in one 
the examples put forth in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers, where one suicide 
bomber, referring to his would-be Israeli victims, wrote in his will that his suicide 
attack was carried out in order to “take revenge upon the sons of monkeys and the 
pigs, the Zionist infidels and the enemies of humanity” (Brooks, 2002). Cultural 
processes can also help in furthering along a process of dehumanizing others. For 
instance, education, socialization, and other cultural practices are in some situations 
able to entrench and sanction dehumanized views of other individuals and groups of 
people, while in other cases the beliefs and messages that cultural myths and 
ideologies convey may be distorted and misinterpreted by some people so that 
‘others’ from outside the culture come to be seen in a dehumanized manner. An 
illustration of the above can be seen in the examples provided by the Palestinian case 
in chapter four. As discussed in chapter three, the root of dehumanization often lies in 
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a lack of empathy for particular people. This lack of empathy can arise due to a 
variety of factors, as explained, however it can also be further heightened by group 
dynamics, especially through a manipulation of ingroup-outgroup distinctions. In this 
way, the more an ingroup perceives an outgroup as distinctly different to themselves, 
the less likely the ingroup are to develop feelings of empathy toward them.
(d) Demonization:
Linked to dehumanization, demonization has been shown to be significant in the 
disinhibition process because it helps people to view others as starkly different to 
themselves and other good, normal human beings. Noted predominantly in the fifth 
chapter, demonization is often able to come to fruition through different 
interpretations of religious teachings. Although different from dehumanization in that 
it sees victims not as animals or beasts but as representations of wickedness and 
symbols of evil, demonization is still an important disinhibitor as it has the same 
effect as dehumanization on the way in which a persons inhibitions are lowered or 
removed.
Patrick Magee: A Case In Point:
In order to show how the disinhibition process works, and how the mechanisms work 
together, a pertinent example can be found in Patrick Magee, better known as the 
IRA’s ‘Brighton Bomber’ of 1984. Magee was convicted of both planting and 
exploding the bomb that was meant to blow up the British Conservative Party’s 
conference in Brighton in October of 1984. Magee had planted the bomb 24 days 
prior to the blast, setting it with a timing device. When it detonated, the bomb killed 
five people and injured 34 others (McDonald, 2004). Instead of just killing members 
of the Conservative Party, three of those killed were wives of Ministers attending the 
conference. In subsequent interviews with Magee in the years following his arrest and 
later release from jail, much insight can be gained about the role that differing 
disinhibitors played in his decision to carry out this act against his ‘enemies’. For 
instance, Magee has remarked that one of the reasons he joined the IRA in the first 
place was that he felt morally justified in doing so – as he felt he “couldn’t just stand 
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there and do nothing” (“The Age of Terror”, 2003) while his fellow countrymen, as 
he perceived it, were being unjustly attacked. 
Aside from feeling morally justified in taking part in terrorism, Magee also displayed 
a distinct lack of empathy for his victims, at times bordering on dehumanizing them. 
It has been noted in the past that while he was “concerned not to kill or injure any of 
the staff” at the Brighton hotel, he remained unconcerned about the relatives of those 
attending the hotel’s conference: “at the time I would have seen them as part of the 
political establishment. Now I see them as innocents and I can’t justify that” 
(McDonald, 2004). On top of this, Magee also states that he saw those he classed as 
enemies as a collective “faceless enemy”, and noted that at the time “you’re seeing 
the uniform or you’re seeing the political allegiances” rather than the individual 
people themselves (“The Age of Terror”, 2003). Psychological distance between 
perpetrator and victim is also evident in Magee’s explanations of the Brighton 
bombing, as he mentions that he was not “aware” of the fact that people were actually 
injured or killed as a result of his actions (ibid). Interestingly, the effect of belonging 
to a culture that sanctions political violence can also be seen in the case of Magee, as 
he is very clear to point out that when he joined the IRA, the cultural atmosphere at 
the time was such that it seemed the “most natural thing in the world to join” the 
organization (ibid). 
From this brief case study, it can be seen that Magee was uninhibited in several 
different ways, and that some of the mechanisms evident in his discussion of 
justifying terrorism served to feed off each other. For example, his moral justification 
about joining the organization, fed in part from the cultural sanctioning of the IRA, 
led to Magee believing there was a moral justification for undertaking the Brighton 
bombing, which perhaps in turn allowed him to hold a marked lack for empathy for 
particular victims at the time. This lack of empathy was then able to help him see his 
victims in a dehumanized and deindividuated manner – as “faceless” and as part of a 
larger group rather than as individuals. In sum, from this one case alone it is clear that 
disinhibition, and not just motivation, plays an important role in terrorism, as 
Magee’s perceptions of both the situation and his victims were able to lower his 
inhibitions and psychologically allow him to undertake his now infamous terrorist 
act.
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Concluding Remarks: Implications of the Thesis and Avenues for 
Further Research: 
As this thesis has argued throughout, more attention needs to be paid to 
understanding the psychological mechanisms that lower or weaken a person’s 
inhibitions against terrorism and political violence. This work has shown that these 
mechanisms are crucial in uncovering the process behind how people are able to kill 
other human beings, and as such, one of the main implications of this thesis is that 
researching into disinhibition as an important part of understanding terrorism requires 
much more attention from political psychology experts. Once this part of terrorism is 
explained, it may then become easier to paint a more complete picture of the path to 
terrorism as a whole. By researching in greater depth the conclusions and theoretical 
concepts discussed in this thesis, knowledge on the relationship of disinhibition to 
terrorism can be more fully recognised by those seeking to understand it. In light of 
this, this thesis has also noted that the significance of both situational and individual 
contexts of terrorism are equally as important, and that more time should be invested 
in better explaining how they work and interact together.
Linked to this, another implication of this thesis has to do with the relationship of 
disinhibition and terror to counter-terrorism. Indeed, while the psychology of 
terrorism as a whole can provide insights into more effective counter-terrorism 
strategies (Crenshaw, 1990; 2000), understanding how disinhibition itself relates 
directly to terrorism also has the ability to help determine better counter-terror 
initiatives. For example, a greater understanding of how the psychological processes 
involved in the disinhibition of terrorism are cultivated and maintained may be able to 
help provide information on how to stop or reverse such powerful mechanisms of 
disinhibition as dehumanization. As Bjorgo (2005) explains, “we need insights into 
the conditions and the processes leading up to terrorist atrocities if we are to identify 
possible avenues of prevention, early intervention, or ways of breaking the vicious 
circle of terrorist revenge and counter-revenge” (p.261). In other words, realising the 
power of inhibitors and disinhibitors can give the policy-maker another perspective 
from which to view terrorism and terrorist groups. For instance, a number of scholars 
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have noted that deterring potential terrorists from entering terror groups in the first 
place should be one of the major goals of a counter-terrorist policy (Borum, 2004; 
Post, 2005a, Stevenson, 2004). An understanding of disinhibition comes directly into 
play in the achievement of this tactic, as knowledge about how cultural and religious 
sanctioning of terrorism works in different societies can serve in many cases to 
prevent such a situation from occurring. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 
particular, cultural sanctioning and the attached moral justification of terror seems to 
be one of the main disinhibitors of terrorism (Post, 2005a). As such, policies
undertaken by governments or even non-governmental organizations to counter such 
sanctioning could result in fewer people choosing the life of a terrorist. 
While a comprehensive understanding of how disinhibition impacts terrorism can 
potentially help in stopping terrorism before it begins, it can, in conjunction with 
other knowledge on such issues as motivation for terror, also help to curb terrorism if 
it is either too late for the above tactic to come into play or the policy is unsuccessful. 
For instance, knowledge of disinhibiting mechanisms can provide insights into how 
terrorists and terrorist groups perceive the world around them, their enemies, and how 
they are able to actually go through with harming others. As such, disinhibition helps 
us address the process of terrorism, as well as dealing with the root causes of it rather 
than just its symptoms. Indeed, as Sinai (2005) notes, understanding the processes 
and root causes involved in terror helps in countering terrorist groups because it aids 
in predicting what kind of target a particular group is aiming to attack as well as the 
“degree of lethality in its warfare” (p.217). 
As was noted in the example of Patrick Magee, it can be seen that while he was 
motivated by various political grievances, it was the disinhibition process that 
allowed him to see through his motivation and undertake his bombing attack. In other 
words, an understanding of disinhibition shows us that while motivations of terrorism 
need to be addressed and fixed, the inhibitions that keep violence in place are also in 
dire need of being addressed if a counter-terrorism policy is to fully eradicate, or at 
the very least curtail, particular terrorists and terrorist groups.
From the above implications, it is clear that this thesis is able to provide avenues for 
further research into the psychology of terrorism. For example, in order to lend more 
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validity to the conclusions of this work, different terrorist groups could be applied to 
the same theoretical framework articulated here. As well as this, perhaps the one of 
the most important implications of this thesis is that further research should focus 
more on an examination into the relationship between motivation and disinhibition 
for terrorists. In other words, research should be undertaken to see how motivators 
and disinhibiting mechanisms interact with each other, especially within cultural and 
religious contexts, so the two can be better differentiated and explained. Aside from 
these two possible avenues for further research, one other very important avenue
should look at an examination of counter-terrorism in light of what this study on 
disinhibition has uncovered, as disinhibition helps to explain many of the 
psychological underpinnings in relation to how terrorism gradually becomes justified 
in the eyes of the terrorist. 
However, perhaps the most important avenue for further research lies in applying and 
correcting the problems and obstacles this thesis has run into. For instance, earlier in 
this thesis it was mentioned that a lack of firsthand information regarding the 
illustrative cases may be remedied using a process of interviewing rather than relying 
on information already in existence. While it was noted that interviewing was 
unrealistic for this thesis, further research including such interviewing should be an 
option for future, more detailed work in this area. Following from this, it may, as 
noted, lend more external validity to further research if more than two illustrative 
cases are studied, as a wider and more complete picture of terrorists and different 
terrorist groups may be able to be gained.
As well as this, further research should also seek to work on the problems that can be 
found in the model this thesis has built. For example, further research may be able to 
unearth more disinhibitory mechanisms or discover new ways from which to 
understand the disinhibition process so that a better model can be created that more 
fully demonstrates the relationship between mechanisms and how they interact so as 
to push disinhibition as a process further along. In addition, it may be pertinent to 
research deeper into the psychological effects of culture and religion. Although 
chapters four and five articulated how culture and religion fit into the process of 
disinhibition in terrorism, perhaps more research is still needed on these topics to 
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provide a better explanation of how they fit in with other disinhibiting mechanisms, 
and how important they truly are in the disinhibition process as a whole.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the role that disinhibition plays in enabling terrorism is one that should 
not be underestimated by researchers studying the psychology of terrorism. Through 
an examination of this concept and its relation to terrorism, it has been shown that 
disinhibition is an extremely significant part of understanding terrorism as a whole, 
and that there are numerous disinhibitory mechanisms which both work together and 
feed off each other that help to enable potential terrorists to become actual terrorists. 
Of these mechanisms, perhaps dehumanization and attribution of blame are the most 
recognized; however this thesis has brought together many other just as important 
mechanisms, such as cultural sanctioning, demonization, and mechanisms that come 
into play in group situations. It nearly goes without saying that terrorism is a problem 
that has plagued and will continue to plague our entire world, having already 
horrifically affected an infinite amount of people from all across the globe. As such, it 
is only with a complete understanding of all the facets of terrorism – including the 
psychological aspects examined here – that this problem can be slowly eliminated. 
Thus, this thesis has been an attempt to start or inspire a process of in-depth inquiry 
into the theoretical underpinnings of terrorist psychology in the hopes that the 
problem of terrorism may have a better chance at being more effectively dealt with by 
those who seek to understand and counter it. 
128
128
REFERENCES
•Abu-Amr, Z. (1994). Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
•Ahmed-Ullah, N. and Barker, K. (2004). “Schooled in jihad: Clerics block education 
reform in Pakistan”. Chicago Tribune, November 28.
•Alonso, R. (2001). “The Modernization in Irish Republican Thinking Toward the 
Utility of Violence”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, v24 pp.131-144.
•Andoni, L. (1997). “Searching for answers: Gaza’s Suicide Bombers”. Journal of 
Palestine Studies, v26, i4.
•Apter, D. (1990). “A View from the Bogside”. In Giliomee, H. and Gagiano, J. The 
Elusive Search for Peace: South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland. Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press.
•Arthur, P. (1997). “ “Reading” Violence: Ireland”. In Apter, D. (Ed). The 
Legitimation of Violence. London: Macmillan Press.
•Atran, S. (2003a). “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism”. Science, v299 i5612
•Atran, S (2003b). “Who wants to be a Martyr”. The New York Times, May 5.
•Bairner, A. (1986). “The battlefield of ideas: the legitimation of political violence in 
Northern Ireland”. European Journal of Political Research v14 pp.633-649.
•Bandura, A. (2004). “The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism”. In Moghaddam, F. and Marsella, A. (Eds). Understanding 
129
129
Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions. 
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
•Bandura, A. et al. (1996).  “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the exercise of 
Moral Agency”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, v71 i2.
•Bandura, A. (1990). “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement”. In Reich, W. Origins 
of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of Mind. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
•Bandura, A. (1986). Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive 
Theory. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
•Bandura, A., Underwood, B., and Fromson, M. (1975). “Disinhibition of Aggression 
through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims”. Journal
of Research in Personality, v9 pp.253-269.
•Bandura, A (1973). Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis. New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall.
•Barner-Barry, C. and Rosenwein, R. (1985). Psychological Perspectives on Politics. 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
•Bar-Tal, D. (1997). “The Monopolization of Patriotism”. In Bar-Tal, D and Staub, E. 
(Eds). Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations. Chicago: Nelson-
Hall Publishers.
•Bartholet, J. (1995). “A guaranteed trip to heaven”. Newsweek, v125 i17.
•Batson, C.D., et al. (1997a). “Empathy and Attitudes: Can Feeling for a Member of a 
Stigmatized Group Improve Feelings Toward the Group?”. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology v72 i1.
130
130
•Batson, C.D, et al. (1997b). “Is Empathy-Induced Helping Due to Self-Other 
Merging?”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology v73 i3.
•Battersby, J. (1995). “A Boy Bomber Changes His Mind”. Christian Science 
Monitor, v.87 i97.
•Baumeister, R. (1999). Evil: Inside Human Cruelty and Violence. New York: W. H. 
Freeman and Company.
•Beck, A. (2002). “Prisoners of Hate”. Behaviour Research and Therapy, v40 i3.
•Beck, A. (1999). Prisoners of Hate: The Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility and 
Violence. New York: Harper Collins. 
•Bell, J. B. (1992). “Career Moves: Reflections on the Irish Gunman”. Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, v15 pp.69-88.
•Bell, J. B. (1970). The Secret Army. Great Britain: Anthony Blond Ltd.
•Bennett, W. L. (1980). Public Opinion in American Politics. New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich.
•Berkowitz, L. (1999). “Evil is more than banal: Situationism and the concept of 
evil”. Personality and Social Psychology Review, v3 i3.
•Berkowitz, L. (1993). Aggression: Its causes, consequences and control. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
•Berkowitz, L. (1962). Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.
•Berlet, C. (2004) Dehumanization and Demonization. Retrieved from : 
www.publiceye.org/tooclose/scapegoating-01.html, March 2005.
131
131
•Bernard, V., Ottenberg, P, and Redl, F. (1971). “Dehumanization”. In Sanford and 
Comstock (Eds), Sanctions for Evil. Boston: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
•Bjorgo, T. (2005). “Conclusions”. In Bjorgo, T. (Ed). Root Causes of Terrorism: 
Myths, reality and ways forward. London: Routledge.
•Bloom, M. (2004). “Palestinian suicide bombing: public support, market share, and 
outbidding”. Political Science Quarterly, v119 i1.
•Boakes, R. and Halliday, M (Eds). (1972). Inhibition and Learning. London: 
Academic Press.
•Borum, R. (2004). Psychology of Terrorism. Tampa: University of South Florida. 
Internet Access: www.mipt.org/pdf/Psychology-of-Terrorism.pdf .
•Brewer, M. (1999). “The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup 
Hate?”. Journal of Social Issues, v55 i3.
•Brooks, D. (2002). “Culture of Martyrdom: How suicide bombing became not just a 
means but an end”. The Atlantic Monthly, v289 i6.
•Burdman, D. (2003). “Education, Indoctrination and Incitement: Palestinian 
Children on Their Way to Martyrdom”. Terrorism and Political Violence, v15 
i1.
•Burns, J. (1999). “RUC makes fresh arrests over Omagh bombing: Northern Ireland 
dissident Republican among four more men held”. Financial Times, February 
23.
•Chen, Z. et al. (1996). “Groupthink: Deciding with the leader and the devil”. The 
Psychological Record, 46 i4.
•Coogan, T. (2002). The IRA (Fully Revised and Updated). New York: Palgrave.
132
132
•Coogan, T. (1995). The IRA (Revised Edition). London: Harper Collins. 
•Coogan, T. (1993). The IRA. London: Harper Collins.
•Crenshaw, M. (1990). “The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of 
strategic choice”. In Reich, W. (Ed). Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, 
ideologies, states of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
•Crenshaw, M. (1988). “The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist”. In Slater, R., and 
Stohl, M. (Eds). Current Perspectives on International Terrorism. London: 
The Macmillan Press.
•Cronin, S. (1980). Irish Nationalism. Dublin: The Academy Press.
•Dager, E. (1971). “Introduction”. In Dager, E. (ed). Socialization: Process, Product, 
and Change. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.
•Davies, J. C. (1963). Human Nature in Politics. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc.
•Davis, J. M. (2003). Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle 
East. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
•Diener, E. (1979). “Deindividuation, Self-Awareness, and Disinhibition”. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology v37 i7.
•Diener, E. (1977). “Deindividuation: Causes and Consequences”. Social Behaviour 
and Personality v5 i1.
•Diener, E. (1976). “Effects of Prior Destructive Behaviour, Anonymity, and Group 
Presence on Deindividuation and Aggression”. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology v33 i5.
•Dillon, M. (1994). The Enemy Within. London: Doubleday.
133
133
•Drake, C. (1998). “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection”. Terrorism 
and Political Violence v10 i2.
•Esposito, J. (2002). Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
•Ganor, B. (1998). “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s 
Freedom Fighter?” www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm
•Gerring, J. (1997). “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis”. Political Research 
Quarterly v50 pp957-994.
•Gopin, M. (2000). Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, 
Violence, and Peacemaking. New York: Oxford University Press.
•Hammami, R. and Tamari, S. (2001). “The Second Uprising: End or New 
Beginning?”. Journal of Palestine Studies v30 i2.
•Harkabi, Y. (1971) Arab Attitudes to Israel (trans. Misha Louvish). New York: Hart 
Publishing Company.
•Hart, P. (1999). “The Social Structure of the Irish Republican Army, 1916-1923”. 
The Historical Journal v42 i1.
•Hassan, N. (2001). “An Arsenal of Believers”. The New Yorker, v77 i36 
•Heskin, K. (1980). Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis. Dublin: Gill and 
Macmillan.
•Hirsch, H. (1985). “Why People Kill: Conditions for participation in mass murder”. 
International Journal of Group Tensions, v15 pp.41-57.
•Hoffman, B. (2003). “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism”. The Atlantic Monthly, v291
i5.
134
134
•Hudson, R. (1999). “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism”. Library of 
Congress Federal Research Division. Retrieved from www.loc.gov/rr/frd/. 
•Janis, I. (1972). Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
•Juergensmeyer, M. (2004). “Holy Orders: Religious Opposition to Modern States”. 
Harvard International Review v25 i4.
•Juergensmeyer, M. (2000a). “Understanding the New Terrorism”. Current History
v99 i636.
•Juergensmeyer, M. (2000b). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of 
Religious Violence. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
•Juergensmeyer, M. (1996). “The worldwide rise of religious nationalism”. Journal of 
International Affairs v50 i1.
•Karmon, E. (2003).  “The Role of Terrorism in the Breakdown of the Israeli-
Palestinian Peace Process”. 
www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=485 .
•Keen, S. (1986). Faces of the Enemy. San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers.
•Kelman, H. (1997). “Nationalism, Patriotism, and National Identity: Social-
Psychological Dimensions”. In Bar-Tal, D. and Staub, E. (Eds). Patriotism in 
the Lives of Individuals and Nations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.
•Kelman, H. (1973). “Violence Without Moral Restrain”. Journal of Social Issues
v29 pp.25-61.
•Kelman, H. and Hamilton, V.  (1989). Crimes of Obedience: Toward a social 
psychology of authority and responsibility. New Haven: Yale University 
Press.
135
135
•Kimhi, S., and Even, S. (2004). Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?. Paper 
presented at the International Society of Political Psychology Twenty-Seventh 
Annual Scientific Meeting in Lund, Sweden.
•Kingston, S. (1995). “Terrorism, the Media, and the Northern Ireland Conflict”. 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism v18 pp203-231.
•Kinsella, S. (1994). “The Cult of Violence and the Revolutionary Tradition in 
Ireland”. Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review v83 i329.
•Kressel, N. (1996). Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror. New York: 
Plenum Press.
•Kushner, H. (1996). “Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual”. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism v19 pp329-337.
•Laqueur, W. (1999). The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass 
Destruction. New York: Oxford University Press.
•Laqueur, W. (1987).  The Age of Terrorism. Boston: Little, Brown.
•Larsson, J.P. (2004). Understanding Religious Violence. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
•Lavery, B. (2002). “IRA Apologizes for Civilian Deaths in Its 30-Year Campaign”. 
New York Times, July 17.
•Lincoln, B. (2003). Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
•Litvak, M. (2002). “The Palestine Islamic Jihad: Background Information”. Tel Aviv 
Notes (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies). Retrieved via www.tau.ac.il/jcss, 
2004.
•Luft, G. (2002). “The Palestinian H-Bomb”. Foreign Affairs, v81 i4.
136
136
•MacStiofain, S. (1975). Memoirs of a Revolutionary. Edinburgh: R & R Clark Ltd.
•McDonald, H. (2004). “Brighton bomber says attack helped Irish peace process”. 
The Observer, September 12, 2004.
•McGartland, M. (1997). Fifty Dead Men Walking. London: Blake Publishing.
•McGuire, M. (1973). To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA. London: 
Macmillan.
•McTernan, O. (2003). Violence in God’s Name: Religion in an Age of Conflict. New 
York: Orbis Books. 
•Marsella, A. (2004). “Reflections on International Terrorism: Issues, Concepts, and 
Directions”. In Moghaddam, F. and Marsella, A. (Eds). Understanding 
Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions. 
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
•Mayer, J. (2001). “Cults, Violence and Religious Terrorism: An International 
Perspective”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, v24 pp.361-376. 
•Merari, A. (2005). “Social, organizational and psychological factors in suicide 
terrorism”. In Bjorgo, T. (Ed). Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and 
ways forward. London: Routledge.
•Merari, A. (1990). “The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal terrorism in the Middle 
East”. In Reich, W. (Ed). Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, 
States of Mind. New York: Cambridge Press.
•Milgrim, S. (1974). Obedience to Authority: An experimental view. USA: Harper and 
Row Publishers.
•Miller, P. and Eisenberg, N. (1988). “The Relation of Empathy to Aggressive and 
Externalizing/Antisocial Behaviour”. Psychological Bulletin, v103 i3.
137
137
•Milton-Edwards, B. (1996). Islamic Politics in Palestine. London: Tauris Academic 
Studies.
•Moghadam, A. (2003). “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: 
Motivations and Organizational Aspects”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
v26 pp.65-92.
•Moghaddam, F. (2004). “Cultural Preconditions for Potential Terrorist Groups: 
Terrorism and Societal Change”. In Moghaddam, F. and Marsella, A. (Eds). 
Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and 
Interventions. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
•Morgan, M. (2004). “The Origins of the New Terrorism”. Parameters, v34 i1.
•Moxon-Browne, E. (1993). “Terrorism in Northern Ireland: the Case of the 
Provisional IRA”. In Wilkinson, P. (Ed). Terrorism: British Perspectives. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company.
•Nabulsi, K. (2003). “Being Palestinian”. Government and Opposition v38 i4.
•O’Brien, C. (1994). Ancestral Voices: Religion and Nationalism in Ireland. Dublin: 
Poolbeg Press.
•O’Doherty, M. (1998). The Trouble with Guns: Republican Strategy and the 
Provisional IRA. Belfast: The Blackstaff Press.
•Paletz, D. and Entman, R. (1981). Media, Power, Politics. New York: Free Press.
•Picard, R. (1991). “How Violence is Justified: Sinn Fein’s An Phoblacht”. Journal of 
Communication v41 i4.
•Pizarro, D. (2000). “Nothing More than Feelings? The Role of Emotions in Moral 
Judgment”. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour v30 i4.
138
138
•Post, J. (2005a). “Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism”. Joint Force 
Quarterly no.37.
Post, J. (2005b). “The socio-cultural underpinnings of terrorist psychology: When 
hatred is bred in the bone”. In Bjorgo, T. (Ed). Root Causes of Terrorism: 
Myths, reality and ways forward. London: Routledge.
•Post, J. (1990). “Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of 
psychological forces”. In Reich, W. (Ed). Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, 
ideologies, theologies, states of mind. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
•Post, J. (1987). “Group and Organizational Dynamics of Political Terrorism: 
Implications for Counterterrorist Policy”. In Wilkinson, P. and Stewart, A. 
(Eds). Contemporary Research on Terrorism. Great Britain: Aberdeen 
University Press.
•Post, J., Sprinzak, E., Denny, L. (2003). “The Terrorists in Their Own Words: 
Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle East Terrorists”. Terrorism and 
Political Violence v15 i1.
•Postmes, T., and Spears, R. (1998). “Deindividuation and Antinormative Behaviour: 
A Meta-Analysis”. Psychological Bulletin, v123 i3.
•Radu, M. (2002). “Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges”. Orbis
v46 i2.
•Ranstorp, M. (1996). “Terrorism in the Name of Religion”. Journal of International 
Affairs, v50 i1.
•Rapoport, D. (2001). “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism”. 
Current History v100 i650.
139
139
•Rapoport, D. (1992). “Some General Observations on Religion and Violence”. In 
Juergensmeyer, M. (Ed). Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World. 
London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.
•Rapoport, D. (1987). “Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror?”. In 
Wilkinson, P. and Stewart, A. (Eds). Contemporary Research on Terrorism. 
Great Britain: Aberdeen University Press. 
•Reich, W. (Ed) (1990). Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of 
Mind. New York: Cambridge Press. 
•Reicher, S. (1982). “The determination of collective behaviour”. In Tajfel, H. (Ed). 
Social Identity and Intergroup Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
•Robins, R. and Post, J. (1997). Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.
•Sanford, N., and Comstock, C. (Eds). (1971). Sanctions for Evil. Boston: Jossey-
Bass Publishers. 
•Schweitzer, Y. (2000). “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Characteristics”. 
Retrieved May 2004 from www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=112. 
•Sharrock, D. and Devenport, M. (1997). Man of War, Man of Peace? The 
Unauthorized Biography of Gerry Adams. London: Macmillan Publishers.
•Shinar, D. (1987). Palestinian Voices: Communication and Nation-Building in the 
West Bank. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
•Silke, A. (2003a). “Beyond Horror: Terrorist Atrocity and the Search for 
Understanding – The Case of the Shankill Bombing”. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, v26 pp.37-60. 
140
140
•Silverman, A. (2002). “Just war, Jihad, and terrorism: A comparison of western and 
Islamic norms for the use of political violence”. Journal of Church and State
v44 i1.
•Simon, B. (May 25, 2003). “Mind of the Suicide Bomber”. www.cbsnews.com/
•Simon, S. and Benjamin, D. (2000). “America and the New Terrorism”. Survival, 
v42 i1.
•Sinai, J. (2005). “A conceptual framework for resolving terrorism’s root causes”. In 
Bjorgo, T. (Ed). Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and the way 
forward. London: Routledge.
•Smith, M. (1995). Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish 
Republican Movement. London: Routledge.
•Stahelski, A. (2004). “Terrorists Are Made, Not Born: Creating Terrorists Using 
Social Psychological Conditioning”. Retrieved from: 
www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/stahelski.html, February 2005.
•Staub, E. (1999). “The Roots of Evil: Social Conditions, Culture, Personality, and 
Basic Human Needs”. Personality and Social Psychology Review, v3 i3.
•Stern, P. (1995). “Why Do People Sacrifice for their Nations?”. Political Psychology
v16 i2.
•Sternberg, R. (2003). “A Duplex Theory of Hate: Development and Application to 
Terrorism, Massacres and Genocide”. Review of General Psychology, v7 i3. 
•Stevenson, J. (2004). Counter-terrorism: Containment and Beyond (Adelphi Paper 
367). London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies.
141
141
•Struch, N. and Schwartz, S. (1989). “Intergroup Aggression: Its Predictors and 
Distinctness From In-Group Bias”. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, v56 i3.
•“Suicide Bombers: dignity, despair and the need for hope: an interview with Eyad El 
Sarraj”. (2002). Journal of Palestine Studies, v31 i4. 
•Tal, N. (2002). “Suicide Attacks: Israel and Islamic Terrorism”. Strategic 
Assessment v5 i1, www.tau.ac.il/jcss/
•“The Age of Terror” [DVD]. (2003). United Kingdom: Discovery Communications 
Europe.
•“The IRA and Sinn Fein” (1998). 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/mac.html .
•The Joint Group on Social Questions. (1976). Violence in Ireland: A Report to the 
Churches. Ireland: Christian Journals Ltd. and Veritas Publications.
•Toolis, K. (1995). Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within the IRA’s Soul. New York: St 
Martins Press.
•Valenty, L. (2004). “Organizational Behaviour Theory and the Socialization of the 
Suicide Terrorist”. Paper presented at the International Society of Political 
Psychology, Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting, Lund, Sweden.
•Victor, B. (2003). Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide 
Bombers. USA: Rodale Inc.
•Waller, J. (2002). Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and 
Mass Killing. New York: Oxford University Press.
•Wilkinson, P. (1982). “The Provisional IRA: An Assessment in the Wake of the 
1981 Hunger Strike”. Government and Opposition, v17 i2.
142
142
•Wilkinson, P. (1974). Political Terrorism. London: The Macmillan Press.
•Windmiller, M. (1980). “Introduction”. In Windmiller, M., Lambert, N. and Turiel, 
E. (Eds). Moral Development and Socialization. Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc.
•Windmiller, M., Lambert, N., and Turiel, E. (Eds) (1980). Moral Development and 
Socialization. Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc.
•Wright, J. (1990). “PIRA Propaganda: The Construction of Legitimacy”. Conflict 
Quarterly v10 i3.
•www.anphoblacht.com, 2005
•www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/educ.htm, 2004
•www.haaretz.com, May 2, 2004 
•www.hamasonline.com, 2004 
•www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7941.pdf, December 2001
•www.reuters.co.uk, May 2, 2004 
•www.scoilnet.ie, 2005
•www.un.org.secureworld/report.pdf, 2004
•Zimbardo, P. (2003). “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: 
Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators”. 
Retrieved March 2004 via 
www.zimbardo.com/downloads/2003%20Evil%20Chapter.pdf
•Zimbardo, P. (2000). “The Psychology of Evil”. Eye on Psi Chi (Fall 2000).
143
143
•Zimbardo, P. (1999). Transforming People into Perpetrators of Evil. Sonoma State 
University: Holocaust Studies Center (1999 Holocaust Lectures).
